


Ly 13K Desk

Vol. VII No. 3. 1959



TASHKENT

CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

A quarterly review of cultural developments in
the six Muslim republics of the Soviet Union.



Issued by the Central Asian Research Centre in association with
St. Antony's College (Oxford) Soviet Affairs Study Group.



BUKHARA

CIA Library
M

8708

1433

CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW and other papers issued by the Central Asian Research Centre are under the general editorship of Geoffrey Wheeler, 66 King's Road, London, S.W.3, and David Footman, St. Antony's College, Oxford.

CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW aims at presenting a coherent and objective picture of cultural developments in the six Muslim Soviet Socialist Republics of Azerbaydzhan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kirgizia and Kazakhstan. The subjects treated include history, geography, demography, the arts, education, irrigation and communications.

In addition, the *REVIEW* analyses past and current Soviet publications on the countries bordering on or adjacent to these republics, namely, Persia, Afghanistan, the Indian sub-continent, Tibet and Sinkiang.

The subscription rate is Thirty Shillings per year, plus two shillings postage. The price of single copies is Seven Shillings and Sixpence, plus Sixpence postage.

Distribution Agents :

Messrs. Luzac & Co. Ltd.,
46, Great Russell Street,
LONDON, W.C.1.

Price : Seven Shillings & Sixpence

Library

CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

CONTENTS

	Page
Central Asia	
Russia and Asia	209
The Peoples of Central Asia : Social Customs	213
Stabilization of the Nomads	221
Foraging in Khorasan	230
The Basmachis : The Central Asian Resistance Movement, 1918-24	236
Recent Literature in Central Asia	251
Savings and Social Security	259
News Digest : Administrative and Territorial Changes, The Arts, Conferences, Geography, Party Changes, Population, Religion, Social Conditions, Transport and Communications	270
Borderlands of Soviet Central Asia	
Current Soviet Writing on India	279
Soviet Views on Modern Indian Historiography	282
Afghanistan : The Pashtunistan Problem	291
An Afghan Magazine	301
News Diary : Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Sinkiang.	303

Maps

Principal theatres of operations between Soviet forces and the Basmachis	facing page	238
Asia's western frontier	"	274
The Pathan tribes of the North-West Frontier Province	" "	293
Soviet Socialist Republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan	at end	

Abbreviations

Abbreviations used in the Review when referring to the Soviet Academies of Sciences, and to newspapers and periodicals etc. employed as sources, are as follows :-

AN/SSSR	Akademiya Nauk (Academy of Sciences) of USSR
AN/Kaz. SSR	" " " " " " " " Kazakh SSR
AN/Kirg. SSR	" " " " " " " " Kirgiz SSR
AN/Tad. SSR	" " " " " " " " Tadzhik SSR
AN/Turk. SSR	" " " " " " " " Turkmen SSR
AN/Uzb. SSR	" " " " " " " " Uzbek SSR
SAGU	Sredneaziatskiy Gosudarstvennyy Universitet (Central Asian State University)
BR	Bakinskiy Rabochiy
FET	Far East Trade
KP	Kazakhstanskaya Pravda
KT	Kommunist Tadzhikistana
KZ	Krasnaya Zvezda
NT	New Times
P	Pravda
PV	Pravda Vostoka
SK	Sovetskaya Kirgiziya
SU	Soviet Union
T	The Times
TI	Turkmenskaya Iskra
VVS	Vedemosti Verkhovnogo Soveta

CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

VOL. VII, NO. 3

RUSSIA AND ASIA

Since 1955 three new periodicals dealing with Asian affairs and studies have appeared in the Soviet Union: SOVETSKOYE VOSTOKOVEDENIYE (Soviet Orientalism); SOVETSKOYE KITAYEVEDENIYE (Soviet Sinology); and SOVREMENNYY VOSTOK (The Modern East). This fact, together with the wide range of subjects treated in these periodicals, bears testimony to the great and growing interest taken by the Soviet Union in Asia. This year sees the beginning of yet another journal - PROBLEMY VOSTOKOVEDENIYA (Problems of Orientalism), which constitutes an amalgamation of the first two of the journals already mentioned. This in itself is a development of considerable significance, for it seems that the Soviet Government now wishes the whole of Asia to be dealt with in one academic periodical. SOVREMENNYY VOSTOK has from the beginning been a much more popular publication and will presumably remain so.

Elsewhere in this issue of CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW will be found a brief note describing the latest Soviet definition of the USSR's Asian frontiers. This serves as a reminder of a fact which is often overlooked - that a very large part of Asia - rather more than one-third - lies inside Soviet territory and, apart from the many millions of Russian colonists, is peopled by Asian races. This Soviet Asian territory abuts on the Middle East, on South Asia and on China. It is not surprising, therefore, that Asian affairs are a matter of great concern to the Soviet Government.

It is only during the past three or four years that the western academic world has paid any serious attention to Russia as an authority on Asian affairs and as a competitor with the West for the mentorship of Asian countries. Western governments, and particularly that of Britain, have of course been aware of Russia's potentiality as an Asian power for well over a century. But with very few exceptions western orientalist have ignored the huge and important output of Russian publications on Asian subjects. The neglect of this matter is calculated to have serious consequences since much of Soviet writing and thinking on eastern affairs is contained in publications which do not ordinarily come under the scrutiny of sovietologists and

which in any case require an expert knowledge of Asia seldom possessed by sovietologists.

Good examples of the important light thrown on Soviet Asian policy in Soviet academic literature can be found in the articles which appeared in SOVETSKOYE VOSTOKOVEDENIYE and PROBLEMY VOSTOKOVEDENIYA after the XXth and XXIst Party Congresses, and in the report of the activities during 1958 of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, which appeared in VOPROSY ISTORII, No.4 of 1959. The first of these publications was analysed in detail in CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, Vol.IV, No.4 of 1956, and the last two in the MIZAN NEWSLETTER of May 1959. The significance of writing of this kind may be apprehended from the following quotations taken from MIZAN:

"SOVETSKOYE VOSTOKOVEDENIYE, No.1 of 1956, in an account of the tasks laid down by the XXth Congress, called for a reassessment of the political role of the national bourgeoisie in eastern countries, citing India and the Arab countries as examples of countries where the national bourgeoisie had been at the front of the anti-imperialist struggle. The journal deplored the fact that 'the dialectical conception of the dual nature of the national bourgeoisie has been replaced by a one-sided conception of it as the faithful ally of imperialism in the struggle against the working masses'. In accordance with the new favourable assessment of the national bourgeoisie, subsequent Soviet writing on the national movements of eastern countries has in general found praise for the role of the bourgeoisie in these movements.

"In contrast with this, according to VOPROSY ISTORII, No. 4 of 1959, the Deputy Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies now complains that in Soviet orientalists' work during 1958 'a sufficiently penetrating light has not yet been thrown on such questions as the essential opposition between the working-class and the national bourgeoisie, class distinctions among peasants, the part played by the national bourgeoisie in the exploitation of the peasantry, the connection of the national bourgeoisie with foreign capital, the political parties of the bourgeoisie, their ideology, strategy and tactics at the present stage, and their attitude towards the socialist camp and towards the international communist and workers' movement."

Although there can be no doubt that far too little attention has been paid to these matters in the past, there are encouraging signs that their importance and the need for greater collaboration between Soviet and Asian specialists is at last beginning to dawn on the Western and particularly on the American academic world. During 1957 a careful enquiry into the state of oriental studies in the Soviet Union was carried out by Professor Rodger Swearingen of the University of Southern California and the result published in the JOURNAL,

ASIAN STUDIES, Vol.XVII, No.3 of May 1958. In 1958 a conference on The Soviet Union and Asia was held at Bad Aussee under the auspices of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Ost, and in June this year a conference on Soviet-Asian Relations was held at Los Angeles under the auspices of the University of Southern California. There have also been a number of books dealing with different aspects of Soviet policy in Asia, of which Walter Laqueur's important work *THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MIDDLE EAST* is the latest. But there is still a great deal of leeway to be made up; and there is still lacking the breadth of view which distinguished Lobanov-Rostovski's excellent but all too brief work *RUSSIA AND ASIA*.

Both the conferences just alluded to gave rise to much interesting and fruitful discussion and brought to light certain important facts as well as some limitations. There was Asian representation at both conferences; that at Los Angeles was much stronger than at Bad Aussee, but still not nearly strong enough. Indeed, at both conferences it was clear that by most of the western nations represented, Asia was considered to be that part of the continent lying east of the Great Wall of China and south of the Himalayas. The Middle East and Pakistan were barely mentioned; Mongolia, Tibet and Sinkiang touched upon only very lightly; and, most curious of all, consideration of the large part of Asia made up of Siberia, Kazakhstan, Soviet Central Asia and Transcaucasia was confined to observations that far too little research had been done on these areas.

It is of course obvious that no single conference could hope to deal in any detail with the whole range of Soviet relations with Asia, and also that, from the American point of view, East Asia poses problems of particular urgency. Nevertheless, the undoubted fact that Russia's concern with Asia derives from her territorial possession of more than one-third of it deserves more consideration than it has so far received.

CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW has more than once referred to the need to bridge the gap which exists between Soviet and oriental studies and it makes no apology for returning to the subject again. In the United States more progress has been made in this than elsewhere, but only in respect of the Far East: there are a respectable number of American specialists in Chinese and Japanese affairs who are also familiar with Russian and have a good knowledge of Soviet affairs. In spite of this, however, no systematic and cumulative study of Soviet writing on the Far East seems so far to have been undertaken. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that in matters subject to such incessant changes as Soviet policy in Asia, the prime need is for steady and constant research, the results of which are published at regular intervals. The Central Asian Research Centre is endeavouring to do this for Soviet Central Asia and its immediate borderlands, and in *THE MIZAN NEWSLETTER* has recently extended its scope to the Middle East. But there is a large amount of significant Soviet literature on other Soviet and non-Soviet areas of Asia such as Transcaucasia, Siberia, Mongolia, and Korea, not to speak of China and

Japan, which has so far escaped regular scrutiny, or on which regular information is still not readily available. There is still a dangerous tendency on the part of western orientalists, and particularly of those who cannot read Russian, to underestimate the importance of this literature. It should surely by now have become clear that the critical situation in which the West now finds itself is at least in part due to its persistent minimizing of Soviet ability.

Nuclear Research in Central Asia

Not far from Tashkent the Institute of Nuclear Physics of the Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan is building a nuclear research reactor - the first in Central Asia. The reactor and its accompanying laboratories were due to be completed by the end of June. The apparatus will be used for research into the peaceful uses of atomic energy and for the production of isotopes. The preparations leading up to practical work on the reactor are being carried out by scientists from Uzbekistan, Moscow and Leningrad.

Near the reactor a village is being constructed. It will contain living quarters, creches, a kindergarten, a school, a sports stadium and swimming-pool.

P. 5. 6.59

Lenin Prizes for Central Asians

Lenin Prizes this year were awarded to two natives of Central Asia, the Kazakh author M.O. Auezov for his novel PUT' ABAYA, and President of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences and corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Kh.M. Abdullayev, for his scientific studies published in 1954 and 1957 on the role of granitoids in post-magmatic ore formation.

P. 22. 4.59

Medical progress in Kirgizia

The fourth medical institute in Kirgizia, an institute of onchology and radiology, was recently opened in Frunze.

During the period 1959-65 research institutes of endocrinology, blood-transfusion, maternity and paediatrics will be opened in the republic.

SK. 6. 5.59

THE PEOPLES OF CENTRAL ASIA:

SOCIAL CUSTOMS

A large part of this subject has been covered by the previous article in this series on the position of Islam (CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, Vol.VII, No.1), and the present article deals with customs of more markedly "secular" character. For a more detailed examination of past and present customs in specific areas, the reader is referred to "The Social Structure and Customs of the Kazakhs", CAR, Vol.V, No.1 and "The Survival of Religious and Social Customs in Uzbekistan", CAR, Vol.VI, No.1. Additional information on the problem of women is to be found in "The Position of Women", CAR, Vol.I, No.3 and "Crime Without Punishment", CAR, Vol.II, No.1.

. . .

A mixture of the old and the new prevails in the social customs of Central Asia as in all other aspects of its life. One of the most important factors in revolutionizing its social customs as a whole has been the suppression of nomadism and the subsequent adaptation of the nomads to the settled way of life, in which some of the customs of nomad communities have little chance to survive. The social customs of this vast area are being reshaped to conform with the Soviet code of behaviour and the consequent decline of old customs among the younger generation is far advanced, particularly in towns.

Soviet literature on the subject divides the vast domain of social customs into two groups. The ones which are considered useful or at least harmless are described as "national" and it is even claimed that "in the years of Soviet rule they have developed further".(1) Among the ones which allegedly have benefited by Soviet mentorship are hospitality and, rather surprisingly, respect for older people. But customs incompatible with the modern way of life and, what is worse, too obviously connected with religion are branded as "feudal-bay survivals". The evident purpose of this description is twofold: first of all it suggests that they did not originate among the lower classes of Central Asian society, which since time immemorial are supposed to have displayed their progressive character by their friendly disposal towards the great Russian people; secondly, it serves as a reminder that the "feudal" bays were the creators of these obnoxious customs and represented the forces of reaction and obscurantism in Central Asia. The field covered by this phrase is impressive: "To this category belong feudal-clan survivals, survivals of the feudal-bay attitude to women, survivals of Islam as the ideology of the ruling class of pre-revolutionary Kazakhstan and survivals of the nomadic way of life".(2) These

survivals are at present more pronounced in the village than in the town. "The socialist town sets an example to the village. . . . Even at the present stage of evolution, however, old customs and traditions still persist in the village. This explains why in the villages and auls one meets more often than in the towns with manifestations of the feudal-bay attitude to women, bigamy, marriage of adolescent girls, and the kalym" (bride price). (3) The People's Courts of the South-Kazakhstan oblast in 1955 alone dealt with 109 criminal cases of "feudal-bay" survivals and it is interesting to note that over 90 per cent of the culprits were country people: 85 of them were kolkhozniks, four tractor and combine drivers, two teachers, three kolkhoz bookkeepers and "brigade" leaders.

The official division of customs into "national" and "feudal-bay" has resulted in confusion among the uninitiated: KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA of 31.12.58 complains, "there are still cases of attempts to represent survivals of the past as national traditions and to preserve and cultivate them instead of struggling for their destruction. . . . People are still found who regard the drinking of tea from one bowl by a whole party and eating with the hands from a common dish as national traditions." Dosmukhamed Kshibekov, Kazakhstan's censor of morals, regards the latter practice as a nomadic survival and admits that it is still done, even among the intelligentsia. (5)

In no other field is the modernization of Central Asia as striking as in the position of women and consequently in family life. Once women were treated with scorn and called "long hair and short brains", or "ozhiza, zaif" (useless, weak). Proverbs declared, "woman must not have a will, nor a slave - memories" "a son is wealth, a daughter - a burden". Often unwanted daughters were given humiliating names: Doyduk (we have enough), Besdir (sufficient), Ogul'gerek (son wanted). According to the shariat, girls were fit for marriage at the age of nine, boys at twelve, but in practice they were usually married at 12-13 and 15-16 respectively; in some areas, for example in upper Tadzhikistan, the age was much lower. Polygamy was limited to the richer classes because of the large amount of the kalym or bride price. In Kazakhstan its usual size was 47 head of cattle, sometimes as much as 60. (6) One of the earliest measures taken by the Soviet authorities was to prohibit this practice. It was considered harmful not only because it made it difficult, if not altogether impossible, for the poor to marry, but also because it reduced woman to the position of a chattel with attendant abuses and led to the practice of levirate. But the prohibition of kalym has not been completely effective - it may be claimed that, in a way, it may encourage bigamy; there are many complaints to this effect in the press - example SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA of 7.12.56 attacks the Stalin kolkhoz, Frunze oblast where there are 18 men with two wives each. It might be thought that the abolition of kalym serves as an encouragement to divorce, for there is no question of wasted money to consider, and it makes women so independent that with the help of Soviet courts they do not hesitate to divorce their husbands. Such cases are far less numerous than those of native men divorcing their wives, but they do occur, as one may gather from the announcements of forthcoming divorce suits published on the last page of the republican newspapers.

In the late 1920s a campaign was organized against the wearing of the parandzha, a sort of cloak worn by women over the head, with a veil hanging from it to cover the face. In Turkmenistan the yashmak was worn instead; this seems to have been a Zoroastrian usage - in ancient Persia women covered their mouths in order not to "defile" fire with their "impure" breath. The authorities organized women's meetings, at which they tried to induce them to throw off the parandzha. A meeting on 8th March 1928 at Osh, Kirgizia, was so successful that 110 women belonging to the families of Komsomol and Party members dispensed with the objectionable garment. A hundred and fifty Uzbek women who were at the meeting followed suit.(7) This action met with much resistance; men tried to force their progressive wives to resume the parandzha and there were numerous cases of the murder of native women who were active in the anti-parandzha campaign; in Uzbekistan in 1929 twenty-one women were murdered in a period of four months.(8) One of them was Aftabay Tagirova who made speeches against the evil custom at public meetings until her husband hired men to murder her. Show trials of such offenders provided practical lessons in westernization to the Central Asians. Cases where the yashmak and parandzha are worn, even by wives of Party officials, still occur and agitation against the practice is still going on. The line it takes may be grasped from the following revelation made by a kolkhoz woman at Pyandzh, Tadzhikistan: "The parandzha is very harmful. It hinders the development of our culture. The destructions of the parandzha will make thousands and thousands of women active creators of communism. . ."(9) In other words, apart from the professed task of promoting culture, the struggle for the emancipation of women has another important object - the increase of the labour force, very necessary for assuring the success, for example, of the drive for cotton. This is what makes the press accuse husbands whose wives do not go out to work of maintaining "feudal-bay survivals concerning women". Thus, KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA of 21.7.56 deplored the fact that in the Voroshilov kolkhoz, Kolkhozabad rayon, only 712 women and girls went to work out of the 2,114 who were fit; the same paper of 6.4.58 denounced the Rudaki and Zeravshan kolkhozes in the same rayon, because the majority of the women wore parandzhas and many men working in the administration of the rayon kolkhozes forbade their wives to work or go out.

In the past, young men, much less women, were not free to choose their wives and husbands, and marriages were arranged by the parents. Now this practice is decreasing, though it is still fairly frequent. Many parents have come to believe that their children should be free to find their partners, but this liberalism is limited mainly to sons; daughters, on the whole, are not given full freedom in this respect; but at least they can usually accept or reject the matches arranged for them. Elopements occur when a girl's parents forbid her to marry the man of her choice. Forced marriages, though still numerous, are becoming the exception rather than the rule, though marriages of adolescent girls are still common, so that not many girls finish the middle school, let alone seek further education. It is believed that, as a result of the "feudal" past, girls tend to be mentally

less developed than boys, and even if they finish school, they do little to develop their minds further, especially in country districts. But it is quite common for young men to want their wives to be not only hard-working and presentable, but educated.

But the old prejudices die hard. In the last quarter of 1958 the case of one Bil'bil' Yalkabova was widely discussed by TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA. She wished to study at the Mary Pedagogical Institute and to marry a Komsomol member, Atayev. She did not obey her parents who wished her to give up her educational ambitions and to marry a man they had found for her but whom she had never seen. He was a member of the Ishan clan, the same to which her family belonged and, according to an old belief, marriages should take place only within the same clan in order that their children might be "pure". The day after she had passed her entrance examination to the Institute, she was murdered together with Atayev by men whom her father had hired for 5,000 rubles in order to satisfy an old custom according to which a disobedient daughter must not live. It is typical that in the case of "feudal-bay survivals concerning women" local authorities, usually employing Central Asians, treat the offenders with undue leniency, if they do not ignore the matter altogether or refuse outright to deal with it.

Whatever the actual practice, there is an officially recommended, fool-proof prescription for contracting a happy marriage. PRAVDA VOSTOKA of 1.1.58 gives a practical illustration of it: a wedding is to take place at Tuya-Buguz kishlak; the bride is one Tursun-oy, "a beauty, who this year has picked nine tons of cotton. Everybody would be eager to marry one like her. But this luck has befallen but one man. . ." He is called Temir Dalabayev, "a bonny young man, an excellent collector [of cotton?] who enjoys respect in the kishlak". It is, incidentally, not unimportant that his father "has the Lenin Medal which he has received for cotton" and that the wedding is held in winter when it does not divert the people from their work in the kolkhoz fields.

Among the young people the new type of wedding festivities is said to be becoming increasingly popular - the kzyl toy (red wedding) as distinguished from the old toy. Not only is it devoid of the religious element, but a major feature distinguishing it from the toy is that now men and women guests sit all together and at the same table as the young couple, while before men and women were entertained in separate rooms or even on different days, and the young couple sat in a corner behind a curtain so that the "evil eye" could not cast spells on them - such at least was the practice in the Fergana valley. Though the kalym is not frequent, there are cases where expensive gifts are regarded as obligatory, which in fact is kalym in disguise. But the exchange of gifts between the bride and bridegroom and their families is a general practice. The old custom of arranging marriages for infants or even children still unborn has been abandoned. Mixed marriages - with Russians, Tatars or gypsies - are looked upon with favour by the authorities

and regarded as a symptom of progress. In cases of intermarriage with Russians the husband is a Central Asian; cases of Muslim women marrying Russians are almost unknown. Such families usually adopt the Russian way of life and, in towns, they often do not differ from purely Russian families. Before the revolution such Russian wives, as a rule, became Muslim but now the problem does not arise.

The break-up of the old patriarchal family is believed to be another symptom of progress. Once it was common for married brothers to live together or for married sons to live with their parents. The oldest man in the family, usually the father, was its dictator with sole control of its property and finances. In such families the position of daughters-in-law was particularly bad; they had no rights and were badly treated by their mothers-in-law who inflicted all the housework on them. Now the practice of living in large families is still common and in kolkhozes they often constitute the majority; but their character has become profoundly modified. Their members earn their own money and the father is no longer the undisputed master. There is a large measure of equality among the members including the women.

In the small monogamous family the woman plays an even more prominent part. Often she goes out to work and is thus economically independent of her husband and shares his responsibility for the well-being of the family. In the majority of cases she is in charge of the family budget, a thing unheard of before, but major purchases are discussed with her husband. As she earns her own money, she can, when necessary, maintain her parents, and her husband in spite of old traditions often comes to live with her family. When the wife's or husband's parents live with them, they are respected but are no longer dictators. Another novelty is that there occur families with women as their recognized heads; to this category belong widows, now no longer forced to remarry, and wives with more responsible jobs, for example in kolkhozes, than their husbands. It is not unusual for the husband to help with the housework, but this meets with much disapproval from older people who deplore the fact that men have become women's "servants". The relationship between husband and wife has become less formal and whereas in the past a wife might not call her husband by his personal name and would be addressed by him as "oy, katyn!" (hey, old woman!), now the use of the first name by both is becoming popular. The position of children has also changed. Even the children of the most backward part of the population, the chabans (shepherds), receive modern education, often in boarding schools if their parents' occupation takes them to the most remote parts of the country. Childlessness is regarded as a great affliction and often is a reason for divorce. Couples who have no or few children often bring up the children of their more fortunate relatives or adopt orphans, even of Russian nationality. (10) Small children are fussed over and spoilt but when they reach the age of seven or eight proper discipline is introduced and they are entrusted with some household tasks, like minding the cattle. They treat the father

with profound respect, but their relationship with the mother is much more informal and intimate. A new custom, limited mainly to the urban population, is that of celebrating children's birthdays; it is regarded as a sign of progress, since before 1917 the people did not know the day or even the year of their birth and age was counted according to the twelve-year cycle, the muchal, each year of which was called by the name of some animal. Thus even family customs the most conservative of all - are undergoing a profound change.

The same is happening to dress. Once the main difference was between the agricultural and nomad areas, but now the growing popularity of modern dress as well as the suppression of nomadism are making this difference increasingly slight. The basic features of men's dress are the khalat (sort of overcoat) usually quilted, very wide cotton trousers and the tyubeteyka (embroidered skull cap). The colours and patterns of the tyubeteyka embroidery differ between various districts. The cut of the khalat is basically the same everywhere and the difference is one of colour. This is most apparent in Uzbekistan: in Bukhara and Samarkand it is made of bright cloth of many colours. In Tashkent it is green, black or green in Fergana - sometimes with wide stripes, and bright red with narrow stripes in Khorezm. In Turkmenistan the khalat is also red but of a cherry shade. The only survivals of the nomad past of the Turkmens are a large and heavy sheepskin cap and a sheepskin topcoat worn in winter. In Kazakhstan the nomad type of dress has been modified under the influence of the settled population so that both the khalat as well as a fur coat and a fur or felt cap are worn; the Kirgiz men's dress is similar and the main difference consists in the use of felt khalats and a more frequent use of white felt caps. Women's clothes consist basically of a long, wide, brightly coloured cotton and silk dress with wide and long cotton trousers underneath. The tyubeteyka is now worn by both men and women. The costume is completed by the kamzol (sort of waistcoat without sleeves) and a coat similar in cut to the male khalat or fitted in the waist. Some of the most important local variations are: in Turkmenistan the prevalence of the colour red both in men's and women's dress; a very lavish use of jewellery by women whose head-dress also considerably differs from tribe to tribe; in Kazakhstan the typical head-dress of the married woman is the kimeshek - a white garment covering the head, neck and shoulders; in Kirgizia women wear on their heads the elechek - a high turban made sometimes of as much as 15 metres of white material. Modern dress is worn in towns more than in the country and by young people more than by the old, but combinations of native and European dress are common - thus the khalat may be worn over a jacket, or a sports coat over the native woman's dress. Articles of dress, branded as "survivals of the past" - the parandzha, yashmak and man's turban - are being gradually abandoned.

The difference in housing between the nomad and agricultural lands, once clear, is rapidly waning. The most usual type of Central Asian house is the rectangular, flat-roofed structure of clay or unbaked brick which is found all over the settled regions. It varies in size from a small one-room hut to a spacious two-storey building. A usual feature of the Central Asian house is the

ayvan - a verandah with the roof supported by wooden columns or pillars which may be finely carved, as in Khiva. Once the larger dwellings were divided into the men's and women's quarters, but now the changed position of women is making the practice obsolete. In the past very little furniture was used but in many houses there were clay benches raised above floor level which served as beds, while deep niches in the wall replaced wardrobes. In the nomad lands the yurt, a circular tent with a domed top, made of felt on a folding wooden framework was common, but the use of clay huts was usual in winter. The yurt is popular even now and the erstwhile nomads often erect it beside their houses to serve as a summer dwelling. In Kara-Kalpakia yurts are sometimes found inside large houses which have an opening in the roof through which the top of the yurt protrudes. The coming of the kolkhozes started a revolution in domestic architecture. In towns and villages Russian houses have appeared, each with a number of rooms, glazed windows, improved cooking facilities and often even electricity. But even there interior decoration is often that of the past - thus in Kazakhstan one may see that the only furniture is the same as once was found in the nomad yurt - a chest by the back wall with folded eiderdowns and cushions on it and a low table for meals. But furniture is becoming increasingly popular, particularly in the towns. It is even not unusual to find in sparsely furnished country cottages wireless sets and sewing machines. Thus the suppression of nomadism and the institution of kolkhozes has introduced more uniformity into housing in Central Asia. The standard Soviet version of modern life is slowly replacing the old individualism of the country.

Sources

1. ETNOGRAFIYA NARODOV SSSR. S.A. Tokarev, Moscow, 1958.
2. O FEODAL'NO-BAYSKIKH PEREZHITKAKH I IKH PREDODOLENIY. D. Kshibekov, Alma-Ata, 1957.
3. POBEDA VELIKOY OKTYABR'SKOY SOTSIALISTICHESKOY REVOLYUTSII I RASKREPOSHCHENIYE ZHENSCHIN-TURKMENOK. B. Pal'vanova, Ashkhabad, 1957.
4. SUDY SOVETSKOGO UZBEKISTANA V BOR'BE S FEODAL'NO-BAYSKIMI PEREZHITKAMI. T.T. Inoyatov, Tashkent, 1958.
5. "Muslims of Soviet Central Asia: Trends and Prospects". R. Pipes, THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, Spring and Summer, 1955.
6. "Kirgizskaya Sem'ya v Epokhu Sotsializma" (The Kirgiz Family in the Period of Socialism). S.M. Abramzon, SOVETSKAYA ETNOGRAFIYA, No.5, 1957.

7. TRUDY INSTITUTA ISTORII, ARKHEOLOGII I ETNOGRAFII. Vol.3, Ethnography, Akademiya Nauk Kazakhskoy SSR, Alma-Ata, 1956.
8. O PREODOLENII PEREZHITKOV PROSHLOGO V SOZNANII LYUDEY. B. Baybulatov, Frunze, 1956.
9. Central Asian Press.

Notes

- (1) Kshibekov (see Sources above), p.5.
- (2) Ibid.
- (3) Ibid., p.34.
- (4) Ibid.
- (5) Ibid., p.73.
- (6) Ibid., p.23.
- (7) Baybulatov (see Sources above), p.66.
- (8) Inoyatov (see Sources above), p.16.
- (9) KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, 5.12.58.
- (10) Abramzon (see Sources above), p.141.

Archaeology in Turkmenistan

Turkmen archaeologists, members of the South Turkmen Archaeological Expedition (YUTAKE) have discovered in an ancient cemetery in the Mary oblast mausoleum known amongst the people as the mazar of Abdullah Ansari. Decipherment of the Kufic inscriptions on its walls has revealed that the mausoleum was the tomb of Abdullah, son of Bureyda as-Aslami, an Arab statesman who lived in the seventh century. The inscriptions also contain historical information, hitherto unknown.

PROB. VOS., 1959, No.

S T A B I L I Z A T I O N O F T H E N O M A D S

The Period of Transition - First Soviet Attempts at Stabilization -
Collectivization - Consequences of Collectivization

The Period of Transition

The most important nomad areas in old Transcaspia and Turkestan were the present republics of Kazakhstan, Kirgizia and Turkmenistan, but as the nineteenth century advanced, the old nomadic way of life began to be modified by contemporary economic developments, and a slow transition to settled life began. This development was, probably because of its relative nearness to Russia, particularly apparent in Kazakhstan. Its chief features were the growing importance of agriculture, change in the character of livestock and the weakening of the patriarchal system, which used to be particularly strong in the old nomad societies. Patriarchal social relationships were still strong in the eighteenth century and before their break-up a nomad community (*obshchina*), which roamed as one unit and used common pastures, might embrace hundreds of households of the same clan. But with the growth of population and livestock the area of grazing lands decreased and the communities split into smaller groups. Thus, in the middle of the nineteenth century an average community had 35-50 households, though in some parts of Kazakhstan, such as the region occupied by the Bukeyev Horde, a nomad unit had only 3-5 or 10 households. The split of the old patriarchal system weakened the clan bond.

Another feature of the age of transition was the gradual settlement of the nomads, which was stimulated by the expanding demands of Russian trade and industry and the influx of peasant colonists into Kazakhstan. As pasture lands became scarce, some nomads turned to agriculture which often involved a settled way of life and limited the number of livestock; at the same time others led a semi-nomadic life and were primarily concerned with cattle-feeding.

There were other forms of transition between nomadic and settled life. By the beginning of the twentieth century purely nomadic life was preserved only in the most remote steppe regions of Kazakhstan, but in the northern areas nomadism not combined with agriculture was very rare. Outside the districts of permanent settlement the shortage of grazing lands caused stronger clans to appropriate better areas of winter pasture and the lesser ones found it increasingly difficult to feed their cattle, which in turn made them turn to agriculture. In some nomad regions the shortage of pastures was so acute that they were not even divided and continued to be used in common. The extent to which the nomads settled varied from one area to another. In 1909-10 in some districts 70 per cent of all farms were held by settled nomads, while in 1911, in

the Vernyy uyezd, 79.3 per cent of Kazakh households were engaged in agriculture. But, on the whole, just at the end of the Revolution 75.5 per cent of the native population of Kazakhstan were still nomadic.

The third feature of the period of transition was the change in the type of animals bred. While the nomads had mainly sheep and horses, with camels, asses and horned cattle in the south, the change to settled life increased the importance of cattle everywhere with the result that in agricultural areas they came to constitute 40-50 per cent of all domestic animals. In this connection it is important to remember when considering fluctuations in the number of animals, that as they wintered outdoors and fodder was limited, severe winters caused grave losses; in 1912-13 in Semirech'ye, for example, over 100,000 cattle and about a million sheep and goats died.(1)

In Kirgizia agriculture and cattle-breeding were inseparable in the economy of the nomadic aul, and purely agricultural areas were few. Roaming with flocks and herds had a seasonal character; in spring the animals grazed in the neighbourhood of fields cultivated by their owners, in summer on highland meadows, and in autumn often returned to the spring grazing lands where the crops were harvested; after this they moved to winter pastures. As the nineteenth century advanced, the area of arable land increased so that in the 1880s the export of grain from Kirgizia was considerable.(2)

The situation in Turkmenistan was in many ways similar. In the nineteenth century agriculture expanded and its combination with cattle-breeding was usual in the agricultural oases. By the beginning of the twentieth century some areas were concerned chiefly with the cultivation of land - the districts of Mary, Tedzhen and Ashkhabad - though cattle-breeding was still widespread there. Particularly good grazing lands lay between the Amu-Dar'ya and Tedzhen; further to the west the river valleys of the Krasnovodsk uyezd and the region of the Balkhan mountains provided good summer pastures, while before the coming of winter the nomads crossed the Atrek into Persia. This last practice made nomadism in Turkmenistan particularly obnoxious to the Soviet authorities.

First Soviet Attempts at Stabilization

The stabilization of the nomads by the Soviets in a sense hastened and completed a process which had started long ago. An important political reason for the suppression of nomadism was the need to destroy the already weakened patriarchal system, which even in its decline was unacceptable to the authorities as overstressing clan loyalties while in fact all loyalty should be paid to the state. To this end the destruction of the class of bays and, in Kirgizia, manaps (the two wealthiest groups in the clans) was undertaken; this in turn served as a prelude to the stabilization of the nomads. ". . . For the purpose of suppressing clan survivals it was essential to change economic conditions - to transfer the cattle-breeders from nomadic to settled life. Another reason for

the persistence of clan survivals was the dependence of poor people on the bay. The liberation of the toiling masses from the bays' influence and the unmasking of the predatory character of the latter made it possible to overcome clan survivals."(3)

This "liberation" started in Kazakhstan in 1928 and it was part of collectivization. "Some 700 bays had their goods confiscated and were deported. One hundred and fifty thousand head of cattle were taken from them, but this figure includes other animals reckoned against the unit of one head of cattle. Apart from cattle, farm implements, buildings, means of transport etc. were confiscated. Descendants of sultans and khans as well as the bays were moved to distant regions and officially allotted land. The confiscated cattle and other property were given to 25,000 poor peasants and agricultural labourers. Men of this class formed about 300 cattle-breeding kolkhozes. Also five cattle-breeding sovkhoses were founded."(4)

In Kirgizia it was decided in 1927 to take the same course of action. The more important bays and manaps were found dangerous for "they used their material wealth and clan survivals to incite national and clan antagonisms, they engaged in anti-Soviet activities and aspired to disorganize the construction of socialism".(5)

At the same time closer attention was paid to the mass of the nomads. In 1927 the government of Kirgizia took steps to intensify "political education" work among them and it was soon noticed how difficult the task was. In summer the nomads moved with their animals to highland pastures called dzhaylu, one of the most important among which was the Susamyr valley. It was visited by nomads, some of whom even came from Kazakhstan, so that every summer some 1,000 households with 700-750,000 animals stayed there. This meant that for a large part of every year the people were away from their administrative and communal political centres. Local authorities in whose districts the dzhaylus lay were unable to manage the masses of nomads flocking there in summer. "The result was that the cattle-breeding nomads derived very little profit from what Soviet and Party organizations could offer them. Such a state of affairs in the dzhaylus, particularly the one on the Susamyr, enabled the bays and manaps to exploit clan survivals in order to prey upon the labourers and poor men. . ." (6) In other words, the authorities found it too difficult to control the nomads as closely as the requirements of the Soviet regime demanded. A remedy was sought by setting up "dzhaylu soviets" with powers corresponding to those of local authorities elsewhere; but the measure proved unsuccessful owing allegedly to the perversity of the hostile bays and manaps. In those circumstances the most practical solution was to extend the drive for collectivization to the nomads.

In 1928 in Kazakhstan 567,000 households were nomadic, but in spite of the disadvantages of this way of life they prospered and between 1913 and 1929 the number of animals grew by 35.9 per cent.(7) In Kirgizia the situation was

similar for, compared with the pre-war years, by 1929 there was an increase of 36.1 per cent.(8) Thus from the point of view of the economic well-being of the nomads their stabilization was no pressing necessity.

Collectivization

In Kazakhstan collectivization was a complicated process. Its agricultural regions, which contained but a small minority of the population, were regarded as best prepared for kolkhoz life; the ones where agriculture and cattle-breeding were combined were believed to be more difficult and the nomad areas, situated mainly in central Kazakhstan, presented the gravest problem. On 5th January 1930 the Central Committee of the Party issued a decree on collectivization, according to which kolkhozes were to be founded in the agricultural districts by the spring of 1932, but in the nomad and semi-nomad areas the completion of the task was postponed until the end of the first Five-Year Plan, i.e. 1933. In the latter districts the semi-nomadic population was herded into the kolkhozes more easily than the nomads: there were 939 kolkhozes on 1st October 1928 and by January 1930 the figure increased to 2,096.(9) The decree of 1930 directed that in cattle-breeding areas the foundation of groups working together on their common land should be encouraged as a form of transition to kolkhoz life. The nomads thus forced to settle were too bewildered to understand what was expected of them, did not know how to raise crops and build houses, but with the help of Russian kolkhozniks proceeded to adapt themselves to the new way of life. Collectivization opened up new parts of the country to agriculture and the area of arable land extended into central Kazakhstan, the Kara-Kums and the shores of the Caspian and Aral Seas and of Lake Balkhash. The drive for collectivization was so successful that in 1933 alone 242,000 nomad households were settled on the land (10), though 182,000 of them had some land already. The state gave them financial help and in the year 1933 alone 43m. rubles were spent, while nomad and semi-nomad households were exempted for two years from supplying quotas of grain and cattle to the state as well as from taxes and other financial liabilities.

Similar developments took place in Kirgizia "where the promotion of collectivization and the setting up of kolkhozes was linked with the task of destroying the remnants of the feudal clan system".(11) In January 1930 the Central Committee of the Party, realizing that the "degree of readiness" for collectivization varied from one district to another, fixed various dates by which collectivization in them was to be completed; the final date was 1933. In the spring of 1930 the Kirgiz flocked to the kolkhozes en masse and their enthusiasm for collectivization is stated to have been so great that "they drove away the kulaks and bays from their lands, confiscated their cattle and chattels and begged the Soviet authorities to arrest and deport them from the republic".(12) But according to the source from which the above quotation comes, they were at the same time deplorably susceptible to the bays' intrigues, whose object was the wholesale destruction of cattle. In February 1931 the conduct of collectivization

was systematized by the decision of the Plenum of the Communist Party of Kirgizia that in the next four years 85,000 nomad and semi-nomad households should be settled on the land. The first to do so were the nomads of the border rayons - At-Bashi, Alay, Kochkorka etc., probably in order to stop them roaming outside the borders of the Soviet Union. In 1931 alone 1,730,000 rubles were spent on the task. The Party and government organizations made themselves responsible for building villages in the rayons of settlement; in the remote mountain rayon of Alay 2,419 houses were built in one year and 2,341 in the At-Bashi rayon. By the beginning of 1934, 68.9 per cent of small households were covered by collectivization.(13) It is noteworthy that more than eight times as much money was spent per nomad in settlement in Kazakhstan in 1933 as in Kirgizia in 1931.

In Turkmenistan stabilization of the nomads seems to have been slower. By 1930 only four per cent of the nomads had been submitted to collectivization and it was not until the end of 1931 that the movement assumed a mass character and cost the state 3,697,000 rubles.(14)

In its initial stages, collectivization as a form of struggle against clan survivals proved singularly unsuccessful. Many kolkhozes constituted themselves on the clan basis, for example in the Cholpon-Ata volost' in Kirgizia some reactionary elements popularized the slogan "each clan in its own kolkhoz" with the result that in one village eight kolkhozes, each with 10-12 households, were set up. There were also large kolkhozes, each embracing a number of clans, but even there each clan kept to itself and worked together, its members constituting a "brigade". For example, the Tegizchildik kolkhoz united 900 households belonging to 11 clans, each "governing" itself to the prejudice of the kolkhoz management; the Don-Tala kolkhoz, Balykchi rayon, had 1,000 households which split into seven clan kolkhozes. In some large kolkhozes the clans lived some 30-40 kilometres from one another and instead of a common management each was subject to its own chief. Such chiefs were, allegedly, under the influence of the bays and other sinister elements exploiting the clan system for their own purpose in their struggle against the Soviet system.(15) In Kazakhstan the situation was similar: "During collectivization in a number of outlying auls clan kolkhozes were set up and their heads were the clan aksakal-bays. Under the form of kolkhozes they tried to preserve the old clan relationship between the lord and the subject."(16) This caused another purge of the evil characters while in Turkmenistan even bays' poor relatives were excluded from kolkhozes as a precaution; they were in some cases not paid for their work, even if they renounced their relationship with the bays and were eager to do their best for the kolkhozes.(17)

Consequences of Collectivization

It is admitted that in the course of collectivization the authorities, however well-meaning, committed serious mistakes and "deviations from the Party line", but there is no clear distinction between the sins of the officials and those of the perverse elements headed by the bays. It seems that the former admirably - though not deliberately - facilitated the task of the latter, so that they shared the responsibility for a major disaster during the period of stabilization - the catastrophic decline in the numbers of livestock. The authorities were guilty of unduly hastening collectivization, which was contrary to the Party's instructions. They forced the people to join kolkhozes and the result was that by 20th March 1930 in Kirgizia 37.2 per cent of households were collectivized instead of the planned 28.9 per cent while in some rayons as many as 80 per cent were forced into kolkhozes; some rayons, like those of Chu and Karabalty, carried out the task in only three months.(18) This enabled the "kulak agitation" to incite the people to anti-Soviet rebellions (in the Uzgen rayon the people cooperated with a Basmachi band and planned to kill all communists). In Kazakhstan similar "deviations" were made by the authorities and the nomads were their main victims. In February 1930 in the space of a few days the number of collectivized households grew from 26 to 45.1 per cent, while in a number of the most backward rayons between 80-100 per cent were driven into kolkhozes.(19) A good example of this sort of abuse was the case of the Talass rayon, Syr-Dar'ya okrug (district); there in March 1930 the authorities decided to complete the collectivization quickly and proceeded to drive together nomads from a number of auls to a place where a kolkhoz was to be established. The result of such forcible transfer was that a large number of camels died and there was a severe loss of lambs. When the nomads gathered, they were made to build settlements from their yurts and 300-400 households were to occupy each settlement. Some yurts were converted into byres for the cattle and their owners forced to share other people's yurts. Such "deviations" caused great discontent among the nomads, which was expressed by the mass destruction of cattle. Within a few months the number of animals in Kazakhstan decreased by 20 per cent and in some rayons by 50-60 per cent, while in the most backward of them the bays even managed to provoke anti-Soviet riots. A.B. Tursunbayev says, "until now our historical literature did not explain the reason of the decrease in the numbers of cattle. . ." and he follows it by an explanation, though of little originality, ascribing the reason to the above-mentioned deviations.(20) In Kirgizia the situation was the same. The kulaks, bays, and manaps as well as the bourgeois nationalists, who had treacherously penetrated into the kolkhozes, turned to sabotage; they spread disease among the animals (sic), did not feed them, and broke the backs of horses. The result was that by 1931 the number of cattle had decreased by 35.9 per cent, horses - 20.9 per cent, sheep and goats - 47 per cent, while in the Ketmen'-Tyube rayon alone between January-October 1931, 5,163 horses, 2,521 cows, 65,603 sheep and goats and 555 camels were destroyed.(21) Another reason for this was the fact that originally many kolkhozes did not have byres and stables so that the animals wintered outdoors and died of cold and

starvation. In Turkmenistan also the mass destruction of cattle took place in 1929-30, but no figures are available.

This situation made the Party authorities intervene. First of all the source of evil was discovered and as a prelude to reform the local Party officials resorted to "criticism and self-criticism". They then took more practical steps to stop the rapid decline of livestock. The Soviet Government and the Central Committee of the Party appointed a special commission and entrusted it with the task of restoring Kazakhstan's agriculture and cattle-breeding. In cattle-breeding areas the population received allotments of arable land and farming implements and those who needed cattle could buy on easy terms from the sovkhozes and kolkhozes - in 1933-4 some 900,000 head of cattle were thus sold.(22) An additional measure was the foundation, in 1933, of the political departments of the MTS which in 1933-4 purged the kolkhozes of bays and other "enemies of the people". Owing to these combined efforts in 1933 the fall in the number of livestock stopped and in 1934 a slow recovery started. In Kirgizia the situation improved as early as 1932; on 26th March of that year the Central Committee of the Party directed that forcibly communalized livestock must be returned to its owners and in fact the kolkhozniks received back their animals and some cattle-breeding kolkhozes specializing in manufacturing foodstuffs (kolkhozno-tovarnyye fermy) were even dissolved. The republican authorities of Kirgizia exempted the settled nomads and semi-nomads (60,000 farms) for a period of two years from supplying their quotas of grain and from other obligations towards the state. The situation was further improved by the political departments of the MTS whose efforts disclosed and drove away from kolkhozes hundreds of bays and kulaks.

No precise information is available on the effect produced by stabilization and collectivization on the population of the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan. It is, however, on record that the total number of Kazakhs fell by nearly one million between the censuses of 1926 and 1939.

To push the people into kolkhozes was easier than to destroy their "clan survivals". As recently as 1949 it was found that in Kazakhstan there were kolkhozes where even young people and children were aware of their clan membership. It was also deplored that some heads of establishments of productive work, kolkhozes and rayons appointed their staff according to the candidates' clan background and not their professional and political merits. Thus in 1947 in the Burlyu-Tobe rayon, Taldy-Kurgan oblast, heads of kolkhozes were appointed from clans to which the majority of the kolkhozniks belonged. Four kolkhozes inhabited by people of the clan of Tulengut were transferred to the Kzyl-Balyk selsovet (village soviet) while three kolkhozes situated within a convenient distance of it were put under the remote Balkhash selsovet because their members belonged to the clan of Zhalair.(23) Such cases had parallels

in other oblasts. According to Kshibekov, there are other clan survivals which still persist, but he does not specify them; instead he says vaguely: "In the Soviet period a great deal has been done to suppress undesirable phenomena arising from the nomadic way of life, but as yet they have not been completely overcome. This is why further struggle against them is one of the unavoidable tasks in developing the material and intellectual culture of the Kazakh people." (24)

Notes

- (1) See also CAR, Vol.V, No.1, "The Social Structure and Customs of the Kazakhs" and Vol.IV, No.3, "Seasonal Nomadism".
- (2) See also CAR, Vol.V, No.4, "The Social, Economic and Political Effects of Russian Influence in Kirgizia (1855-1917)".
- (3) Kshibekov, D. O FEODALNO-BAYSKIKH PEREZHITKAKH I IKH PREODOLENIY. Alma-Ata, 1957, pp.13-14.
- (4) ISTORIYA KAZAKHSKOY SSR. Ed. M. Abdykalykov and A. Pankratova. Kazogiz, 1943, p.516.
- (5) ISTORIYA KIRGIZII. AN/Kirg. SSR, Institut Istorii, Frunze, 1956, Vol.II, p.154.
- (6) Ibid., pp.154-5.
- (7) Kshibekov, op.cit., p.62; BOL'SHAYA SOVETSKAYA ENTSIKLOPEDIYA, 2nd Edition. Vol.19, 1953, p.335.
- (8) ISTORIYA KIRGIZII, p.173.
- (9) MATERIALY OB"YEDINENNOY NAUCHNOY SESSII, POSVYASHCHENNOY ISTORII SREDNEY AZII I KAZAKHSTANA EPOKHI SOCIALIZMA, Alma-Ata, 1958, p.322.
- (10) BOL'SHAYA SOV. ENTSIK. Vol.19, p.336.
- (11) ISTORIYA KIRGIZII, p.179.
- (12) Ibid., p.180.
- (13) Ibid., pp.204-5.
- (14) ISTORIYA TURKMENSKOY SSR. AN/Turk. SSR, Institut Istorii, Arkheologii i Etnografii. Ashkhabad, 1957, Vol.II, pp.344, 355.

- (15) ISTORIYA KIRGIZII, pp.194-5.
- (16) Kshibekov, p.15.
- (17) N. Tikhonov, KOCHEVNIKI. Moscow, 1931, pp.82-83.
- (18) ISTORIYA KIRGIZII, p.182.
- (19) ISTORIYA KAZAKH., p.534.
- (20) MATERIALY, pp.324-5.
- (21) ISTORIYA KIRGIZII, p.195.
- (22) ISTORIYA KAZAKH., pp.541-2.
- (23) Kshibekov, pp.17-18.
- (24) Ibid., p.62.

Ancient manuscripts discovered in Turkmenistan

An expedition of the Turkmen Academy of Sciences recently discovered in an old medrese in the Mary oblast of Turkmenistan over two thousand oriental manuscripts. The most noteworthy of them was a thousand-year-old copy of the SHAH-NAMEH of Abul Qasim Ferdousi, written in the naskh script on Bukhara silk paper. The manuscript consists of 1,400 pages containing more than 136,000 lines. The manuscripts belonged to a teacher at one of the Mary medrese who died sixty-four years ago.

TI. 14.5.59
PV. 19.5.59

Stone Age discoveries in Uzbekistan

A camp site of primitive man is being excavated in Samarkand - the first case of the discovery of such a site in Uzbekistan on the territory of a modern city. Material found on the site date it to the late Stone Age. The discovery is expected to make a great contribution to the study of the living conditions of late Stone Age man in Central Asia.

PROB.VOS., 1959, No.2

FORAGING IN KHORASAN

When General Skobelev was planning his final attack on the Akhal Teke Turkmen, he wished to relieve the pressure on his long line of communications with Krasnovodsk by buying supplies and means for their transport in the northern provinces of Persia, which lay on his right flank, and establish bases there as near as possible to Geok-Tepe (see note (1) at end). He wrote on 12th May 1880, to Zinov'yev, the Russian Minister to Persia, to ask for his help in this matter. (General Lazarev had had much the same idea in 1879, but for one reason and another had abandoned his plan.) Skobelev decided that a commercial agent would not always be trustworthy, and put in charge of the mission, with letters to the il Khan of Bojnord and Quchan, a man who had been in the country before and knew many of the powerful people, Colonel N.I. Grodekov, from the seventeenth chapter of whose book, VOYNA V TURKMENII: POKHOD SKOBELEVA V 1880-1881 GG. (St. Petersburg, 1883), this account is taken. He was given instructions how much flour, rice and barley was required, and was told to spare neither money nor presents: it was better to pay too much in Persia than to let the expedition drag on and spend huge sums in that way.

Grodekov's party reached Astrabad (Gorgan) on 1st September, and found out only by chance, four days later, that Zinov'yev had asked that they should appear in civilian clothes: his telegram to Skobelev had been garbled, and they had come in uniform. At this time Mirza Hosayn Khan, the Foreign Secretary, was dismissed, and since this entailed, as was usual, the invalidation of all the instructions he had given and even of the firmans he had countersigned, Grodekov's mission was held up. Zinov'yev approached the Shah directly, and appeared about to succeed when the news arrived about the uniforms, by which the Shah was greatly disturbed. Skobelev, too, was much distressed, and telegraphed to Grodekov that he must be ready to return at the first request from Zinov'yev. (He also wrote to Zinov'yev his views on the Anglo-Russian Central Asian question.) The British Minister called on Zinov'yev and reminded him that in 1878 the Persian Government had told both Great Britain and Russia of the undesirability of their sending agents into Khorasan: and that Great Britain had at once withdrawn Captain Napier from Mashhad. He thought that the Cabinet might now send him there again. Zinov'yev said that he still did not know what Captain Napier's orders had been in 1878, although he might have his suspicions. With Colonel Grodekov it was an entirely different affair: there was nothing mysterious about his mission; and he explained its purpose. The British Minister confined himself to saying that he could not answer for what the opinion of the British Government might be.

The Shah had demanded an explanation from Zinov'yev, but he accepted his account of the garbled telegram, and merely requested that Grodekov should continue his journey in the character of a commercial agent.

Grodekov left for Shahrud on 6th September, with three firmans, addressed to the ilkhán of Bojnord and Quchan and the Governor of Darreh Gaz. His instructions from his Minister were to avoid everything that might remind the Persians of the fact that he was an officer in the Russian army. He must call on Prince Rokn ud-dowleh at Mashhad, who was the governor of the whole of Khorasan; he must avoid too close relations with the ilkhán, for fear the Persian Government should suspect that the Russians had any "special views on them"; he should not let it be thought that he was gathering any intelligence not directly connected with the object of his mission; it would be indispensable to give presents to the ilkhán and other persons who might be useful, but he should not show himself too generous at first. He must avail himself of the help of such people, but not let them get the whole management of things into their hands, for they might easily turn this to their own mercenary ends. It would be better to use no intermediaries, and to let the cooperation of the ilkhán be primarily moral. Upon arrival at a place he should not announce the whole amount that he was prepared to buy, for this would lead to a quick and excessive rise in prices: the Persians were extremely grasping in dealings with foreigners. The whole thing was an entirely new departure, and they were certain to meet with difficulties, but he relied on Grodekov's energy and close acquaintance with the Muslim East. Zinov'yev also warned him against possible interference from Napier.

The Russian commercial agent at Mashhad, Nasirbekov, was also given suitable instructions.

Grodekov arrived on 22nd September at Bojnord, where he was received by the ilkhán, Yar Mohammad Khan, a man of forty-five who had seen much fighting against the Teke Turkmen. Since 1873 their raiding had diminished, and he had seldom had to mount his horse; so he had set himself to the steady accumulation of money. For instance, in a law case he would most likely fine both parties, to his own profit. His people forgave him his cupidity, however, in recognition of his past exploits. He was given to strong waters, and had even built a small distillery for his own use.

After talking to him Grodekov realized that he would not be able to keep to Zinov'yev's instruction not to let the ilkhán get the furnishing of provisions into their hands, because Yar Mohammad Khan was himself a merchant and wanted to get a high price for his wheat, and because nobody else would dare to sell if he did not. After a distribution of presents to himself and his followers he took a close and sincere interest in Grodekov's plans, and Grodekov moved on to Shirvan, which Amir Hosayn Khan Shoja' ud-dowleh, the ilkhán of Quchan, was using at the moment as a base from which to prepare an aleman, a raid, on the Teke Turkmen.

This man, knowing that Yar Mohammad Khan had returned Grodekov's call, made the first call himself, drank several glasses of different liquors in a short time, and then summoned singers and musicians: there was "a complete orgy".

On the 29th Grodekov went with the Amir, escorted by 100 horsemen, to the source of the Atrek, drinking all the way. There some splendid tents were pitched, and there was shooting at a tethered ram and hawking at bagged pigeons. After dinner, although the Amir was drunk, Grodekov managed to talk some business with him. He had realized that when the Russians took Geok-Tepe he would lose half his vilayet, and had been to Tehran to offer to take it himself. The offer had been refused; he had reconciled himself to this, although he would be losing his income from the ransoms of the prisoners taken in his alemans, and now promised the Russians every kind of help: corn, transport, cattle, horsemen - he would even come himself to help.

Grodekov says that Shoja' ud-dowleh was an unusually intelligent and capable man, of an entirely European cast of mind; he had seen the world and, when he was sober, was an extraordinarily pleasant companion. He was a despot, wholly given over to debauchery and avarice, who would cut off his people's noses and ears, and they could not stand him. "Here's bread, salt, a bite to eat and a pleasant companion for you," he said to a son of his who had taken part in a conspiracy against him; and he had set before him bread, salt, and the hand and the corpse of one of his fellow-conspirators.

On 30th September Grodekov received a written undertaking of what the Amir would provide (although of course he did not sympathize with Skobelev's campaign, and therefore Grodekov had to accept every condition he chose to make). Grodekov then left for Mashhad on 4th October, engaging on the way one Karl Defur, an enterprising young Dutchman (who had been born in Russia but had left it recently for reasons which he did not care to give), to go to Darreh Gaz and report from there what was going on among the Akhal Tekes and at Merv. By now Grodekov had agents, mostly Russian Tatars or Persians, in twelve of the towns of Khorasan.

At Mashhad he was amicably received by Rokn ud-Dowleh, who accepted valuable presents from him. Permission had not originally been sought from the Persian Government to buy supplies in Mashhad, for fear of sending prices up: now news arrived of the failure of the harvest in the whole of Seistan, and this, coupled with Grodekov's agents' purchases in Quchan, did indeed cause prices to rise; so Nasirbekov determined to buy wheat secretly from the stores of the Imam Reza Mosque. The British agent, Abbas Khan, stirred up the Muslim clergy, particularly powerful in this Shiite centre, who made representations to Rokn ud-dowleh and, on 5th October, before Grodekov's arrival, a caravan of 57 camels, loaded with wheat bought by Nasirbekov, which was about to leave the town, was stopped by his orders. Grodekov arrived, and a rumour went about that he was "the head merchant of the Russian state" and was going to buy up all the corn. Matters seemed to be at a standstill, but Grodekov had recourse to a good deal of complicated bribery, and promised Rokn ud-dowleh a landau, which he wanted (he eventually compounded for 2,200 rubles); and by 7th October "gold had softened steel", the caravan was allowed out and Grodekov no longer had any reason for complaint. He then left for Shirvan, telling Nasirbekov to do no more buying in Mashhad for fear of further difficulties.

There was the same sort of trouble at Sabzavar, caused by rumours spread by Armenian traders. The people egged on by the clergy, rushed to the caravanserai, where the caravan was preparing to leave, beat the caravan-bashi to death, spilt some of the flour, and would not let the camels start. Nasir-bekov managed to get Rokn ud-dowleh to give orders for the seizure and punishment of the instigators and for the flour to be allowed out of the town.

Another plan of the Armenians, to buy up all the free corn in Khorasan, was defeated by Shoja' ud-dowleh, who at last, on 12th October, set off for his raid on the Akhal Tekes, to the huge relief of Shirvan, where he and his men had been living at free quarters. Doing business with him, while assisting at his orgies and keeping pace with him in drinking, was "more than difficult", Grodekov says. His parting message to Grodekov was that everything he had undertaken to do on Grodekov's behalf should be carried out to the full, and that he would be able to present himself to Skobelev with "a white face"; and he left word with the local inhabitants that none of them was to dare to sell the Russians any corn.

The network of agents all over Khorasan were buying successfully, without raising prices unreasonably, and Grodekov's main stores, at Shirvan and Bojnord, were filling up well; but he decided that these two places were not sufficiently close to Geok-Tepe, and therefore made a reconnaissance to find a nearer place to which he might move at least part of the stores. He pitched on Yangi-kala, not more than eight farsakhs (60-70 versts) from Geok-Tepe, which had a "citadel" and was defensible. Shoja' ud-dowleh undertook the protection of this entrepot, and did in fact strengthen the guard on the frontier. Grodekov put Lieut. Krishtapenko in charge, with a small garrison. The local Kurds complained, however, that this was inviting Teke raids from which they themselves would suffer; and indeed there were Teke spies everywhere. Zinov'yev wrote to say that Yangi-kala was outside the borders of Persia and too close to the Akhal Teke oasis; there were rumours of Teke bands on the move, and so Grodekov decided to postpone the further movement of stores to Yangi-kala. He recalled Krishtapenko and dispersed the garrison he had hired.

Meanwhile Shoja' ud-dowleh had abandoned his aleman. He wrote to Grodekov: "Be assured that I have your affairs in mind: do not be uneasy. As soon as Moharram is finished I shall go myself to the frontier, and if your people shall wish to go there, I will accompany them. In a word, be not uneasy about your affairs. And I thank you for sending the other chandelier. An accursed workman fixed a nail badly in the ceiling; your first chandelier was broken because of that. Such is the negligence of the Muslim people. Only Jesus alone, upon whom was shed all the grace of God, could come from heaven and form such a people upon earth as are the Russians. By as much as I was grieved by the loss of the first chandelier, by so much have I been solaced beneath the light of the new one. It is out of friendship that you take upon you so many labours, but I do not consent to these troubles. Since it was

a friendly present, I must accept it, would I or not, on condition that you forgave me for breaking your first chandelier. You and your people are appointed by the Russian Government, out of friendship and according to the understanding between the two high Governments every desire of yours shall be fulfilled. But you know not well the Turkmen, how unchancy and evil they are. One must be careful. But do you be easy. Not desiring to repeat to you the assurance of my friendship, know that all that ever I do is for the good of our friendship."

By the beginning of November that quantity of flour and barley which Grodekov required had been collected, and Grodekov rejoined the fighting troops, leaving Lieut.Col. Volkov to finish the foraging operation in Khorasan.

A description follows of the sacking-up of the stores, in double sacks (some of the sackcloth had to come from Baku), and of the purchase of meat: what had been bought up to now had been barley, wheat-flour, salt, maslo (ghi, perhaps), rice and peas.

Volkov's orders were to assemble as many baggage-animals as possible, in order to move up some barley to Skobelev at once for the horses, and to clear all Grodekov's stores as soon as Geok-Tepe was taken. Russian cavalry would be sent to the frontier to convoy them, and, if they went rather further, the necessary political porridge would have to be swallowed. The thing was to be done in a friendly fashion, and the local Persian magnates were to be implicated as much as possible. There were difficulties when his drivers refused to move, for fear of the Tekes (see note (2) at end), and when the Persian Government hesitated to allow such obvious help to be given to the Russians, for fear of the English; but these difficulties were surmounted, and the stores began to be moved at once on the fall of Geok-Tepe in January 1881, and all the supplies from Khorasan had been delivered in the oasis by the middle of May.

Notes

- (1) The fortress and battle to which English writers give the name of Geok-Tepe is usually called by the Russians Dengil-Tepe: Grodekov uses both names. Edmond O'Donovan, in *THE MERV OASIS*, 2 vols. (London, 1882), Vol.II, pp.67-68, says, "Geok-Tepe. . . is a misnomer, the true name of the place being Yangi Sheher, or the New Town. . . In the north-western portion of the town stands an ancient earth-mound called the Dengil-Tepe, a name sometimes also given to the town itself."
- (2) Grodekov tells in chapter one of what Curzon calls "the prodigious prestige enjoyed by the Turkoman brigands". A Persian who enjoyed a great reputation for bravery was attacked in the night by a Teke. The Persian, being the stronger of the two, soon threw his assailant to the ground; but just as he was taking out his knife to cut the latter's throat, the Teke called

out: 'What are you doing? Do you not see that I am a Teke?' The Persian at once lost his presence of mind and dropped the knife, which was seized by the Teke and plunged into his opponent's heart (G.N. Curzon, RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA, London, 1889, p.119).

Kazakhstan's underground seas

An exhaustive study of Kazakhstan's sub-surface water resources, which involved trekking thousands of miles across deserts, has recently been completed and has resulted in the discovery of hitherto unknown underground "seas". The boundaries of artesian reservoirs, their volume, depth, pressure and origin have now been established and plans for a water-supply system for the arid areas are being worked out.

There are nearly seventy of these sub-surface fresh-water seas, some of them under the deserts of Kyzylkum, Muyunkum and Bet-Pak-Dala; they form vast layers of water-logged gravel and gritstone and resemble a sponge which, if "squeezed" would yield enough water to fill almost two Aral Seas. In all they cover half the area of Kazakhstan. There are also sub-surface salt-water reservoirs, whose salt will one day supply raw material to the chemical industry, as well as hot water reservoirs and natural supplies of mineral water.

SU. No.112, 1959

THE BASMACHIS⁺

THE CENTRAL ASIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT, 1918-24

The Basmachi Revolt in Fergana - The New Soviet Policy - The Rising Spreads to Bukhara - The Epic of Enver Pasha - The Rising is Crushed - Some General Conclusions.

The October Revolution of 1917 brought a Soviet government to power in Tashkent, the capital of Russian Turkestan, whose authority soon extended to most of the towns of the area. Practically no Muslims were included in this new government which carried out a policy of national discrimination and oppression against the native population. The Muslim intelligentsia, few in number and undecided in policy, gathered at Kokand in the Fergana Valley and established what became known as the Kokand Autonomous Government which sought autonomy within the Russian state with full national representation and self-rule for Turkestan. The authority of this government, however, extended little further than Kokand itself. Between Russian Turkestan and the Afghan frontier the emirate of Bukhara still existed as a semi-independent state ruled by the fanatical and reactionary Emir Said Alim who looked on the Kokand leaders as dangerous liberals or "innovators" (dzhadid - jadid) and thus offered them no support.

In January 1918 the Tashkent Soviet Government issued an ultimatum to the Kokand Government to surrender, and in February the city was sacked by Soviet troops, many of whom were German and Austrian prisoners of war in the service of Tashkent. Having razed the city to the ground the Soviet troops proceeded to plunder the Fergana Valley, one of the richest areas of Turkestan. The Tashkent Government ordered all cotton, the chief product of the region, to be confiscated. Looting, extortions and expulsions of the native population followed and added to the miseries caused by famine and unemployment. (It has been estimated that 300,000 to 400,000, or one-third of the population of Fergana, were unemployed in 1917-18.) In addition the Tashkent Government had in December 1917 declared the shariat to be invalid and had destroyed religious foundations and law-courts.

+ The word "basmachi" is generally thought to be a derivation of "basmaq" meaning to attack or oppress. Before the Revolution it was applied to marauding bands of robbers in Central Asia; after the Revolution, to the anti-Soviet partisan movement.

The Basmachi Revolt in Fergana: January 1918 to November 1919

The native reaction was immediate. Independently of each other, and without direction from the members of the Kokand Government, local leaders seized arms against Soviet authority. By April 1918 every village in Fergana had its Basmachi partisan unit. Soviet rule was soon reduced to a tenuous hold on the chief towns and the railway line. The three divisions that were sent to Fergana were of little avail against the rebels who, closely supported by the local population, made continuous surprise attacks on the Soviet troops and then melted into the background. The history of the Basmachi revolt at this period is one not of military campaigns but of local ambushes, arson and murders. In every district the pattern was the same, but the Basmachis had no cohesion and acted independently, sometimes even against each other.(1)

Two leaders soon emerged who gradually brought larger territories under their rule. These were Irgash in the Kokand area and Madamin (or Makhmed Amin-Bek) in the Margelan area. They were men of opposing temperament and political views: Irgash whose prowess became a byword throughout Turkestan was a conservative and a fanatical Muslim. He had ended a ten-year sentence, apparently for brigandage, in 1917 and at the end of that year had been called in by the Kokand Government to organize their meagre troops. By September 1918 he controlled enough territory to have himself proclaimed emir-ul-musulmanin and was enthroned with all the pomp and ritual once used by the khans of Kokand.(2) Madamin was only 23 years old in 1917.(3) He was of a wider and more liberal political outlook and welcomed Tatar and Bashkir intellectuals to his force. Later, in 1919, he was to enter into an alliance with Russian anti-Bolshevik groups. In the past he too had been a convict, though his crime is not known, and in 1917 had become head of the Margelan soviet's police force. Such was the disunity between the leaders at this time that in the summer of 1918 Irgash's forces came to blows with those of Madamin, apparently over a misunderstanding.(1)

Soviet sources usually allege that the Basmachi movement was assisted by the British. PRAVDA of 10th November 1922, for instance, quotes an agreement allegedly made in September 1918 between Irgash and a Russian anti-Bolshevik group in Tashkent in which it was stated that the British would supply arms and money. It seems probable that attempts were made by Russian anti-Bolsheviks to make an agreement with the Basmachis during 1918 but nothing concrete seems to have been achieved.(4) British assistance at this time is almost certainly a myth. Colonel Etherton, the British Consul in Kashgar, recalls that he was in touch with the Fergana Basmachis but does not seem to have sent them material aid.(5) Togan (Akhmed Zeki Validov), the Bashkir nationalist leader who was later involved in the Basmachis in Samarkand, believes that the British did nothing to help the Basmachis in the early days of the revolt and writes that Madamin's envoy to Kashgar had no success.(3)

The year 1919, however, brought the Basmachis important Russian allies.

In January, Osipov, commissar for war in the Tashkent Government, staged an unsuccessful coup in Tashkent and fled to Fergana with some of his followers. For some months they joined Madamin, but left for Bukhara later in the year.(6) Of greater importance to Madamin was his alliance with the Russian "Peasant Army". This force consisted of Russian peasants settled near Dzhahalal-Abad who, having been armed by the Soviet Government in November 1918, became discontented with the rigours of War Communism and the harsh policies of Tashkent. In the summer of 1918 they entered into a formal alliance with Madamin. The combined forces captured Dzhahalal-Abad in August and followed up this success by taking Osh and Irkeshtam and by penetrating the Pamirs where they took Rangkul', Murgab, and Kyzylrabot. In the Fergana Valley, fighting became more violent: the Red Army was constantly harried and the entire railway line between Namangan and Andizhan was totally destroyed. No quarter was given to captured Soviet troops.

By September Madamin and his allies controlled enough territory in Fergana for them to feel the need of a unified and reorganized administration. Towards the end of September Madamin summoned a kurultay or congress of the population of Fergana at which a Provisional Government of Fergana was proclaimed with Madamin as president, and Monstrov, leader of the Peasant Army, as his deputy. With the aid of Russians, such as Belkin who became Madamin's chief of staff, military reorganization was carried out and administrative reforms realized. Through the Russians, contact was established with Kolchak and with other anti-Bolshevik Russian organizations. Madamin sent envoys to the Emir of Bukhara and in December 1919 received an Afghan delegation who offered him arms and financial help and who reconciled him with Irgash.(7)

The activities of Irgash during 1919 are obscure. It seems that he suffered a severe defeat from the Red Army in November 1918 (8) and in the spring of 1919 (9) made peace with the Soviet authorities. He was allowed to keep his troops and continue his rule of the Kokand district where he adopted a neutral position and did not interfere with Madamin. According to one report (1) he was killed during the summer of 1919 while fighting near Margelan and was succeeded by Khalkhodzha who joined forces with Madamin on 22nd August. (Khalkhodzha had been imprisoned during the Kerenskiy period for incitement against the Russians, but had escaped from Osh prison together with its other inmates in April 1918. (10)) Other reports confirm that Irgash was still alive in December when the Afghan delegation arrived, (11) but his name does not reappear after this time.

The success of the Fergana Provisional Government was short-lived, and external factors hastened its fall. In September the Red Army operating from central Russia defeated Ataman Dutov whose forces had for two years prevented contact between European Russia and Turkestan. Reinforcements reached the Soviet Government in Tashkent and a determined attack was made in Fergana. The Red Army recaptured Osh on 26th September and Dzhahalal-Abad on 30th. But political measures as well were to cause the fall of the Fergana Government, and disunity among the Basmachis.

PRINCIPAL THEATRES OF OPERATIONS BETWEEN SOVIET FORCES AND THE BASMACHIS.

OCTOBER 1917 — OCTOBER 1924.



J.P.



Reproduced with due acknowledgment from *Les Basmachis* by Joseph Castagné (Paris, 1925)

The New Soviet Policy: November 1919 to August 1920

In November 1919 full communications were opened between Tashkent and Moscow. The first action of the Central Government was to send the Turkestan Commission to take over authority in Tashkent from the much discredited Tashkent Bolsheviks. Immediate action was taken to win over the generally hostile native population: a Tatar brigade of the Red Army was sent to Fergana to win over their co-religionists, the Basmachis, as much by propaganda as by military operations; throughout Turkestan the bazaars were reopened and private trading permitted; food was distributed fairly between natives and Europeans; and the local population was encouraged to join the Communist Party and Soviet institutions.

The first of the rebels to be won over by the new policy was Monstrov's Peasant Army whose uneasy alliance with Madamin's Basmachis was strained by fear of Afghan influence after the visit of the Afghan delegation in December and by suspicion of Madamin who insisted on calling his troops a "Muslim People's Army" and who had called the populace to a holy war. On 12th January Monstrov started truce talks and on 17th his conditions, which included permission for his troops to retain their arms, were accepted. Most of the Russians who had been with Madamin now left him but he continued to fight for a few more months increasingly hampered by famine. On 31st January two lesser Basmachi leaders surrendered with 600 armed and 2,000 unarmed troops; and on 4th February, Parpi who had been active in the Andizhan area surrendered with 3,000 soldiers. Soviet troops now attacked Madamin in force. He was defeated but escaped. Peace offers were made to other Basmachi leaders including Islankul (Namangan district), Khalkhodzha, and Aman Palvan (one of Madamin's lieutenants). Each Basmachi leader was offered the right to retain such territory as he had conquered together with his troops and his arms; further, no Soviet institutions were to be set up in Basmachi territory and each Basmachi leader was to enjoy the status of Soviet brigade commander.(1) In March the commander of the Tatar brigade opened talks with Madamin and on 7th March an agreement was signed by which in return for an amnesty Madamin acknowledged Soviet rule.(1) The surrender of Madamin broke the resistance of the other Basmachi leaders and during March all except Kurshirmat (or Shirmukhamad Bek), who was to prove one of the most stubborn fighters, surrendered to the Soviet authorities.

On 14th May Madamin who had been sent on a peace mission to Kurshirmat was shot by him as a spy and a traitor. Kurshirmat now became undisputed Basmachi leader in Fergana and set up his own Provisional Government in May 1920. Russian administrative divisions were abolished and replaced by the system that had existed under the khans of Kokand.(12) Like Irgash, Kurshirmat was a conservative and worked closely with the clergy. He sent envoys to the Emir of Bukhara to seek his assistance but the Emir, apparently feeling bound by his treaty with the Tashkent Government (signed in March 1918 after the failure of the Bolshevik attack on Bukhara), cast them into prison and refused his

aid.(3) On 31st May therefore Kurshirmat sent his brother Tash Mekhmet to Afghanistan.

The success of the Soviet Government against all but Kurshirmat was, however, more apparent than real. The Basmachis who were enrolled in the Red Army caused continual problems owing to their indiscipline and addiction to plunder. Native mistrust of the Bolsheviks revived after the disappearance of Madamin whose fate was not known for some time. Moreover labour conscription, and in the summer of 1920, military conscription were introduced, and other unpopular measures such as requisitions continued. The nationalist intellectuals too were increasingly disillusioned by Soviet nationality policy in other parts of Russia. The events of September 1920 were to set off a new and revived Basmachi resistance movement.

The Rising Spreads to Bukhara: September 1920 to September 1921

In September 1920 the Red Army launched a successful attack on Bukhara. The Emir fled and a Young Bukharan Government was set up in his place. The Young Bukharan party was a liberal, reformist group composed mostly of young men of rich families who had been inspired by the dzhadid movement. In their opposition to the Emir's regime the party sought allies in the Russian Bolsheviks. The party fell into two factions: the moderates, and the communists, the latter being naturally more pro-Bolshevik. Both factions were united in their hatred of the old regime. The new government was closely supervised by the Russians; but it had some independence and inevitably certain tensions arose between the Young Bukharans and the Bolsheviks, which increased as the Basmachi movement in East Bukhara grew stronger. Bukhara became the rallying ground for Muslim intellectuals driven by choice or by necessity from many parts of Russia. Among them was the Bashkir leader, Togan, who arrived in Bukhara in 1921 and set about organizing the secret Turkestan National Union which aimed at a genuinely national government for Turkestan free from Russian domination.(3) Many Turkish officers, exiles or former prisoners of war, were also to be found in Bukhara at this time.

The Emir fled from his capital to East Bukhara, a mountainous region with a long history of unrest and rebellion. Here he joined his most fervent supporters, the chiefs of the turbulent local tribes, of whom the most important were Ibrahim Bek of the Lakay tribe, Tokay Sari, Ishan Sultan, and Dauletmend Bek. These united in opposing the new regime in the capital and, although at first they had little contact with Fergana, became also known as Basmachis.

Having consolidated their rule, with Russian help in western Bukhara, the Young Bukharans turned their attention to East Bukhara. In February 1921 a Red Army expedition was despatched to Gissar. It occupied Denau on 16th February, Dyushambe (now Stalinabad, the capital of Tadzhikistan) on 21st, and Kulyab on 15th March. Early in March, the Emir, under pressure from the Soviet advance, fled to Afghanistan, and in May settled near Kabul. In spite of Soviet repres-

entations to the Afghan Government, he continued to take an active interest in the fate of his former kingdom and was in close contact with the rebels of East Bukhara. During the summer of 1921, the Young Bukharan Government sent Ata Khodzha to negotiate with the Basmachis. On 1st August he concluded a treaty with some of the rebel leaders by which they swore to recognize the new government. In return Ata Khodzha promised not to allow Russian interference in East Bukhara. But the Russians refused to ratify this agreement, and as Ata Khodzha had failed to win over Ishan Sultan, Ibrahim Bek, or Tokay Sari, whose fanatical hatred of the dzhadidi prevented the possibility of any compromise with the Young Bukharans, the Basmachis took once more to arms.(3) In September Ata Khodzha was forced to withdraw with the Russian troops to Dyushambe in the face of a fierce Basmachi attack. Tension increased between the Young Bukharan negotiators and the Russian commanders. In September Ata Khodzha was replaced by his brother Osman Khodzha as Bukharan representative in East Bukhara, and Ali Riza Bek took over command of the Bukharan troops which were posted with the Russian troops at Dyushambe. The Russian commander began to intrigue with Ibrahim Bek against the Young Bukharans. Ibrahim encamped near Dyushambe, ambushed and tortured any Young Bukharans that fell into his grasp, but left the Russians unmolested.(3)

If the Basmachis of East Bukhara were prepared to use the Russians as allies in the bitter hostility to the "innovators", those of the Samarkand area were prepared to cooperate with the reformists against the Russians. Togan recounts how he was able to win over Dzhebbar (Jabbar)+ Bek and Akhil Bek, among others, to the ideas of the National Union. They agreed to support the Young Bukharans and to work for a strong national government free from Russian influence. But Togan's Union failed to win over Abdul Kakhar, one of the most powerful Basmachi leaders in this area and a staunch emirist.(3)

Meanwhile, in Fergana, the Basmachi movement gained new vitality. Well armed, well mounted, and with general popular support, the Basmachis won control of all the Fergana countryside and the towns of Margelan, Namangan and Andizhan as well. Under the command of Kurshirmat, they destroyed cotton mills and the railway line; they made contact with Togan's National Union (Kurshirmat sent two delegates to the Baku Congress of Peoples of the East in September 1920 to establish relations (3)), and with various Russian anti-Bolshevik groups. They had supporters in Party and Soviet offices, and thus received advance information about Russian moves. Their ranks were strengthened by the adherence of Turkish officers and Muslim intellectuals from many parts of Russia.(3) In spite of several large-scale attacks the Red Army could make little headway against them until the summer of 1921, when the Soviet forces were greatly reinforced.

+ See "A Note on Sources", fourth paragraph, at end of article.

In spite of the fact that the Emir of Bukhara had refused Kurshirmat help earlier in the year, after his deposition in September 1920 the Emir sent letters and presents to Kurshirmat asking for assistance. Kurshirmat apparently felt himself sufficiently strong to send 500 men under his brother Ruz Mekhmet, and later in the year went himself to East Bukhara to meet the Emir at Dyushambe.(3)

The Soviet Government was using both military and political methods against the Fergana Basmachis at this time: peace talks were interspersed with increasing military pressure. Attempts were made to win over the native population and the newly formed Red Militia had some success. In August 1921 truce talks were started with Kurshirmat and his deputy the Kirgiz Muetdin. But the Basmachis refused to agree to lay down their arms.

In September, however, the Red Army was reinforced by two divisions. On 12th September Nizam Khodzhayev, President of the Central Executive Committee of Turkestan, came to negotiate with Kurshirmat. According to Kurshirmat's memoirs quoted by Togan (3) Nizam Khodzhayev said: "I now embody the Government of Turkestan. You may join us and should it be necessary we shall die together." Whereupon Kurshirmat asked: "Is the Russian Military Staff in Tashkent with its troops also subordinate to you?" "Yes." "If that is so, command them to abandon the whole of Turkestan immediately. From that hour I too will enter your service and recognize you." Nizam Khodzhayev hung his head for shame and left without another word. A Soviet source (Ginzburg (9)) says only that Kurshirmat was presented with an ultimatum to disarm, that he prevaricated, and therefore the Red Army launched an attack. After furious fighting near Margelan, Kurshirmat was defeated and fled to East Bukhara. Severe casualties depleted the Basmachi ranks; among those that fell was the Kirgiz scholar Turekul Dzhanuzakogly, who was one of the first to have studied Kirgiz oral epics and to have written down the great saga MANAS. The Red attack was so successful that only Muetdin was left to carry on the struggle with greatly reduced troops and territory.(3) But if the back had been broken of the Fergana rebels, the rising in Bukhara had not yet reached its zenith.

The Epic of Enver Pasha: November 1921 to August 1922

By the end of 1921 the effects of the New Economic Policy began to be felt in Central Asia. Private trading was once more allowed, and the peasants were given funds and seeds. In addition, in their effort to win the native population the Soviet Government reintroduced the shariat courts, restored the wagf lands to religious foundations and permitted religious schools to be reopened. In Fergana the much weakened Basmachis fell prey to Soviet intrigues which set one leader against another and Kirgiz against Uzbek. A rift opened between Muetdin the Kirgiz commander in Fergana and his deputy the Uzbek Izrail Bek. In January 1922 Kurshirmat came especially from East Bukhara in a fruitless attempt to restore unity. In face of a determined Soviet advance Muetdin was forced

back to the Alay mountains where he was captured in June. In September he was put to death. But a handful of local leaders continued to form pockets of resistance in the Fergana area.

In East Bukhara the situation remained unchanged until the arrival in the autumn of 1921 of the already legendary Enver Pasha whose adherence to the Basmachis gave the resistance movement a short-lived international renown. After the defeat of Turkey in the World War, Enver Pasha who had been the leading figure in the Young Turk triumvirate, was disgraced and condemned to death by the nationalist government of Kemal Ataturk. He escaped to Germany and thence, in 1920, to Moscow, hoping to find in the Russian Bolsheviks allies in his personal campaign against British imperialism. On its side, the Russian Government hoped to use Enver's immense prestige in the Islamic world to win the Muslims of Russia to the Bolsheviks. Jemal Pasha, the second member of the triumvirate, had reached Russia before Enver and was sent to Afghanistan in October 1920 to dispel Afghan suspicions of Moscow. It seems likely that Lenin hoped to use Enver in a similar capacity in Bukhara. A closer acquaintance with the Bolsheviks, however, gradually raised doubts in Enver's mind, and the Soviet treaty with Kemal, Enver's bitterest rival, which was signed in March 1921 no doubt decided him to change his allegiance. In October 1921 Enver arrived in Bukhara apparently "on a mission of peace" to the Basmachis. (13)

In Bukhara he learned of the situation in East Bukhara and held discussions with nationalist leaders. Togan reports his first meeting with Enver at which Enver discussed his plans for uniting the Basmachis and the nationalists against the Russians. Togan attempted to dissuade him arguing that the Russians were now in a position to concentrate all their military strength in Turkestan, that the country was suffering an acute famine, that the Fergana Basmachis had been much weakened, and that no understanding had yet been reached between the Emir and his supporters and the reformists. Togan urged Enver instead to go to Afghanistan where his services would be more valuable. Others, however, and notably Hajji Sami, a Turkish officer who accompanied Enver, urged him to join the Basmachis. For some days Enver was undecided; but his cold reception by the Russian representative in Bukhara, Yurinev, decided his course of action. On his last night in Bukhara he told his aide Muhiyeddin: "We must fight for Turkestan, and if we fear the death that is ordained by fate and prefer to live the life of dogs we deserve the curses of our ancestors and of our descendants. But if we can bear to fight for freedom, we shall have ensured the liberty and happiness of our descendants." Muhiyeddin recalls that Enver dreamed of creating a Turkic kingdom in Turkestan.(3)

Early in November 1921 Enver rode out of the city of Bukhara ostensibly on a hunting expedition. He was accompanied by a party of 25 of his closest adherents. Khalil, the deputy chief of police in Bukhara, went in advance to Dyushambe to warn Ali Riza and Osman Khodzha of Enver's approach. Enver travelled through Karshi to Termez where he was joined by Osman Kharvush, head of the Shirabad militia, with about 50 men. His force grew to about 100 men.

At Dzhilikul' he met the Basmachi leader Tokay Sari who commanded some 2,000 men and who warned him not to make contact with Ibrahim Bek. But at the end of November Enver moved into Ibrahim's territory and on 1st December the two leaders met. Ibrahim at once disarmed Enver on suspicion that he was a Bolshevik spy and Enver was kept virtually a prisoner for some six weeks until a letter from the Emir dispelled Ibrahim's suspicion. But Enver was still looked on with mistrust as the man who "turned out Sultan Abdul Hamid and started the whole of the New Movement".(3)

Hajji Sami meanwhile had travelled to Dyushambe, enlisted Osman Khodzha and Ali Riza, and attempted a coup against the Russians. The troops at Dyushambe consisted of 600 Uzbeks commanded by Ali Riza, and a smaller number of Russians. The Russians, however, offered stubborn resistance and were helped by Ibrahim Bek. On 12th December Ali Riza was forced to surrender the town and fled with Hajji Sami and Osman Khodzha to Afghanistan, hotly pursued by the Russians and Ibrahim Bek's Lakays.

On 15th January 1922, however, Enver Pasha was released by Ibrahim Bek and allowed to join Ishan Sultan at Gissar. From now on his successes grew and as his prestige heightened so more and more flocked to join his force. At the end of January with a small force of 200 poorly armed Tadzhiks he advanced on Dyushambe. At the first attack Enver captured 120 rifles and two machine guns. He besieged the town and by 8th February the Russians had lost 100 men and 88 had deserted to Enver. On 14th February the town was surrendered and Enver pursued the Russians to Mirtube. Later in February, warned of an impending Russian attack, Enver withdrew to Kafirnigan. Nonetheless the capture of Dyushambe won him the support of other Basmachi leaders. Early in March Kurshirmat sent 100 soldiers from Fergana under his brother Ruz Mekhmet to join Enver. In April 300 Afghan volunteers, recruited by Hajji Sami and Osman Khodzha in Kabul, joined Enver bringing arms and money. In the middle of April at a meeting of rebel leaders at Kafirnigan Enver was declared to be their political and military leader and he took the title of "Commander of the Muslim and Bukharan Armies". Finally in May, Ibrahim Bek came to make his apologies, but he still mistrusted Enver and took no part in the fighting.

Optimism grew among the Basmachis. By May Enver's troops had grown to 7,000. He was joined by the former President of the Kokand Government, Adil Dzhan, by 70-year old Khadzhi Khekem (Hajji Hakim) who had been formerly in the service of Yakub Bek at Kashgar, by the Azerbaydzhani scholar and reformist, Akhund Yusuf Telibzade, and most significant of all, by the Bukharan Minister of War, Abdul Khamid (Hamid) Arifov. At the end of April Enver sent emissaries to other parts of Turkestan to unite the resistance movement. He appealed to the Turkmen leader Dzhunaid Khan who was still showing strong resistance in the Karakum desert. Ali Riza was sent to the Amu-Dar'ya to make contact with the Turkmen, and Telibzade went to Samarkand whence he was to travel north into Kazakhstan to win support there. Enver advanced on Baysun, the fortress which commanded the approaches to western Bukhara, but in spite of repeated attacks he was unable to make it surrender.

Meanwhile the Basmachis around Samarkand who worked closely with the National Union gained control of most of the countryside. But Enver does not seem to have had much success in uniting them with his own forces. In March and April Abdul Kakhar, the strongest but most reactionary of the Samarkand Basmachis, besieged Bukhara. This attack is frequently ascribed to Enver (14) but in fact he seems to have had no part in it. In May the Basmachis were so strong around Samarkand that when Eliava and Ordzhonikidze visited Ulug Bek's Observatory they could do so only under a strong guard.(3)

In April a ten-man Soviet peace delegation arrived in Baysun to negotiate a truce.(1) But Enver's reply was uncompromising: "Peace is only acceptable after the withdrawal of Russian troops from Turkestan soil. The Freedom Fighters, whose commander I am, have sworn to fight for independence and freedom until their last breath." Togan wrote to Enver urging him to accept the peace offer as he had news from Moscow that the Soviet Government intended to send 100,000 men to Turkestan if the offer were refused.(3) Possibly before Togan's letter arrived, however, Enver sent an ultimatum to the Soviet Government on 19th May through his friend Nariman Narimanov, President of the Azerbaydzhan Soviet Republic. Enver demanded that all Russian forces and all Soviet institutions should be removed from Turkestan, Khiva, and Bukhara within fifteen days of the receipt of the ultimatum. Not surprisingly the Soviet Government did not reply, but massed its troops for an attack.(1)

Intrigues started between the Russians and the Emir's followers. Former officials of the Emir were taken into the service of the Young Bukharan Government and made contact with the emirist Basmachis and thus learned of the rebels' movements. The Emir's supporters started to attack the Basmachis who were of more liberal outlook. In April Abdul Kakhar's band attacked and murdered twelve Bashkir officers who had come to join the Samarkand Basmachis. Ishan Sultan attacked and disarmed the forces of Fuzayl Makhdum, a staunch supporter of Enver, in Karategin. Another emirist, Evliyakul Toksaba attacked Dzhebbar Bek and then deserted to the Russians with 400 men.(3) Ibrahim Bek and his Lakays continued to harry Enver, and in July Enver was forced to send Dauletmend with a strong force against them. Enver was in close contact with the Emir and urged him to use his influence among his followers, but whether from inability or from disinclination the Emir did nothing.

In June and July Soviet military pressure increased. In June they captured Nurata, a stronghold of the Samarkand Basmachis, and in July advanced into East Bukhara taking Denau, Dyushambe, Kurgan-Tyube, Kulyab, and Bol'dzhuan. Enver with his depleted forces retreated east. In July the Afghan volunteers who were with him were recalled to Kabul as a result of a rapprochement between Moscow and Kabul. Ibrahim Bek and the Lakays continued to attack anyone they considered to be a dzhadid and cooperated with the Russians. On 4th August Enver with a small band of his most devoted followers was celebrating the feast of sacrifice at a village near Bol'dzhuan. Warning

came that a Russian force of 300 men was approaching. Enver immediately left his companions and with only 25 men rode to the attack. After furious hand to hand fighting in which the faithful Dauletmend fell Enver was killed by a machine gun bullet fired by a Russian soldier from a rock above the gorge where the fighting took place. Enver was buried at Cheken near Bol'dzhuan and fifteen thousand people gathered at his funeral to lament his death.(15)

The Basmachis are Crushed: September 1922 to the end of 1923

From the autumn of 1922 Soviet troops poured into the Basmachi areas. In Fergana, the Red forces cordoned the towns and prevented contact between town and countryside. Corn was imported to the towns, but the Basmachis and the peasants in the countryside suffered acute famine. In March 1923 the Soviet authorities offered the peasants corn on condition that they used it only for their own food and that they planted cotton. Forced by hunger the peasants agreed. The Basmachis were thus deprived of their food supplies and had to extort corn by force from the peasantry. They lost their strongest weapon - the support of the local population and the movement deteriorated into banditry. Once more they became prey to internal dissensions. Although desperately weakened, those who still continued to fight were the most convinced and stubborn opponents of Russian rule, and it was not until June 1923 that the Red Army cleared the Andizhan and Namangan districts, while the Kokand area was not freed from Basmachis until August.

In Samarkand too, the Basmachis gave stubborn resistance as they were forced further into the Turkestan and Gissar mountains. Togan who was fighting with Akhil Bek's group left them to escape to Europe at the end of 1922. After much hard fighting Akhil Bek was killed in May 1923. Other Basmachis from this area were either crushed or retreated to East Bukhara.

After Enver Pasha's death, Hajji Sami was elected commander in East Bukhara, and started a desperate campaign for unity among his much depleted forces. He sent emissaries to Ishan Sultan, who had withdrawn to the Darvaz mountains, and on his refusing to fight, captured him and put him to death. Ibrahim Bek had been attacked by the Russians after Enver's death and agreed to join Hajji Sami. Kurshirmat too rallied to his side and his seasoned Fergana troops were the nucleus of Hajji Sami's small force. But the Basmachis were forced ever further east and north into the mountains and in spite of vigorous partisan actions could make no impression on the overwhelming mass of the Soviet army. Kurshirmat left for Afghanistan at the end of 1922. In May 1923 Hajji Sami suffered a crushing defeat, and, badly wounded, escaped to Afghanistan on 23rd June. Deprived of a commander, the Basmachis splintered into small local groups. In July 1923 the Red Army pushed into Karategin and on 17th captured Garm. From here they mopped up the remnants of the Fergana Basmachis who had retreated into the Alay mountains.

Resistance was now broken, but small pockets of opposition still existed. Around Kerki, Ali Riza fought on for three more months, and Abdul Kakhar who had withdrawn from the Samarkand area continued to fight well into 1924. During 1925 Kurshirmat's brother was still active around Bol'dzhuan and Ibrahim Bek continued fighting in the Vakhsh valley. But most of the other leaders escaped to Afghanistan.

In November 1925 Soviet troops occupied the island of Urta-Tugay in the Amu-Dar'ya on the grounds that it was being used as a base for Basmachi raids into Soviet territory. In 1926 Ibrahim Bek withdrew to Afghanistan. At the end of 1928 Amanullah, the Emir of Afghanistan, was overthrown and his throne temporarily seized by Bachcha-i-Saqao, a bandit leader from northern Afghanistan.(16) Whether from encouragement from the new ruler - as Soviet sources allege - or from the generally anarchic situation in Afghanistan, or whether from native opposition to the Soviet collectivization drive in the Soviet Union, Basmachi raids from Afghanistan into Soviet territory grew bolder in the early months of 1929. In April 1929 Maksum Fuzayli crossed the border and in twelve days advanced 200 kilometres to Garm increasing his troops on the way from 25 to 500. At the same time Kurshirmat captured the village of Vanch. But Soviet paratroops quickly dealt with these incursions.(17)

Throughout 1930 and 1931 Ibrahim Bek continued to harass the Soviet authorities. There was considerable press speculation on his whereabouts, but he was captured by Soviet troops in July 1931 after leading yet another raid, and was executed shortly after.(18) Ibrahim Bek was the last of the leading Basmachis to be suppressed, but emigre Turkestan newspapers continued to report sporadic outbursts of local resistance even up to 1950.(19)

Some General Conclusions

Turkestan writers such as Hayit, or Togan, see the Basmachi movement as a national revolt of the Turkic peoples of Central Asia against Russian domination. Togan writes: "The Basmachi movement is a great national movement. . . It was joined by men who had taken part in the 1916 rising, by those who participated in the revolt of Dukchi Ishan in 1898, by old men who had fought with the last khans of Kokand and with Yakub Bek of Kashgar. . . This national rising was adopted by the Turkestan National Union and it was joined by members of the Bashkir, Bukharan and Khivan governments, by Kirgiz and Kazakh intellectuals, by western Turkish officers, by Enver Pasha, by many Afghans and Kashgaris. . . Not since the sixteenth century has there been a national movement among the Turkic races of Turkestan which absorbed every class of the native population. . . and lasted for so many years."(3) Both Togan and Hayit emphasize that the movement was "pan-Turk" rather than "pan-Islamic", that it fought for political independence rather than for traditional Islam.

While it is true that the Basmachi revolt covered a large area and in-

volved a large number of people fighting was restricted always to local partisan actions. There was contact but little coordination between the numerous local leaders, and even Enver Pasha failed to weld the Basmachis into a single force. Moreover those Basmachi leaders who achieved the greatest renown were not the intellectuals or the reformists but the conservative Muslims such as Irgash, Kurshirmat, Ishan Sultan, or Ibrahim Bek. Ginzburg (9) says of the Fergana Basmachis: "The Kokand Government gave the Basmachi movement its leaders and a political character, former robbers made up the general staff, and the ruined peasantry became the rank and file." But it would seem to be truer to say that the former robbers were both the leaders and the general staff. Vasilevskiy (17) is more accurate when he says that the native bourgeoisie were too weak to become the leaders of the revolt and so they joined forces either with the reactionaries or with Russian anti-Bolshevik groups.

The rise of the Basmachi revolt in East Bukhara was a direct consequence of the overthrow of the Emir. But the origins of the Fergana Basmachis are more complex. The Fergana Valley had been conquered by the Russians in 1875-6, but the population were not reconciled to their new rulers and rose against the Russians in 1877-82, 1886, 1898, and 1916. The mullas and educated classes remained openly hostile. Under Russian rule cotton-growing had been introduced and by the Great War 50 per cent of the cultivable area was under cotton. Fergana became the most prosperous area of Russian Turkestan. By 1917 the dislocation in the transport system meant that huge stocks of cotton had accumulated in Fergana while insufficient grain was imported. The result was an acute economic crisis, mass unemployment and famine, which affected all classes. The immediate causes of the movement can be found in the excesses of the early Soviet government, the abolition of the shariat, and in the sacking of Kokand.

Soviet sources such as Vasilevskiy (17) ascribe the defeat of the Basmachis to the success of the Soviet authorities in winning over the peasantry, to increasing prosperity and to the introduction of reforms. While the relatively lenient policies of the N.E.P. period certainly contributed to the decline of the revolt, there is no doubt that dissension in the Basmachi ranks and the sheer weight of Russian arms were overriding factors. Today the vastly increased number of Russian settlers in Central Asia precludes any possibility of such a widespread revolt being repeated.

A Note on Sources

A standard account of the Basmachis in Fergana, written from the Soviet point of view, is Ginzburg's article "The Basmachi Movement in Fergana" (NOVYY VOSTOK, 10-11, 1925). This has been used as the basis for the account of the Basmachis in the Fergana Valley. Joseph Castagné's LES BASMATCHIS (Paris, 1925) contains some useful information on Fergana and East Bukhara, but the chronology

is often not clear, and the work is based largely on newspaper reports.

The basis for the account of the East Bukharan Basmachis is a typescript English translation of Togan's *TURKILI VE YAKIN TARIHI* (Istanbul, 1942-7). Though his general conclusions are somewhat romanticized and his narrative not always clearly exposed, Togan writes with personal knowledge of the events and personalities involved in them.

The most valuable general account of the movement is to be found in Baymirza Hayit's *TURKESTAN IM XX. JAHRHUNDERT* (Darmstadt, 1956). Hayit has used Russian, German and Turkestan sources, including Ginzburg and Togan.

The problem of transliteration is gravely complicated by the variety of sources used. In general, place and personal names have been transliterated from the current Russian versions. Where common Muslim names are obscured by transliteration from Russian the more usual spelling has been added in brackets e.g. Khadzhi (Hajji).

Notes

- (1) Baymirza Hayit. *TURKESTAN IM XX. JAHRHUNDERT*, Darmstadt, 1956, Chapter III. (A typescript English translation has been used.)
- (2) Akhmed Zeki Validi Togan. *TURKILI VE YAKIN TARIHI*, Istanbul, 1942-7, Chapter V. (A typescript English translation has been used.) Togan says that Kishkin Irgash, head of the Kokand troops, was killed after 12 days fighting near Kokand and his place taken by Katte Irgash. Joseph Castagné. *LES BASMATCHIS*, Paris, 1925, pp.81-82.
- (3) Togan, *op.cit.*
- (4) Castagné, *op.cit.*, pp.21-22. See also Alexander G. Park, *BOLSHEVISM IN TURKESTAN*, New York, 1957, pp.31, 41.
- (5) Etherton. *IN THE HEART OF ASIA*, London, 1925, pp.151, 159, 230. See also *CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW*, Vol.VII, No.2, "The Revolt in Transcaspia", pp.126-8, for an account of alleged British intervention in Turkestan in 1918-20.
- (6) Castagné, *op.cit.*, p.84.
- (7) I. Reysner. *AFGANISTAN*, Moscow, 1929, pp.205-7. See also *CAR*, Vol.IV, No.2, p.172, for an account of the Afghan attitude to the Basmachis at this time.
- (8) Castagné, p.82.

- (9) Ginzburg. "Basmachi Movement in Fergana", NOVYY VOSTOK, 10-11, 1925, says that this was in February. Togan op.cit. says in May.
- (10) Hayit, op.cit.; Castagné, p.83.
- (11) Castagné, p.18; Reysner, op.cit.
- (12) Hayit gives a full account of Kurshirmat's administration.
- (13) See BULLETIN PERIODIQUE DE LA PRESSE RUSSE, No.107, June and July 1922.
- (14) See Fitzroy Maclean. A PERSON FROM ENGLAND, London, 1958, p.343; and G.S. Agabekov. G.P.U. ZAPISKI CHEKISTA, Berlin, 1930, pp.47-48.
- (15) This version of Enver's death seems to be the best substantiated. Agabekov op.cit., however, devotes a chapter of his book to describing how he was sent by the Soviet counter-espionage organization to find Enver. Disguised as a merchant he travelled to East Bukhara to the camp where Enver was settled. The camp was two days' journey from Denau. Having located him, Agabekov sent word back to the Russian commander at Denau who immediately despatched a force which attacked the camp and killed Enver. In another work (CHEKA ZA RABOTOI, Berlin, 1931) which is used by Fitzroy Maclean (14) Agabekov describes Enver's camp as one day's journey from Denau. Bol'dzhuan where according to other sources (Castagné, Hayit, Togan op.cit.) Enver was killed is about 100 miles from Denau as the crow flies and the intervening country is mountainous and broken by steep valleys. Agabekov's story must thus be suspect.
- (16) See CAR, Vol.IV, No.4, pp.176-7, 178, 179-80.
- (17) Vasilevskiy. "Phases of the Basmachi Movement in Central Asia", NOVYY VOSTOK, No.29, 1930.
- (18) CAR ibidem, p.199.
- (19) Hayit, op.cit., Note 530.

RECENT LITERATURE IN CENTRAL ASIA

A prominent feature of the Soviet regime in Central Asia has been the creation of new national literatures. The pre-Revolutionary tradition was mainly poetical and the literary forms of the novel, short story, drama and film script are still young. In the absence of any native tradition these forms have developed according to the example of Russian classical and Soviet literatures, which are still the official models for study. In the circumstances, the relation of Russian to Asian Soviet literature is that of an elder brother, while the official Asian attitude towards Russian Soviet literature is one of provincial deference towards the metropolis.

Soviet authorities regard it as important that the literature of a previously backward people should include all literary forms. A subordinate reason for this is that some have a greater propaganda capacity than others (for example the play and film script). The main reason, however, is that the degree of development of a people's literature is taken as an index of the degree of development of its culture and economy as a whole so that a fully developed literature becomes a convenient symbol of the benefits of the October Revolution. This has a bearing on the level of technical skill of Soviet Central Asian literature.

Technical skill

In Kazakhstan it was reported at a plenum of the Management Committee of the Writers' Union that Kazakh poetry was characterized by "wordiness, rhetoric, inability to solve the themes undertaken powerfully, originally and vividly, inability to respond to important events in the life of the republic and of the whole Soviet land in such a way as to sear the hearts of men with its voice".(1)

In Turkmenistan also young writers, while praised by Abdulla Muradov for their choice of subjects, are criticized for their inability to draw convincing characters and for their pale language.(2)

There is a more drastic mixture of praise and blame in the case of Kirgiz writers who are praised for their increased skill in character-drawing since the war (when, apparently, the heroes of prose and verse works had frequently been men "whom fire does not burn, nor water drown", who would be more in place in the folk-epics from which they were presumably drawn). By 1957 they had been replaced by typical representatives of the present time as a result of Kirgiz authors' "thoughtful assimilation" of the rich experience of, among others, Russian literature.

At the same time THE LAST CARTRIDGE by N. Baytemirov was criticized for its portrayal of a class enemy who, instead of working in quiet concealment, draws attention to himself by abducting a Komsomol secretary and trying to marry her forcibly. "To our eyes", writes the author of the article, "this character is quite unrepresentative [of a class enemy]". (3)

Writing about Azerbaydzhani poetry A. Effendiyev says (4) that "character is the Achilles' heel of the long poems of today", and M. Guseyn (5) reproaches Azerbaydzhani poets for writing derivative poems dealing with worn-out situations. Agricultural themes were being treated in a cliché'd style which had grown up recently, while the theatre and cinema (apart from the work of I. Efendiyev) were both laggards.

These criticisms were repeated at the Third Writers' Congress of Azerbaydzhani where some prose works, especially those on agricultural subjects, were characterized as primitive, schematic, full of longueurs, unnecessary details and tiresome descriptions. (6)

Sweeping criticisms of the young writers of Tadzhikistan appeared in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in a report of the proceedings of a plenum of the Management Committee of the Tadzhik Writers' Union. Plays were said to lack conflict, to contain too much talk and not enough action and to be guilty of schematic character drawing and careless and inexpressive language. Prose works are said to deal with shallow subjects, to be monotonous and at times "quite hopeless". Young writers are in too much of a hurry to publish and as a result do not polish their work. So, in a recent book by M. Sharki, who, in spite of all, is said to be talented, only one story deserves approval; the others are so bad in subject, language and composition that they cannot be called literature at all. Young writers in general, the article reports, are unwilling to work or take advice and are spoiled by indulgent criticism. (7) Tadzhik playwrights were also criticized (8) for not having produced a new play on a contemporary theme for the Tadzhik Ten-Day Festival in Moscow.

At a writers' meeting called by the Tadzhik Central Committee no less a person than the president of the Writers' Union, M. Tursun-zade, was criticized for leaving his hitherto much praised poem THE VOICE OF ASIA in a half-finished state in the original, trusting that its faults would be glossed over in the Russian translation (which the author obviously considered to be more important). The original Tadzhik version was said to be no more than a first draft. (9)

The most comprehensive criticism of technical weaknesses in a Central Asian literature, however, appears in ZVEZDA VOSTOKA. (10) In this article young Uzbek writers are criticized for faulty construction, love of clichés, unnatural, lifeless dialogue, the use of Dei ex machina to aid the plot over a difficult situation and a primitive and naive conception of the positive hero combined with a general inability to draw characters. Their stories are encumbered with irrelevant detail. THE SON-IN-LAW by S. Anarbayev, for example, is an attempt at the

"psychological" type of story in which the point - the disappointment of an old man in his son-in-law and his family whom he meets at a family gathering - is intended to be conveyed by a description of things done and said without the direct intervention of the author, speaking in his own person. The criticism indicates that it was an unsuccessful attempt at the genre from any point of view but suggests (since it is criticized also for not containing a declaration of the author's point of view) that few stories of this type are likely to be favourably received in the Soviet Union. The article goes on to criticize young Uzbek writers for their high-flown language even in dialogue. The following example is given (the heroine speaks): "This man, my husband, in his nobility appears to me like the sun, thrusting his rays through gloom. That man I curse like a shade before my eyes, but this man I worship." Finally, the article concludes, there is noticeable in different authors a depressing similarity of theme and treatment, even of characters: the setting is a factory (or kolkhoz) and the home. The heroes, whether intellectuals, workers or collective farmers, experience and suffer the same things. The basic conflict is likely to be between a suffering wife and a feudally-minded husband or, more recently, between an ideal husband and a spoiled wife.

It is difficult to decide how correctly the above criticisms represent modern Central Asian literature. As was noted above in the case of Tursun-zade, originally weak productions often gain from translation into Russian. Also, critics have naturally tended to pay more attention to technical faults than to technical excellences. However, certain conclusions can be drawn. The above criticisms refer mainly, though not exclusively, to young writers and it is obvious that their low level of technical achievement is causing concern. Many reasons are alleged for this state of affairs - idleness on the part of the young writers themselves, lack of experienced guidance from the writers' organizations and from senior writers, indulgent criticism. Young writers' faults appear also to be due to an inadequate grasp of realism as a technique. Their weakness in this direction may be partly explained by the fact that they have no native realistic tradition to fall back upon, partly by the extreme care necessary in a Soviet writer to prevent his realism from toppling over the edge into "naturalism" (see below). Finally, the Soviet eagerness that all forms should be represented in Central Asian literature has obviously led to the publication of works which would, perhaps, never be considered for publication in any other country. This has made the quantitative achievement of Soviet Central Asian literature impressive, but at the expense of quality.

The role of literary criticism

During any discussion of the shortcomings of Central Asian literature in the Soviet press, one of the many alleged reasons - and one which is constant - is unsatisfactory literary criticism. In almost all the cases of technical weakness quoted above the literary critic was one of the scapegoats, in some cases for indulgent criticism which "spoils" young writers, in others for in-

discriminately damning criticism which discourages them, and on one occasion for partiality: I.D. Mustafayev, First Secretary of the Azerbaydzhani Central Committee, accused critics of working on the basis of "this was written by X, so we cannot criticize it; this was written by Y, so we must criticize it".

Theoretically the literary critic's task is more than literary. He is expected to comment not only on the form, style, construction etc. of a given work, but also on the ideological correctness of the development of its theme. Mustafayev's remark implies that these two duties sometimes conflict and this can be confirmed from independent sources.

There are some differences observable between certain passages in the Russian and Kazakh versions of OCHERK ISTORII KAZAKHSKOY SOVETSKOY LITERATURY, AN/Kaz. SSR (Alma-Ata, 1958), the Kazakh edition of which was reviewed in PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN' KAZAKHSTANA, 1958, No.7. In the Kazakh edition the article on M. Auezov omitted all this author's work written during the 'twenties except KARASH-KARASH (which is favourably regarded by Soviet critics). The Russian edition has expanded its account to include such suspect works as KARAKOZ (Black Eyes) and KIYLY ZAMAN (Difficult Times). M. Auezov is at present a highly favoured writer. His chronical-novel ABAY has been hailed as the supreme achievement of Kazakh prose (although when the novel first appeared Auezov was criticized for idealizing the feudal system of the past and minimizing the class contradictions of the pre-revolutionary aul. See CAR, Vol.I, No.1, p.79, and Vol.II, No.3, pp.355-6). It is a fair supposition that his earlier works were left out of account in the earlier (Kazakh) edition because the authors of the chapter were not sure what their attitude towards them should be. (This book gives other examples of the flexibility of critics. For example, in the Kazakh edition G. Mustafin in his novel KARAGANDA was said "... not [to have] succeeded in creating large-scale, memorable images of Russian people". This statement was criticized as needing support. The Russian edition on this point reads: "the novel's distinction is in its images of Russian and Ukrainian workers".)

A further possible reason for the omission of the early work of some writers is given by Mukhitdinov in his speech at the First Congress of the Intelligentsia of Uzbekistan, on the 11th October 1956. He noted that critics were avoiding the period 1905-17 "through a fear of permitting some mistakes in their evaluation of dzhadidism (jadidism) to which even some progressive Uzbek writers and poets at times adhered", and were so shy of the 'twenties that one received the impression that the only writer active then was Khamza. The time had come to investigate the cases of certain writers and poets whose works had been suppressed but who, although they may have committed mistakes, were not hostile to either Party or people. As an example he names Abdulla Kadyri (Dzhulkunbay).

Kadyri was suppressed in the late 'thirties because of nationalist tendencies (although the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia 1st ed., 1937, writes of him:

"Kadyri's work has been influenced by nationalist tendencies from which the writer has freed himself during recent years"). Certain critics evidently assumed from Mukhitdinov's words and other similar indications that the way was clear for a denial of the existence of nationalism in the 'thirties. These critics came in for reproof after Khrushchev's thesis on the connection between literature and art and the life of the people (May 1957). By then they had obviously gone too far in the direction indicated by Mukhitdinov and in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA of the 29th July 1958 Izzat Sultanov redressed the balance. While it was quite correct, he said, that Kadyri should have been rehabilitated, his rehabilitation and that of Fitrat (Abdul Rauf) and Chulpan (whose fate appears to have been the same as that of Kadyri), should not give rise to any doubt whether there had been such a thing as nationalism at all. The rehabilitation of these writers was justified not because there was no nationalism in the 'thirties, but because by that time they had abandoned their former nationalist standpoint.

These particular evolutions took place during the "thaw" and so to a certain extent represent a special case. However the difficulty, which they illustrate, of foretelling correctly the Party line is a constant one, and it is this difficulty which explains the critic's caution and preference for tried cliches. And yet it is this caution and unwillingness to speak except in commonplaces which attracts criticism from the Party and from fellow-writers.

Ideological considerations

The period under consideration begins approximately with N.S. Khrushchev's paper "The Connection between Literature and Art and the Life of the People" (11th May 1957) in which he criticized Dudintsev and others for writing and M. Aliger for publishing works which distorted Soviet actuality and showed it in a bad light. Khrushchev devoted one paragraph to two films (CAVALIER OF THE GOLD STAR and KUBAN' COSSACKS) which exemplified the other extreme and showed Soviet actuality in too favourable a light. In fact no Central Asian writer has been criticized on this ground. In this paper Khrushchev reaffirmed complete ultimate Party control over works of art. His words were echoed in all the republics of Central Asia, but most graphically by M. Tursun-zade, President of the Tadzhik Writers' Union. In June 1957 (12) he stated that advanced writers had always served the Party and were still in the vanguard of the battle for peace, technical progress and the fulfilment of all the decisions of the Party and Government. He ended with the threat not to coddle (nyanchit'sya) writers who lacked Party spirit (partiynost'). "We will obtain from them. . . truthful works which will help the Party to carry on the battle for our just cause." In September of the same year (13) he explained that present criticisms did not mean that writers should ignore the seamy side of Soviet life. Life must be reflected in all its fullness, but reflected so that the result should be an affirmation of what is new and advanced. In a similar context an Uzbek

writer quoted with approval Mayakovskiy's proud declaration in AT THE TOP OF MY VOICE that he was "called-up and mobilized by the Revolution". He did not go on to quote "I set my foot on the throat of my own song".(14)

In all republics also the criticism was made that the life of the people was more varied than was shown by Soviet literature. Writers were urged to go out among the people and study their life before writing about it, as B. Kerbabayev had studied the life of Turkmen oil-workers before writing NEBIT-DAG. The First Secretary of the Azerbaydzhani Central Committee, I.D. Mustafayev, however, made concrete suggestions for remedying the situation, at least as far as young writers were concerned. Young writers, he said (11), must "work in the corresponding industry or organization", that is to say (presumably) that if they want to write about an oilfield they must first work in one. This, Mustafayev went on, would give them discipline and a better knowledge of the life of the people. He remarked, however, that the young writers were not eager to follow his advice.

As a corollary of the criticism that present-day life was unsatisfactorily reflected in Soviet Central Asian literature came exhortations to writers to deal more with modern themes. In October 1957 S. Babayev, then the First Secretary of the Turkmen Central Committee, gave a specimen list of such themes; the images of the modern shepherd, milkmaid, swineherd and silk-cultivator and of the workers on the Karakum Canal.(15) Strangely enough this theme was most emphasized this year in Kazakhstan, in spite of the fact that the greatest Kazakh literary success of recent years has been M. Auezov's historical novel ABAY. Urged, perhaps, by a message from the Kazakh Central Committee which noted the undesirable fact that modern themes are rare in Kazakh Soviet literature, G. Musrepov, President of the Writers' Union, said in his report to the Fourth Writers' Congress that there must be a return to modern themes. The rot had set in, he said, with S. Mukanov's SULU SHASH (Pretty Hair) (approximately 1928) which dealt with the position of women in a feudal and patriarchal society, and Kazakh literature had followed his "infectious example" through inertia ever since. He himself and M. Auezov were also to blame. Nevertheless the young people should know the history of their country, of the battle of the workers for liberation, the heroic history of the Communist Party. Consequently Kazakh writers, while turning towards modern themes, must continue to give a reflection of the revolutionary past of each people.

It is not surprising that this confused and self-contradictory exposition came in for criticism from S. Mukanov (M. Auezov did not speak). Mukanov claimed that anything, old or new, connected with revolutionary transformations and socialist construction was "modern". Kazakh authors had the right to write about Chokan Valikhanov (as Mukanov himself has done, in a play) or Ibray Altynsaryn on the same artistic level as that on which Auezov had written about Abay. Musrepov's thesis was reaffirmed, however, by Dzhandil'din, a Secretary of the Central Committee.(16)

While the above criticisms apply equally to all republics, in three - Kazakhstan, Kirgizia and Tadzhikistan - there was specific criticism of individual writers for having "distorted Soviet actuality".

In the Party magazine PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN' KAZAKHSTANA, (17) Sabit Mukanov's novel THE ROLLING STEPPE published in SOVETSKIY KAZAKHSTAN, 1957, Nos.1-3 (i.e. before Khrushchev's paper) was severely criticized on this ground. The editorial board of SOVETSKIY KAZAKHSTAN was censured for allowing publication and Mukanov was directed to rewrite the novel. The subject of the novel is the development of the Virgin Lands. The following details will give some indication of the reasons for its suppression. One of the main characters Amandykov, an old Bolshevik, former member of the Cheka, OGPU and MVD and at the time of the novel an oblast First Secretary, had, while combatting nationalism in the 'thirties, himself become infected by it, so that he represented the organized transfer of people from other republics into Kazakhstan. His wife is bribed to influence him to send an unpopular (because too communist) member of his staff into a distant rayon. Amandykov does this. The volunteers from the other republics who have come to develop the Virgin Lands are portrayed as hooligans and drunkards, even as newly-released convicts; (the following sample of conversation is quoted: "What did you do time for?" - "Nothing really. I killed the wrong man." - "Ah, I understand.") Early this year (23) Mukanov was reported still to be at work on THE ROLLING STEPPE "which is dedicated to the self-denying labour of young patriots".

In Kirgizia in September 1957 (18) three writers were named as guilty of "crude naturalism" and as having distorted Soviet life. M. Aksakov (THREE IN THE STEPPE and THE GOLD WATCH); Ye. Kovskiy (WOLF); N. Baytemirov (THE SAVAGE). Aksakov made a public confession of penitence, but Kovskiy, who was said to be completely divorced from life, appears not to have spoken. Criticized less severely were T. Umetaliyev, S. Shimeyev, Abdumomunov and K. Dzhanatoshev. (19)

Criticism in Tadzhikistan centred on Ye. Lopatina, M. Fofanova and G. Mirzo(yev).(12) It was these writers whom Tursun-zade promised not to coddle (see above). They were criticized again at an open meeting of the Tadzhik Writers' Union three months later.(20) On this occasion it was revealed that Mirzo(yev) had written a poem, FAGFUR, on the "resettling of the mountaineers in the fertile valleys". Fofanova made a public confession of guilt and apology. Lopatina made a fighting speech in which she berated critics for unhelpfulness and expressed her pride in being a Soviet citizen, but in which she made no formal apology. Mirzo(yev) held out until November (9) when, at a meeting called by the Tadzhik Central Committee, he was reminded that he had "cast doubt on the acts carried out by the Party and Government in the interests of the republic's economy". He also made a public apology and promised to do better in the future.

It should not be thought, however, that Central Asian writers were not

also praised on ideological grounds. Auezov's ABAY, Kerbabayev's THE DECISIVE STEP (see CAR, Vol.III, No.3) and NEBIT-DAG, Musrepov's AWAKENED COUNTRY and others were frequently praised, both on technical and on ideological grounds (although ABAY has also been criticized; see above). Mingled sparingly with the criticism there was even praise of young writers. In Turkmenistan they had chosen as their subjects "the growth of the prosperity and culture of the people. . . the love (of our young people) for their socialist fatherland and the Communist Party", they also earned praise for their creative fervour and clearness of purpose.(2) In Azerbaydzhan M. Ibragimov, M. Guseyn, I. Shikhly, I. Guseynov and S. Kadyrzade are praised in general terms as promising young writers.(21)

There is no ideological crisis in Central Asian literature. At the height of the "thaw" period three republics were significantly affected ideologically (and in one other - Uzbekistan - certain young writers suffered "a loss of assurance"(22)), none of the writers involved appears still to be resisting criticism. The crisis appears rather to lie in the low level of technical skill of many writers, chiefly the young, with all the implications of such a state of affairs for the future.

Notes

- | | |
|------|---|
| (1) | LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 27.12.56 |
| (2) | TI. 5. 7.57 |
| (3) | SK. 21. 2.57 |
| (4) | BR. 30.11.58 |
| (5) | Ibid., 5.12.58 |
| (6) | Ibid., 8.12.58 |
| (7) | LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 26. 4.58 |
| (8) | KT. 6. 6.57 |
| (9) | Ibid., 15.11.57 |
| (10) | ZVEZDA VOSTOKA, 1958, No.12 |
| (11) | BR. 9.12.58 |
| (12) | KT. 21. 6.57 |
| (13) | Ibid., 28. 8.57 |
| (14) | PV. 24.10.57 |
| (15) | TI. 31.10.57 |
| (16) | KP. 10-12. 3.59 |
| (17) | PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN' KAZAKHSTANA, 1958, No.1 |
| (18) | SK. 26. 9.57 |
| (19) | Ibid., 20.11.57 |
| (20) | KT. 28. 9.57 |
| (21) | BR. 4.12.58 |
| (22) | PV. 16.10.57 |
| (23) | KP. 15. 2.59 |

SAVINGS AND SOCIAL SECURITY

The material to be found in the Central Asian press on this subject falls into four main categories: lotteries, State loans, savings banks, and social security.

It has proved impossible to include fire, life and accident insurance in the survey as the only sources available are textbooks which deal more with the principles of rating than with insurance practice, while the material in the Central Asian press is limited to advertisements. As no information is available, therefore, on the modifications caused in the practice of these branches of insurance by specifically Central Asian conditions, it was decided to exclude them.

The sources used are the Central Asian press, to which references are given in the text, and the following books:

RASKHODY NA SOTSIAL'NO-KUL'TURNYYE MEROPRIYATIYA PO GOSUDARSTVENNOMU BYUDZHETU SSSR: STATISTICHESKIY SBORNIK, Moscow, 1958 (referred to as RASKHODY); NARODNOYE KHOZYAYSTVO KAZ. SSR, Alma-Ata, 1957 (referred to as NKhKAZ); NARODNOYE KHOZYAYSTVO KIRGIZSKOY SSR, Frunze, 1957 (referred to as NKhKIRG).

The intention is to use the material to illustrate the growth in the standard of living in the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan in the period covered - roughly 1956-8.

. . .

I. Lotteries (Loterei)

The lotteries are regarded officially mainly as a means of contributing money to the State in order to raise the standard of living, and only secondarily as an opportunity for ordinary citizens to enrich themselves, and the publicity of lotteries dwells mainly on the former aspect. Nevertheless the prizes, which absorb 40 per cent of the income of the lottery, are considerable and range from Volga and Moskvich cars (value 40,000 and 15,000 rubles respectively) to small alarm clocks at 75 rubles. Money prizes range from 5,000 to 20 rubles. (KP. 7. 5.58.)

It is not without interest to note that the Minister of Finance of Uzbekistan, V. Muratkhodzhayev, thought it necessary to stress in PV. 28. 2.58 that lottery tickets must be bought voluntarily: it is forbidden to force

people to buy, or to stop money out of employees' pay packets and make up the difference with lottery tickets. This suggests that there had been in the past some degree of "consumer resistance" to the lotteries. Nevertheless, in Kazakhstan (KP. 13. 9.58) the opening of the second lottery of the year was announced by Atambayev the Minister of Finance in response to public demand. During the first lottery, in the first quarter of the year, 45m. rubles worth of tickets had been sold. By March 1958 in Turkmenistan 2,185,000 rubles worth of tickets had been sold. (TI. 12. 4.58.)

This all suggests that people have more money to spare for luxuries.

II. State Loans (Gosudarstvennyye zaymy)

State loans in the Soviet Union draw their income from the profits of State enterprises, savings banks' deposits (see "Savings Banks" below) and from the investment of private citizens. The current loan is the freely convertible State Interior 3 per cent Lottery Loan. The issue of further "subscription loans", (zaymy, rasprostranyayemye po podpiske sredi naseleniya) i.e. compulsory mass loans, was stopped on the 19th April 1957 by a resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and of the Council of Ministers. Simultaneously, the lotteries on current loans of this type were stopped and the date by which the bonds of current loans may be redeemed was postponed to 1977. From that date they are to be redeemed gradually over a period of 20 years. The State Interior 3 per cent Lottery Loan was explicitly excluded from this resolution. In fact the State defaulted on its obligations in respect of these loans.

The principle of the Lottery Loan is similar to that of the British Premium Bonds. All bonds take part in lotteries held at regular intervals throughout the year. A winning bond is cancelled (pogashayetsya) and consequently takes no part in further draws. It is calculated that one out of every four bonds purchased wins a prize. As in the case of the British Premium Bonds the prizes are sums of money. Interest is paid on the bonds at the rate of three per cent per year. According to the GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA, Vol.16, the bonds "are freely bought and sold by savings banks".

Like the lotteries, the State Loans are primarily represented as "investment in the future". Full use is made in the publicity of the role played by the loans in the economy of the country. However, stress is also laid on the prizes that may be won and on the fact that "50 per cent of the sum placed by State savings banks in the State Loan out of the increase in their residue of deposits in 1958, and of the sum invested in 1958 in the State 3 per cent Interior Lottery Loan" (VVS. 1957, No.28) is assigned to the budgets of the various Union republics and is thereby devoted "to the further development of the national economy, to social and cultural aims and to an increase in the material prosperity of the workers" (PV. 5. 8.56). The remaining 50 per cent is (presumably) assigned to the Union budget. So Kh. Gafurov, Deputy Minister

of Finance of Uzbekistan, wrote that during the Fourth Five-Year Plan Uzbekistan received in prizes 551m. rubles and during the Fifth Five-Year Plan 1,300m. rubles. (PV. 5. 8.56.)

The Minister of Finance of Uzbekistan, Muratkhodzhayev, wrote in PV. 28. 2.58, that during the past five years more than 208m. rubles worth of bonds had been sold in the republic. As a result the Ministry of Finance of the USSR had been authorized to issue in 1958 an extra 2,000m. rubles worth, not 1,000m. as normally (presumably for the whole Soviet Union).

In Turkmenistan (TI. 8. 5.56) bond holders had received in prizes during the first four months of 1956, 26,093,000 rubles - 3,119,000 rubles more than in the same period of 1955. By the 1st October 1958, 6,400,000 rubles worth of bonds had been sold - almost 1,500,000 rubles more than by the 1st October 1957.

In Kazakhstan (KP. 9. 5.56) in the first five months of 1956 more than 112m. rubles had been paid in prizes - 15m. rubles more than in the same period of 1955.

III. Savings Banks (Sberegatel'nyye kassy)

Rights of personal property in deposits in Soviet savings banks are guaranteed to depositors by law, according to Article 10 of the Constitution of the USSR. The sums deposited, with the exception of an essential reserve left in the banks to carry on day-to-day operations and of sums which must be no lower than three per cent of the total residue of deposits and which are kept on an account in the Gosbank of the USSR, are contributed to the State Loan. Interest is paid on deposits at the rates of two per cent per year on current accounts and three per cent on deposit accounts (srochnyye vklady). There are also lottery accounts in which the interest goes to make up money prizes which are distributed by means of a raffle.

There appear to be no controls on withdrawals. The depositor has the right to receive his deposit in part or in a lump sum as he wishes.

The statistics available on savings banks cover the number of banks, the number of depositors, the total sum deposited during a given period, and the total sum in the banks at the end of a given period after withdrawals have been subtracted from deposits (the Russian for this is ostatok vkladov, here translated as "residue of deposits").

In NKHKAZ., p.353, the number of accounts for the years 1951-6 is given as follows (in thousands):

1951	-	484.8	1954	-	799.9
1952	-	561.0	1955	-	966.6
1953	-	707.5	1956	-	1094.8

The number of deposits between 1951-5 had almost doubled. In KP. 7. 4.56, however, it is stated that over this period the number of accounts had increased 3.9 times. The same article goes on to complain that the banks are slow, inaccurate, and often unsuitably housed. In the Gur'yev, Alma-Ata, West-Kazakhstan and Kzyl-Orda oblasts the number of banks was too low and had hardly increased over the past few years.

During 1956 (KP. 14. 4.57) the residue of deposits in Kazakhstan increased by 335.8m. rubles. (NKhKAZ gives the figure for 1955 as 1,253.9, and for 1956 as 1,577.5, an increase of 323.6m. rubles.) According to the same article the residue of deposits increased during the first four months of 1957 by a further 346.8m. rubles, 291m. more than in the corresponding period of 1956.

By June of the same year (KP.17. 8.57) the sum of deposits (it is not clear whether this means the residue of deposits or not) had increased by comparison with the same period of 1956 by 429m. rubles and the number of depositors by 154,800. This brought the total of depositors to 1,250,000 with a total sum deposited of 2,015,564,000 rubles. By January 1958 (KP. 10. 1.58), however, the number of depositors had fallen to 1,094,000, although the total sum deposited had slightly increased to 2,200m. rubles. The average size of an account was given as 1,654 rubles - six times as high as in 1940. NKhKAZ gives the average deposit in 1940 as 260 rubles. In 1958, therefore, the average deposit had increased by over seven times. Another slight discrepancy is found when one multiplies the number of depositors by the average deposit: the result is 1,809,476,000 rubles, not 2,200m. rubles as given above. The residue of deposits increased in 1957 by 610m. rubles, double the increase in 1956. This agrees with NKhKAZ which gives the total for 1956 as 1,577.5 - 622.5 rubles below 2,200m. rubles. In 1956, according to NKhKAZ, the residue of deposits increased from 1,253.9 to 1,577.5 - 323.6m. rubles.

In KP. of 5. 2.58, the Kazakh Minister of Finance Atambayev gives slightly different figures as referring to the "present time":


Total deposits	-	2,197m. rubles
Total depositors	-	1,328,000

His other statistics agree with those given in KP. of 10. 1.58.

The total number of banks in Kazakhstan in 1956 is given in KP. of 7. 4.56 as 2,000, of which 376 had been opened in 1955. The figures in NKhKAZ are only slightly different - 2,097 at the end of 1955, of which 369 had been opened during the year. Presumably the 97 new banks had been opened during the first

three months of 1956. In 1956, 126 new banks were opened (KP. 14. 4.57), and 102 new banks in 1957 (KP. 10. 1.58). This gives an increase of 228 over the 1955 total of 2,000. The actual total for 1957, however, is given as 2,312.

NKhKAZ gives statistics showing how the total amount deposited is split up between four sections of the community - peasants, workers, employees (white-collar workers), and those not claiming to belong to any of these three classes. In the following graph the fourth category has been omitted.



The figures shown in the graph have obviously been influenced in the last year (1955-6) by the influx of population to the Virgin Lands. The majority of these people work on sovkhoses and consequently are classed as workers. It is to this that we may attribute, at least in part, the sharp rise in the workers' graph in 1956.

Figures for Uzbekistan covering the whole republic are rarer. In PV. of 28. 2.58 the Minister of Finances writes that at the end of 1957 the savings banks of the republic contained 1,530m. rubles, more than double the total for 1954. In January alone 46.8m. rubles had been deposited. For the rest the only figures available are for a few individual rayons, and all show considerable increases.

In Turkmenistan information is available only for the oblasts of Tashauz (TI. 15.11.56, 9. 5.58) and Chardzhou (Khodzhambas rayon) (TI. 9. 5.58). The figures show large increases between 1956-8 in both savings bank deposits and depositors.

The only information for Kirgizia is contained in the statistical collection NKhKIRG and may best be reproduced in tabular form:

	<u>1941</u>	<u>1946</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1956</u>
<u>Total deposits in savings banks</u> (millions of rubles)	34.8	38.9	87.0	300.0
<u>Number of accounts</u> (thousands)	91.7	36.4	90.1	191.1
<u>Average size of an account</u> (in rubles)	379	1069	966	1570
<u>Total number of savings banks</u>	320	257	315	359

It is noteworthy that in 1946, when both the number of accounts and the number of banks had fallen sharply from the 1941 level and the total deposits had barely increased, the average size of an account was almost tripled.

It is necessary to stress that an increase in savings bank deposits is a limited guide to prosperity. Such an increase may also be due, for example, to a change in the public attitude to keeping money in a governmental institution and to an increase in the number and availability of branch savings banks. The total number of savings banks has in fact been increasing, and this is bound to have had its effect.

IV. Social Security (Sotsial'noye obespecheniye)

All the material under this heading in the Central Asian Press refers to the new State Pensions Law of 14th July 1956, which came into effect on the 1st October 1956. Pensions are non-contributory, and the following information is essential for an understanding of the material.

A. The following categories are entitled to pensions:

- (1) Workers and employees; (2) servicemen; (3) students; (4) other citizens who have been incapacitated during the fulfilment of State or social duties; (5) members of the families of citizens in these categories in the case of the loss of the bread-winner.

B. Pensions are paid on the following grounds:

- (1) Old age; (2) disability (invalidnost'); (3) to dependents left without support.

C. Old age pensions become payable:

- (1) To men of 60 who have worked no less than 25 years; (2) to women of 55 who have worked no less than 20 years.

The old age pension may in no case be less than 300 rubles per month or more than 1,200 rubles per month. Within these limits the pension may be from 50 to 100 per cent of the actual average monthly wage.

D. Disability pensions are estimated according to the degree of disability. Pensioners are assigned to Groups I, II, or III by medical boards (Vrachebno-trudovyye ekspertnyye komissii (VTEK)). Disability pensions are from 45 to 100 per cent of the average monthly wage.

The effect of the new law was to extend the pensions scheme to categories A. (3), (4) and (5) above and to reduce the differential between the extremes of the former scale by imposing an upper and a lower limit. It is claimed in the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, Vol.51, article "Law on State Pensions", that this law has increased the average disability pension by 50-65 per cent and the average old age pension by 90 per cent.

Collective farm workers, as before, receive their old age and disability pensions either from the funds which are by law formed within the kolkhozes from their income (which, presumably, means that the richer kolkhozes are able to pay higher pensions) or from the Kolkhoz Mutual Aid Banks (Kolkhoznyye kassy vzaimopomoshchi) which all collective farmers are eligible to

join. TI. 14.10.56 reports that in the Ashkhabad oblast of Turkmenistan there are 111 such banks which have issued approximately 170,000 rubles, during what period is not stated. Kolkhoz managements, however, are under strong moral pressure to increase their scale of pensions in order to keep pace with the State increases. It must not be forgotten also that retired collective farmers do not depend entirely on their pensions in order to live. They still have their private plots of land.

There follow some details of increases in kolkhoz pensions.

In Kirgizia (SK. 20. 9.56) in the Molotov kolkhoz, Petrovskiy rayon, Frunze oblast old people receive an allowance monthly from the kolkhoz management. For example, an invalid who has worked 20 years receives per month 30 kilos of wheat, and 10 centners of hay and 5 of straw for his animals.

In the Hammer and Sickle kolkhoz, Kalinin rayon, Frunze oblast (SK. 30.11.56), pensioners receive the same as the other members of the kolkhoz - 4 kilos of grain and 3 rubles cash, presumably (although this is not explicitly stated) per workday (trudoden'). The number of workdays allotted them as pension is not stated.

In the Lenin kolkhoz, Suzak rayon, Dzhahalal-Abad oblast (SK. 30. 6.57), 38 people receive personal pensions according to the decision of the kolkhoz management. Two people are mentioned as receiving 150 rubles cash and 30 kilos of wheat and vegetables per month. In the first five months of 1957 the aged and disabled received from the kolkhoz 18,800 rubles and 710 kilos of wheat. They had also been helped to acquire farm animals. Of 20 two-room houses which had been built, 10 were to be given to pensioners.

In the Komintern kolkhoz, Petrovskiy rayon, Frunze oblast (SK. 17. 1.58), three men aged over 60 who still work have been awarded pensions of 120 workdays over and above the 300-450 workdays they receive for their work.

The fullest account available, however, of the pensions arrangements in a Kirgiz kolkhoz appears in SK. of 2. 10.58. In the Kalinin kolkhoz, Voroshilov rayon, Frunze oblast, during 1957 income totalled 4m. rubles. Each of the kolkhozes 767 members worked on an average 456 workdays. The value of a workday was one kilo of grain and 7.45 rubles, or in cash 10.18 rubles. 11,200 workdays were assigned for pensions to the 120 pensioners.

The method of assigning pensions was modelled on that of the State. The applicant's working life (rabochiy stazh), earnings for the last 3-5 years of his working life and the number of his dependents were determined by a committee of collective farmers, his degree of disability (if any) was ascertained by a VTEK and, finally, his pension was agreed by a general meeting of kolkhoz members and management.

In Tadzhikistan (KT. 1. 8.56) in the Lenin kolkhoz, Stalinabad rayon, a new pensions' scheme was adopted. Pensions were to be paid for illness, disability and old age. Pensioners would receive from 12 to 15 workdays per month depending upon the length of their working life.

In the Moscow kolkhoz, Oktyabr'sk rayon (SK. 11. 8.56) men over 60 and women over 55 who have worked in the kolkhoz for more than 15 years are to receive 300 rubles per month pension. 90,000 rubles have been assigned for pensions for 1956. In the Stalin kolkhoz, Ordzhonikidze rayon (SK. 19. 5.57), 105,000 rubles are to be paid in pensions in 1957 as against 27,000 rubles in 1956. A fund of 32 tons of grain has been created for pensions paid in kind. The newspaper report adds that the example of this kolkhoz should be more widely known.

For very many people, apart from the collective farmers, the new pensions law meant that their pensions would increase, or that they would begin to receive pensions where formerly they had been ineligible. Eligibility had to be proved, however, as pensions depended either on length of working life and average earnings, or on degree of disability. The amount of paper work facing social security organs was so great that they had to hire extra labour, a large proportion of which was unskilled. In many cases there were insufficient doctors to serve the VTEK's. These difficulties and the fact that only two and a half months were allowed in which to prepare for the new law led to a partial breakdown of the organization. Some pensioners were overpaid, others underpaid and yet others were not paid at all. This state of affairs facilitated fraud. In KP. 11. 4.58 it was reported that various doctors in Alma-Ata, who were all fit enough to work from 12 to 17 hours per day on VTEK's, were receiving invalids' pensions and that there were 20 such doctors in Polyclinic No.1. The VTEK Control Commission, which should check such abuses, was itself implicated. Its head, Vinokurov, had received 1,600 rubles sick pay (on the authority of a medical certificate from Polyclinic No.1) for a period when he had been at work. His deputy, Marochneva, was being paid for 27 hours work per day.

The majority of newspaper articles deal in whole or in part with such complaints which can be taken as being representative of all the Central Asian Republics. There is also a certain amount of information at republican, oblast and rayon level of sums being or about to be spent on social security and a few examples of increases in individual pensions. RASKHODY (p.78) gives total expenditure on social security in the republican budgets. These figures are not the sum received in pensions in the various republics. The reasons for this are, presumably, that the pensions received in any one republic come from different sources and that the total expenditure contains overhead costs (salaries etc.) as well as sums paid in pensions. The increases in these figures do, however, reflect the increase in pensions in the various republics.

In 1957 (KP. 16.10.56) the sum spent on pensions in Kazakhstan increased

from 70m. rubles to 119m. rubles. (RASKHODY: 1956 - 426.9m. rubles; 1957 - 844.1m. rubles.) In the Semipalatinsk oblast in 1957 (KP. 8. 1.58) the sum spent on pensions increased by approximately 3m. from 5,167,200 rubles.

In Turkmenistan (TI. 29. 8.56) before the new law 110m. rubles were paid in pensions annually. Under the new law this sum was to increase to 190m. rubles. In TI. of 3.12.57, however, figures for pensions are given as:

1940	-	7.4m. rubles
1956	-	140 m. rubles
1957	-	250 m. rubles

(RASKHODY: 1956 - 57.7m. rubles; 1957 - 110m. rubles.)

KT. of 23.10.57 gives the sum assigned to Tadzhikistan for 1956 under the new law as 96m. rubles, and for 1957 as 193m. rubles. In 1957 also, 1.9m. rubles was to be spent on artificial limbs, teeth etc. (protezy), and 6m. rubles on homes for invalids. (RASKHODY: 1956 - 49.2m. rubles; 1957 - 89.4m. rubles.) Yet a fourth set of figures is given in KT. 31.10.58 where it is stated that the new law has increased the annual sum spent on pensions in Tadzhikistan from 95m. rubles (presumably the sum for 1956) to 220m. rubles.

About Kirgizia as a whole there is a report in SK. of 22. 8.58 on the meetings held in the Supreme Soviet of the Republic to consider the application of the law. Appropriations of State funds for social insurance had greatly increased. Republican appropriations for 1957 totalled 138m. rubles (which agrees with the figure given in RASKHODY) while the total expended in pensions in 1957 was 258m. rubles as compared with 120m. rubles in 1955. Disability pensions paid out of the Republican budget totalled 122m. rubles in 1957 as against 41m. rubles in 1955. There is some information also about the law's effect at oblast and rayon level. In the Tyan'-Shan' oblast (SK. 25. 9.56) its effect has been to increase some pensions from 150 rubles to 1,200 rubles (an extreme case). In the Proletarskiy rayon of Frunze 1.1m. rubles per month will be paid in pensions, almost double the former total.

In Uzbekistan, according to RASKHODY, the expenditure from the Republican budget totalled in 1956, 220.8m. rubles and in 1957, 457.9m. rubles. In PV. of 9. 2.58 it is stated that the budget for 1958 will be 121m. rubles higher than in 1957. In Uzbekistan alone more than 500,000 cases had been reviewed. (PV. 22.12.56.) Previous to the new law the pensioners of the Central rayon of Tashkent had received 1.2m. rubles per month; this sum would be more than doubled. Individual examples of pensions include a school-teacher who, together with his wife, will receive 1,000 rubles per month, and a painter and decorator whose pension will increase five times. What he had been receiving previously is not stated, but, since his pension could not increase to more than 1,200 rubles (if it was an old age pension), it could not have been more than 240 rubles per month.

The purpose of compiling the above information is, as already stated, to use it to demonstrate a rise in the standard of living in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. It seems undeniable that the information does illustrate such a rise. It is, unfortunately, more difficult to decide how great this rise is and what level the standard of living has now reached. It is not known how representative the figures are, or how fair is the picture they give. To take only the example of collective farm pensions, it is obvious from the tone of the publicity that its aim is to encourage more collective farms to increase their pensions, and it is clear from several references that only the best examples are quoted. How high the level of pensions in the other farms is, or how numerous these other farms are is also not known. Finally, the scope of the present account is too restricted for it to give in itself a complete picture of the standard of living in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Such questions as wages, the availability and cost of consumer goods etc. have also to be considered. It is hoped, however, that the information contained in the present account can be used in the creation of such a complete picture.

The Karakum Canal

On the 28th January 1959 near Mary (the ancient Merv), Turkmenistan, the Karakum Canal joined the River Murgab, thus connecting the rivers Murgab and Amu-Dar'ya. At that date the canal was approximately 400 kilometres in length. (See also CAR, Vol.II, No.3, pp.255-62, Vol.V, No.3, pp.277-8.)

SK., TI. 30.1.59

NEWS DIGEST

The following items are taken from newspapers and periodicals received during the period 1st April - 30th June 1959. A list of abbreviations used will be found at the beginning of the Review.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND TERRITORIAL CHANGES

Administrative changes

Kirgizia

P. Ye. Vakulov appointed a Secretary and member of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kirgizia. SK. 27. 5.59

Kazakhstan

G. A. Kozlov appointed Secretary and member of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Kazakh Communist Party in place of G. A. Mel'nik (who was recently appointed Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. CAR, VII, 2, p.154). KP. 29. 4.59

Territorial changes

Azerbaydzhan

To commemorate the 400th anniversary of the death of the poet Mukhammed Fizuli (Muhammad Fuzuli), by decree of 2nd April 1959 the town of Karyagino has been renamed Fizuli. VVS. 16. 4.59

Turkmenistan

By decree of 25th May 1959 the Ashkhabad oblast has been abolished, the Tedzhen, Kirovsk and Serakhs rayons being transferred to the Mary oblast. The remaining rayons and towns are being subordinated directly to republican organs of control. VVS. 11. 6.59

Kazakhstan

By decree of 9th May 1959 the Beskaragay rayon has been transferred from the Pavlodar to the Semipalatinsk oblast. VVS. 28. 5.59

By decree of 6th June 1959 the Taldy-Kurgan oblast has been abolished, its territory becoming part of the Alma-Ata oblast. VVS. 18. 6.59

THE ARTS

The Second Azerbaydzhani Ten-Day Festival of Art and Literature

The festival was held in Moscow between 22nd May and 2nd June 1959. The first festival, held in 1938, had been narrower in scope - in particular literature was hardly represented. The present festival was fully comparable with any of the other dekady held recently in Moscow. The Akhundov Opera and Ballet Theatre, the Azizbekov Dramatic Theatre, the Samed Vurgun Russian Dramatic Theatre, the State Symphony Orchestra, State Concert Orchestra and the Orchestra of Folk Instruments took part, together with the best amateur groups. More than 800 paintings, drawings and pieces of sculpture were exhibited. There were also exhibitions devoted to the history and architecture of Azerbaydzhan.

Reports in the press, both republican and Union, indicate that the festival enjoyed considerable success, especially the theatrical and musical sections. Doubts were expressed, however, about the quality of Azerbaydzhani literature. In LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 26. 5.59, Yu. Surovtsev noted that even the best writers, such as Mekhti Guseyn in BLACK CLIFFS and M. Ibragimov in THE MERGING OF THE WATERS, were inclined to pay too little attention to questions of psychology and motivation. This point was taken up later during discussions between Russian and Azerbaydzhani writers. Some Russian writers, led by V. Dudintsev, criticized M. Ibragimov and others for lack of psychological depth. The majority, however, felt that psychological depth was not equally necessary for all authors, and V. Druzin went so far as to say that in his opinion Azerbaydzhani novels were by their nature novels of action, not of psycho-analysis.

BR. 17. 5.59, BR.& P. 21. 5. - 3. 6.59

CONFERENCES

The Joint Scientific Session of the Academies of Sciences of the USSR, Central Asia and Kazakhstan on the progressive significance of the incorporation of Central Asia into Russia was held between the 26th and the 29th May 1959 in Tashkent. The present note will be restricted to the session itself and will deal only with points which were treated barely, if at all, in the preliminary publicity (see CAR, Vol.VII, No.2, pp.157-60).

The speech of Kh.A. Abdullayev, President of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences who opened the session gives a partial indication of the purpose of the meeting. After paying due tribute to Lenin's national policy Abdullayev went on to say that "a correct solution of the problem" of the progressive significance of the incorporation is to serve the interests of the "further strengthening of proletarian internationalism and Soviet patriotism, of the friendship and unity of the peoples of our country", and said further: "Soviet historians and orient-
alists must exert a powerful influence on the formation of a progressive viewpoint. Their researches must serve as the sharpest ideological weapon in the

fight against anti-scientific, anti-Marxist concepts. Falsifiers of history and revisionists, the various types of underling of the imperialists and colonizers will find in the works of Soviet scientists a fitting rebuff and annihilating criticism."

Some indication of the type of "falsification" of Soviet history intended to be understood was given by Sh. Tashliyev who in his paper attacked the concept of a "Turkestan nation" of Muslims, with a single language - Turki. Proletarian internationalism is equally opposed both to artificial division and to artificial unification of nations. The latter is "equivalent to the enforced subjection of one people to another". Any attempt at the formation of a unified state of Turkestan would be such an artificial unification. It is noteworthy that this point is touched on in KOMMUNIST TURKMENISTANA, 1959, No.5, where Baymirza Hayit's book TURKESTAN IM XX. JAHRHUNDERT, Darmstadt, 1956, is reviewed. Here also the unity of the Central Asian Turkic languages and peoples is denied and the friendship of the peoples of Central Asia for the Russian people is affirmed. - Ed. CAR.7 Both Tashliyev and I.I. Mints referred to "bourgeois historians" who were trying to prove that Soviet national policy is a continuation of that of tsarism. In this connection Tashliyev referred specifically to the Central Asian Research Centre (Moscow Radio, 26. 5.59). In PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN' KAZAKHSTANA, 1959, No.6, also in an article, "Pravda sil'neye lzhi", among other institutions and periodicals this Centre and CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW are subjected to violent criticism for "distorting the facts" of the history of Central Asia and similar crimes. - Ed. CAR.7

On the question of the attitude of the peoples of Turkestan to their incorporation opinions at the session differed. On the one hand A. Pyaskovskiy wrote before the session that not all the peoples of Central Asia welcomed the incorporation, nor was the resistance to conquest limited to the ruling class. On the other hand S. Radzhabov said in his paper that the popular masses in Central Asia expected the incorporation to bring them relief from the rule of their feudal tyrants, "only individual groups of local rulers and of the reactionary Muslim clergy, intent on preserving intact the old feudal ways and their own despotic power, organized resistance and raised up isolated anti-Russian revolts". In the debate towards the end of the session he returned to the point saying: "There must be a wider treatment, in the light of historical facts now at hand, of the question of the desire of a number of Central Asian peoples voluntarily to assume Russian citizenship." In this he was supported by D. Dzhamgerchinov and A. Il'yasov who "showed by historical examples that in some cases the resistance shown by the local inhabitants to the seizure of Central Asia by Russia was organized by agents of British Imperialism".

Frequent reference was made to the example provided by Soviet Central Asia for the underdeveloped countries of the East in that it had achieved socialism while avoiding "the agonizing stage of capitalism". "The practice of the socialist republics of the Soviet Union has proved to the whole of mankind that colonial, dependent or underdeveloped countries, once they have overthrown the

rule of the imperialists, can by-pass the capitalist stage and, with the help of the socialist countries, can gradually make the transfer to socialism" (I.I. Mints). "Many former colonial peoples have already won their national independence. Colonialism is cracking at the seams. . . . The peoples of the East are turning their gaze to the Soviet Union - their sincere friend" (A.A. Altmyshbayev).

As the main theme of the session has been the friendship between the Central Asian and Russian peoples both before and after the Revolution it is perhaps unfortunate that six months earlier there had been published in Alma-Ata a collection of documents (SOVETSKOYE STROITEL'STVO V AULAKH I SELAKH SEMIRECH'YA. Pt.1, Alma-Ata, 1957) which indicates that in some cases the relationship was less than friendly. Document No.78 (from the resolution of the Xth Party Congress) speaks of colonization on the part of Russian settlers, and goes on to say, "the policy of tsarism. . . consisted in settling in these areas as many kulak elements from among the Russian peasants and Cossacks as possible. . ." Also published is a circular letter from the Central Committee to the Turkestan Party (16th January 1922) criticising local communists for allowing colonialist traits to appear in their work (Document No.125).

The session appears to have deviated little from the treatment given the problem in Prof. S. Radzhabov's book ROL' VELIKOGO RUSSKOGO NARODA V ISTORICHESKIKH SUD'BAKH NARODOV SREDNEY AZII, Tashkent, 1955. There is as yet insufficient evidence to say why the question has been resurrected at the present time, although Abdullayev's remarks and the references to "bourgeois historians" and their attempts to "falsify Soviet national policy" may be significant in this connection.

PV. 13. 5.59, PV. 27-30. 5.59

GEOGRAPHY



The border between Europe and Asia is conventionally drawn along the Ural mountains (where it is marked by obelisks on the main railway lines), the river Ural and the Caucasus mountain range. In the latter area its position is uncertain; it is drawn sometimes along the main watershed, more rarely along the northern slope of the range, while in the BOL'SHOY SOVETSKIY ATLAS MIRA it coincides with the state boundary of the USSR. While such natural features are an obvious choice to mark the boundary, the resulting border does not indicate any difference in natural conditions and is inconvenient for cartographers and geologists in that it splits the Urals and the Caucasus, which form natural geographical units, each into two parts.

For these reasons, at a meeting in 1958 of the Moscow section of the All-Union Geographical Society, it was recommended that the border between Europe and Asia should be drawn along the eastern foot of the Urals, the Mugodzhär mountains, the Emba river, the north shore of the Caspian, the Kumo-Manych depression and the south coast of the Sea of Azov to the Kerch' straits (see map above reproduced from VOKRUG SVETA, 1959, No.4). Thus the Urals lie wholly in Europe and the Caucasus wholly in Asia. The Sea of Azov belongs to Europe. This boundary will be shown in all Soviet maps and geography textbooks.

VOKRUG SVETA, 1959, No.4

PARTY CHANGES

Azerbaijdzhan

It was announced in Baku on the 12th July that after a debate on the state of Party organization in the republic and on "shortcomings and mistakes in the work of the Bureau of the Central Committee and of its First Secretary I.D. Mustafayev" a plenum of the Central Committee removed Mustafayev from his post on the grounds that he was "unable to cope with the work" (he has been First Secretary since 1954). His place was taken by V.Yu. Akhundov, former chairman of the Council of Ministers.

N.A. Mukhitdinov was present at the plenum and delivered a speech.

P. 13. 7.59

POPULATION

The preliminary results of the 1959 census were published simultaneously in all republics on the 10th May 1959. The total population of the USSR on the 15th January 1959 was 208,826,000; in 1939 it had been 190,678,000. The figures for the six Muslim republics are given below. (The 1956 figures are the estimates published in NARODNOYE KHOZYAYSTVO SSSR, Moscow, 1956.)

	<u>1939</u>	<u>(1956)</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>Urban</u>	<u>Rural</u>
Uzbekistan	6.3m.	(7.3m.)	8.1m.	2.7m.	5.4m.
Kazakhstan	6.0	(8.5)	9.3	4.0	5.3
Azerbaijdzhan	3.2	(3.4)	3.7	1.8	1.9
Kirgizia	1.4	(1.9)	2.0	0.7	1.3
Tadzhikistan	1.5	(1.8)	1.98	0.65	1.33
Turkmenistan	1.2	(1.4)	1.5	0.7	0.8

The data produced by the census are at present being passed through calculating machines in order to provide on a territorial basis the distribution of the population according to sex, age, nationality, language, education, schooling, family position, social grouping, means of support, branches of the national economy or of production (in which employed) and main occupations. P.10. 5.59

Out of a recent list of candidates elected to the Supreme Soviet of Kirgizia containing 300 names, 177 names were of non-natives (Russians and Ukrainians). The Kirgiz SSR contains Uzbeks, Uygurs, Dungans, Tatars, Tadzhiks and Kazakhs as well as Russians and Ukrainians. According to the GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA (2nd ed.) Vol.21, 1953, the Kirgiz made up 51.7 per cent of the total. SK. 3. 6.59

RELIGION

The campaign against Seventh Day Adventists and Baptists (which continues in all republics) was noted in CAR, Vol.VII, No.2, p.162, where it was stated that only the non-Muslim sections of the population were affected. Recently, however, a report appeared in Azerbaydzhan of a member of the Muslim intelligentsia, lawyer Ali Allakhverdi ogly Ragimov, who had become a Baptist. Ragimov soon became head of the sect in Kirovabad and his conversion is represented as an act of careerism.

BR. 19. 5.59

SOCIAL CONDITIONS

The decisions of the XXIst Party Congress have increased the importance of the fight of "survivals of the past" since the Seven-Year Plan is a plan of Communist construction, and there can be no such survivals in the consciousness of Communist Man. Those entrusted with the task of eliminating these features in Central Asia are faced with a formidable problem, not least in the Islamic attitude towards women. Old habits die hard as is shown in the examples quoted below.

A Middle School teacher Dolores (sic) Dulyatova was abducted from Chilik village (Alma-Ata oblast) by a lorry-driver Khelilov and his accomplices and forced to marry him.

The Enbakhshi-Kazakh inter-rayon State Prosecutor Syzdykbekov refused to issue a warrant for the arrest of the culprits and, in fact, took their side. The rayon Party Committee also treated the crime lightly and did not give it a due "political appraisal".

Finally the oblast Party Committee was forced to intervene. Syzdykbekov was given a severe reprimand to be entered on his Party registration card and was removed from his post. Khelilov and his associates were put up for trial. The Chilik rayon Party Committee debated the low standard of political propaganda among the workers.

PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN' KAZAKHSTANA, 1959, No.6

A Tadzhik kolkhoznik, Aso Sabirov, who was strongly averse to exposing his wife to the gaze of strange men and was also traditionally hostile to any other medical treatment than that given by "wise women", refused to allow his wife (who was sick with an infectious disease) to call a doctor. He and his family hid the patient for six days. When finally the illness was discovered by the kolkhoz nurse he refused to allow her to treat the patient and chased her out of his house. His refusal of treatment by the kolkhoz medical orderly (a man) was even stronger. Only after 10 days of persuasion by doctors from the rayon centre did he allow his wife to be brought to hospital. Two days later he appeared in the company of four other men and demanded his wife. At home the woman's health deteriorated sharply. When it became obvious that she was dy-

ing Sabirov finally called a doctor. It was too late, however, to prevent his wife's death. KT. 31. 5.59

TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS

Aviation

Turkmenistan

Owing to the increased speed of the TU-104B, which has recently been introduced, flights by IL-14's from Ashkhabad to Moscow have been discontinued. From 15th May these aeroplanes, together with IL-12's, have been used to open up new routes in Turkmenistan and to increase the number of flights on certain of those already in existence.

At present there are two flights a day from Ashkhabad to Krasnovodsk. Extra flights have been added to the Ashkhabad - Tashauz route. An extra flight has been added to the Ashkhabad - Kerki route, stopping only at Mary. The elimination of other stops has shortened the distance flown by 300 km. An extra flight has also been added to the Ashkhabad - Baku route.

New routes have been opened between Ashkhabad and Novo-Urgench and between Ashkhabad and Tashkent by way of Mary, Chardzhou and Bukhara. TI. 17. 5.59

Uzbekistan

The Summer time-tables (introduced 20th May) provide for four flights a day by TU-104 between Tashkent and Moscow and Tashkent and Tbilisi. TU-104B airliners are being flown on the Tashkent - Alma-Ata route; the fare will be no more than the present rail fare. A route has been opened between Nukus and Krasnovodsk where passengers can change to TU-104B airliners to reach Moscow.

AN-10 ("Ukraina") airliners will open the Tashkent - Kiev route, and IL-18's the route from Tashkent to Leningrad. The routes Tashkent - Delhi and Tashkent - Kabul will be served by Soviet and Indian aircraft.

A number of routes have been equipped for night-flying. The Samarkand airport has been reorganized for 24-hour operation. PV. 21. 5.59

Tadzhikistan

In connection with the introduction of fast jet and turbo-prop airliners and the increase in air traffic of 600 per cent expected by 1965, construction of a new airport is to commence this year in Stalinabad. KT. 27. 5.59

Kazakhstan

New local air routes are being opened in the Virgin Lands of northern Kazakhstan. One such route, the "Bulayevo ring", which starts at Petropavlovsk and covers all the sovkhozes of the Bulayevo rayon (North-Kazakhstan oblast), is already in operation. Traffic has already started along local routes in the Oktyabr'sk rayon. No information is available on the type of aeroplane being used. P. 11. 4.59

On 1st June, simultaneously with the introduction of the summer time-tables, non-stop flights of IL-18's began between Alma-Ata and Moscow. The flight lasts six hours. The IL-18 also opened, on the 15th June, a new route between Alma-Ata and Rostov via Tashkent and Baku. Two flights a day are being made from Alma-Ata to the spas of Adler and Mineral'nyye Vody via Aktyubinsk, Gur'yev and Astrakhan'. On shorter routes, such as those between Alma-Ata and Kustanay, Karaganda and Pavlodar which have all recently been opened, IL-12's and -14's are in use.

The delivery of "Super-AERO-45" aeroplanes from Czechoslovakia, which are capable of carrying three passengers at 250 km. per hour and have short landing and take-off runs, has made it possible to open up air routes within individual oblasts. It appears, however, that the craft will be on hire like taxis and that no regular flights will be made. KP. 31. 5.59

THE BORDERLANDS OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

CURRENT SOVIET WRITING ON INDIA

Since 1957, when the output of Soviet writing on India reached unprecedented heights, much of it being published in connection with the tenth anniversary of India's independence, the Soviet Union has continued to publish an impressively large amount of material dealing with India. To give its readers an idea of the bulk and scope of this material CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW has made a survey of Soviet periodicals published in the period January - March 1959 and received at the Central Asian Research Centre. This period may be taken as broadly representative of the post-1957 period, although the survey does not cover, for example, medicine, agrarian questions and caste, subjects which no doubt continue to occupy Soviet experts. Material appearing in books and newspapers has not been taken into account, nor have insubstantial references to India in general articles. A more complete bibliography will as usual be provided by the next issue of RECENT SOVIET SOURCE MATERIAL ON SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA AND THE BORDERLANDS.

The list which follows is sub-divided into classes which have been determined by the nature of the material under review rather than by any preconceived idea of classification. Details of the sources used will be found at the end of the article.

Economy and Industry

Approximately 4,700 words have appeared in the three numbers of SOVREMENNY VOSTOK under review, consisting of six short articles and one of nearly 2,000 words. A fairly short article on the subject of Soviet-Indian economic relations has appeared in VNESHNYAYA TORGOVLYA, two articles (on Indian atomic energy and the iron and steel industry respectively) appeared in the two issues of MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA and two more general articles were in Nos.6 and 10 of NEW TIMES.

Education

There was a brief article in INOSTRANNAYA LITERATURA (No.3 of 1959) on the new school textbooks in Kerala and the opposition they have met with from "reactionaries".

Exploration and Travel

A short article appeared in VOKRUG SVETA, and a more substantial one on Hyderabad in SOVREMENNY VOSTOK (No.2 of 1959).

History

Three articles appeared in PROBLEMY VOSTOKOVEDENIYA: two long ones, dealing with the sixth and seventh centuries and the history of Tamil culture respectively, and a brief report of Indian publications.

Linguistics

A substantial article on the modern lexicography of Hindi appeared in VOPROSY YAZYKOZNANIYA.

Literature

There was an article in SOVREMENNY VOSTOK (No.1), on a recent Russian translation of the Mahabharata and a notice in PROBLEMY VOSTOKOVEDENIYA of the INDIAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY. Several brief reports provided information on the current literary scene in India in INOSTRANNAYA LITERATURA, which also carried (No.2) a long review on the symposium CONTEMPORARY INDIAN LITERATURE (New Delhi, 1957).

Politics and Current Developments in general

NEW TIMES had two short articles (Nos.5 and 10), the latter on Soviet-Indian friendship. SOVREMENNY VOSTOK (No.2) had an article on the question of Goa and a short account (in No.3) of a recent Indian political conference.

Reviews (other than literary)

An account of an exhibition of German paintings in Bombay was briefly mentioned in No.3 of INOSTRANNAYA LITERATURA. Among the reviews which appeared in PROBLEMY VOSTOKOVEDENIYA were one on an Indian atlas and one on an Indian economic geography of Soviet authorship. There were also short notices on the following works of Soviet authorship: Indian economic history, Indian-Soviet economic relations in the nineteenth century, the ancient city of Taksila, and Indian music.

Translations

Articles written by Indians and appearing in Soviet publications during the period under review are listed here separately and regardless of their subject matter. This does not mean that the authors of some of the articles mentioned above may not be Indians; their nationality is not always made clear.

SOVIET UNION had a review, written by two Indians, of the Moscow production of an Indian play. INOSTRANNAYA LITERATURA (Nos.1 and 3) had short articles on industrialization and culture, the links between Russian and Bengali literature, a recent novel in Hindi, and two larger articles on modern Indian writing. There was an article on Russian and Bengali literature in PROBLEMY VOSTOKOVEDENIYA, while SOVREMENNYY VOSTOK published in the three numbers ten articles by Indians. These included six short reports on the present Indian political situation and future prospects, an equally brief account of social and economic planning, a fairly substantial article on relations between India and the USA, and two very short reports on Indian women of the present day.

Conclusion

Altogether about 56,000 words on the subject of India were published during the period January-March 1959 in the Soviet periodicals received at the Central Asian Research Centre. They may be divided under subject-headings as follows:

Economy and Industry	10,800
Education	500
Exploration and Travel	3,500
History	9,700
Linguistics	4,500
Literature	10,200
Politics and Current Developments in general	2,720
Reviews (other than literary)	3,940
Translations	10,150

Sources

1. INOSTRANNAYA LITERATURA, Nos.1, 2 and 3, 1959.
2. MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, Nos.2, 3, 1959.
3. NEW TIMES, Nos.5, 6 and 10, 1959.
4. PROBLEMY VOSTOKOVEDENIYA, No.1, 1959.
5. SOVIET UNION, No.109, 1959.
6. SOVREMENNNYY VOSTOK, Nos.1, 2 and 3, 1959.
7. VNESHNIYAY TORGOVLYA, No.2, 1959.
8. VOKRUG SVETA, No.1, 1959.
9. VOPROSY YAZYKOZNANIYA, No.1, 1959.

SOVIET VIEWS ON MODERN INDIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY

The following is an account of an article by N.A. Khalfin in SOVETSKOYE VOSTOKOVEDENIYE No. 4 of 1958, pp.146-54, entitled "Some Problems of International Relations in the Nineteenth Century Middle East as reflected in Modern Indian Historiography". This article reviews in about 3,800 words several Indian works on these problems, concentrating especially on the opinions expressed by Dr.B. Prasad and Sardar K.M. Panikkar. Articles dealing with Soviet views on some of the historical problems discussed have already appeared in CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, Vol.IV, No. 2, pp.161-71 and Vol.VI, No. 2, pp.125-41, 205-28, while a more recent article expressing the Soviet point of view - again rather on this period of Indian history than on Indian historians of the period - is O.F. Solov'yev's article in VOPROSY ISTORII, No.6 of 1958, pp.96-109, entitled "The Question of the Relation of Tsarist Russia to India in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries". There has also been a brief review by S.M. Mirnyy in SOVETSKOYE VOSTOKOVEDENIYE, No. 6 of 1958, pp. 126-7, of K.S. Menon's book THE "RUSSIAN BOGEY" AND BRITISH AGGRESSION IN INDIA AND BEYOND, Calcutta, 1957.

. . .

I. The Need for a New Approach - II. The Two Interpretations - III. The Opinions of Dr. Prasad - IV. The Opinions of Sardar Pannikar - V. The Reception of Dr. Prasad's Views in the West.

I. The Need for a New Approach

Khalfin begins his article by noting that Indian historians have written much on the subject of international relations in the Middle East during the nineteenth century, the latter half especially. He suggests that this is no accident, India's history being "closely interwoven with the history of British colonial policy and international relations in the East". He then gives a list of works dealing specially with this subject (1) and of general works on Indian history in which the subject receives attention.(2)

Khalfin insists that "British colonizers systematically falsified the history of the Indian people for political ends" and quotes in this connection Messrs. Jawaharlal Nehru and N. Kasturi. Mr. Nehru is cited as saying of the work of British historians, "truth lies somewhere at the bottom of a deep well while falsehood, open and unashamed, holds sway over all" (3), an estimate en-

dorsed by Mr. Kasturi, "who added that most of the published sources have been distorted and falsified and that unpublished manuscripts are kept under lock and key".(4) Khalfin remarks that against such a background research by scholars of the Indian Republic acquires particular significance, and he mentions some such scholars as having published valuable work in which they have made use of sources which under the "colonial regime" had been made difficult of access.

II. The Two Interpretations

According to Khalfin the work of Indian scholars on international relations in the East during the nineteenth century can be divided between those writings in which "some of the traditional motifs of British bourgeois historiography survive" and those which offer a different interpretation. Dr. Bisheshwar Prasad, Professor of History at the University of Delhi, is mentioned as having almost entirely accepted the point of view of those "active agents of British colonialism, H. Rawlinson, G.N. Curzon and P. Sykes" who attributed a defensive character to "the expansionist and aggressive policy of British ruling circles", maintaining that all British policy in the Middle East was dictated by the need to oppose a "Russian menace".(5)

Khalfin concentrates his attention on the first volume of THE FOUNDATIONS OF INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY. Because this book was written by Dr. Prasad for the Indian Council of International Relations Khalfin considers it to be of practical as well as scholarly significance, and quotes from the author's preface to support his contention. "However", Khalfin continues, "the contents of this volume cause one to doubt whether they conform to the title, for the book bears no relation to India's foreign policy. The subject-matter is exclusively the foreign policy of Britain, whose colonial rule had been set up over the Indian people. This foreign and internal policy was entirely directed at providing Britain with maximum opportunities for exploiting India's workers. The author identifies the interests and aims of the British colonizers with the needs of India and her peoples. For example, describing the harsh methods of Lord Lytton, Viceroy of India 1876-80, in bringing pressure to bear on Afghanistan, B. Prasad remarks that 'the mode of his (Lytton's) approach and the procedure adopted were ill-conceived and injurious to Indian interests' (6), but completely passes over the fact that Lytton stood for the defence of Britain's interests, and not India's, and that his actions with regard to Afghanistan had as their aim the total subjection of Afghanistan to British rule, to the detriment of the Indian and Afghan peoples. It is only on the very last page of his book that Dr. Prasad says 'India's foreign policy, being wholly controlled by Her Majesty's Government and completely subordinate to Whitehall, was directed towards the furtherance of British interests'. This absolutely correct affirmation did not, however, form the basis of his work."

Khalfin follows this up with a long quotation from A SURVEY OF INDIAN

HISTORY by Sardar K.M. Panikkar, whose views contrasting the interests of the British "colonizers" and those of the Indian people are set against Dr. Prasad's. In the introduction to the second edition of his book, Sardar Panikkar writes that it is only partially true to speak of a "British period" of Indian history, "because the true history of India during the period was not made at Whitehall, or even by the Governors-General and Viceroy in Calcutta and Delhi and the bureaucracy which administered the country, but by the people of India. . . There is undoubtedly a history of the British in India, starting from the establishment of the first factories to the withdrawal of the last British soldier from the Indian soil. It is connected with India, as it happened on the soil of India, but it is no more a part of Indian history than, say, MacArthur's occupation of Japan is a part of Japanese history. It is an important chapter of British history and as such deserves to be studied by those interested in the history of British achievements overseas. [Here Khalfin asserts that Panikkar is speaking ironically]. . . the importance attached to the British period, and the disproportionate space which it takes up in our textbooks are altogether unjustified and can only be considered as the survival of British propaganda." (7) Khalfin declares that this view of Indian history is one shared by Jawaharlal Nehru and avoids distorting that history after the manner of Dr. Prasad.

III. The Opinions of Dr. Prasad

At this point Khalfin describes the scope of Dr. Prasad's book, calling it an attempt to outline British policy in the East against a background of the activities of the Tsarist Government in Central Asia in the latter half of the nineteenth century. He stresses the value of Dr. Prasad's work in introducing documents which had not previously received scholarly attention, such as some of the documents of the Foreign and Political Departments of the Government of India [Khalfin says "of the Anglo-Indian Government" - Ed.] preserved in the National Archives, and in making use of such little-studied source material as the Parliamentary Papers relating to Central Asia and Afghanistan. Where Khalfin is most critical of Dr. Prasad is in the absence from his bibliography of works of Russian origin, and of Soviet works in particular. The conclusion Khalfin draws from Dr. Prasad's preface does not reproduce the tone of the author's words, although the underlying meaning has not been distorted. What Dr. Prasad actually wrote is: "I have not been privileged to examine the official Russian archives, which, I was informed, have very valuable material on the varied aspects of Czarist expansion in Asia, and the Tashkent archives have particularly rich material on Central Asian affairs. . . the story is largely built on the British Indian sources of information, and in a study as [sic] the present one, which seeks to analyse the trends of Indo-British policies, the best sources naturally have to be these." The only piece quoted by Khalfin is "on the varied aspects of Czarist expansion in Asia," while "I have (not been privileged" appears as: "(he says) he did not have an opportunity", "very valuable material. . . particularly rich material" appears as "many valuable documents", and "the best sources naturally have to be these" becomes "he

expresses the opinion that the best sources for the present subject are Indo-British." In similar fashion Khalfin deprecates the absence from Dr. Prasad's bibliography of M.A. Terent'yev's three-volume work ISTORIYA ZAVOYEVANIYA SREDNEY AZII, but does not mention that the same author's two-volume RUSSIA AND ENGLAND IN CENTRAL ASIA (8) does appear there and is quoted in the text.

Writing of the matter of Dr. Prasad's book, Khalfin says that it reflects his one-sidedness in the use of documents and works of scholarship in the way it shows British policy in the East as aimed entirely at resisting the expansion of Tsarist Russia (and to a considerably lesser extent the expansion of France), this aim being offered as explanation for the British attempts at strengthening their influence in Makran, Seistan and Kashgar and their tactics in establishing buffer states.(9) Khalfin similarly traces the influence of "British bourgeois historiography" in the writings of Manoranjana Chaudhuri, Vijay Kumar, and N.K. Sinha and A.C. Banerjee (10), who, he says, also, to a greater or lesser extent, see British policy as provoked by mistrust of India. All, he continues, like Dr. Prasad fail to enquire whether a Russian attack would have been practicable in view of Russia's military policy, her economic resources and means of transport.

At this point Khalfin gives his own version of historical events. Acquaintance with the Tsarist archives "leads one", he asserts, "to the conclusion that the Russian Government whose activities in Central Asia were indisputably aggressive. . . could not seriously think of an armed invasion of India, much less of conquering India or her neighbour, Afghanistan." British ruling circles, Khalfin suggests, were well aware of this and the real reason for their fear was that Russia's proximity to India might and did in fact help develop the independence movements among "the enslaved population of the colonies" (11), whatever British historians and press might say when distorting historical facts in the interests of the British bourgeoisie. It was this knowledge which led the British, according to Khalfin, to set up buffer states; they thought these would make the anti-colonialist forces in India lose hope of receiving help from abroad and at the same time they served as bases for activities against Russia.

Khalfin then accuses Dr. Prasad of neglecting the economic factors behind British policy in the East and of drawing, consequently, a one-sided picture of that policy as founded on considerations of strategy and trade. He also finds fault with Dr. Prasad on the grounds that he fails to treat of "the people as a subject of history and a most important factor in historical development", omitting, for instance, to mention the popular hostility towards the British in Turkmenia and Afghanistan, without which "it is impossible correctly to describe the course of events in Turkmenia in the seventies and eighties of the nineteenth century. . . to understand the course and results of England's second aggressive war against Afghanistan in 1878-80."

Expressing his contention that Dr. Prasad has misused the source material

in the Indian National Archives, "which testifies so clearly to England's frankly expansionist plans with respect to the peoples of Central Asia", Khalfin gives as an example Dr. Prasad's treatment of the telegram from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India on the 30th May 1877. "The contents of this document", comments Khalfin, "expose the scheme of British ruling circles for making use of the Turkmen tribes as 'cannon fodder' [this expression is not taken from any part of the telegram reproduced by Dr. Prasad - Ed.] and establishing their rule over them at the opportune moment - either directly or through Afghanistan, which was at that time under British influence. All this has been veiled over by expressing an intention to 'help' the Turkmens. 'The only other course', wrote the Viceroy, 'is to help the Turkomans with whom I am now in a position to open safe communication from Quetta through Meshed. Our information leads us to believe that if secretly organized and encouraged by us, they can make a powerful resistance to any Russian force, and as they are not unwilling to be annexed to Afghanistan, influence now obtained over them may eventually furnish valuable basis for negotiations with Cabul.'"(12)

Khalfin then gives two other examples of Dr. Prasad's alleged failure to draw the correct conclusion from the sources he quotes, this time on British "Mervousness" and the Second Afghan War. He says he could go on giving examples which "provide completely logical grounds for drawing the accurate conclusion that the British Government made extensive and more or less skilful use of the shindy they themselves had raised about a 'Russian menace' to India as camouflage for their own predatory schemes." He concludes his survey of Dr. Prasad's book by observing that the author does not claim, in his chapter on "The Persian Gulf and the Arab Littoral", that Russian hostility was the motive force behind British policy in those regions. He quotes Dr. Prasad as saying that there "the dominating motive was commerce and the tension had its origin not in Russian hostility but in the possible commercial rivalry of the European powers or the analogous (13) claims of Turkey or Persia for suzerainty over the petty principalities under British influence."(14) "As we see", comments Khalfin, "the idea of British foreign policy being 'defensive' in nature has, even in the present case, undergone no alteration although it is refuted by the documents the author himself provides relating to the aggressive actions of Britain against Arab tribes, and the violent methods taken by the British bourgeoisie to guarantee their supremacy on the 'Empire's' sea and trade routes."

IV. The Opinions of Sardar Panikkar

Returning to the work of Sardar Panikkar, Khalfin says that his name might well stand for the other trend in Indian historical writing, for instead of taking the traditional line he holds that "British expansion in the East was of an entirely 'independent' nature and not a 'provoked', 'defensive' measure. Particularly in his interesting work ASIA AND WESTERN DOMINANCE, K.M. Panikkar emphasizes that India was transformed in the nineteenth century into a country 'from which Britain's authority radiated to all parts of Asia'. British states-

men understood, he continues, that by using India as a strong point, employing her resources and 'native' troops, England could exercise 'a dominating voice in the affairs of Asia'. Doctor Panikkar justly remarks that the British pursued their predatory activities at the expense of the peoples of India."(15)

It might not be out of place in this connection to reproduce more fully another passage from Sardar Panikkar's same interesting work, a passage which does not illustrate Khalfin's theme quite as happily as the brief extracts given above. On the previous page he writes: "There was thus no alliance between the Civil Service and big business, and the British Indian bureaucracy was not interested in the exploitation of India. In fact it could legitimately be said that the services championed 'their India', the India of the dumb masses, against British businessmen and capitalists, except where these had become powerful vested interests in rural areas, like tea plantations in Assam and indigo plantations in Bihar."(16)

Khalfin gives the name of A.C. Kapur as one sharing Sardar Panikkar's point of view and throwing more light on the aggressive nature of British policy in the East in the nineteenth century. There is an urgent need, Khalfin urges, for objective research on the subject, all the more so because "the ideologists of the 'cold war', in the words of Academician Ye. Tarle, make frequent references in their pronouncements to 'Russian history as seen in that distorting mirror in which it is made to appear by present-day American, British and Americanized French bourgeois historiography'."(17)

V. The Reception of Dr. Prasad's Views in the West

As examples of the distortion of history in the West, Khalfin gives quotations from two book reviews published in London which he calls "the reaction of bourgeois publications to Dr. Prasad's book THE FOUNDATIONS OF INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY". The first review is taken from "the newspaper THE TIMES at the end of 1956", which a footnote reveals as THE TIMES. [sic] LITERARY SUPPLEMENT of 7th September 1956.

This review is quoted as saying that the requirements of security "dictate an essential continuity in Indian foreign policy; a continuity which is of much greater intrinsic importance than any of the superficial variations of approach which attract so much attention today".(18) On this passage Khalfin comments as follows: "In other words, in the opinion of THE TIMES, India's foreign policy must be founded not on the present ('superficial', as the newspaper expresses it) peace-loving course of strengthening independence and friendship with all countries but on fears for her own security in the face of a threat of 'invasion'. If these recommendations are taken together with the text of Dr. Prasad's book on the events between 1860 and the eighteen-eighties the threat of invasion can only be understood as 'an attack from the north', 'from Russia', or in our days as the mythical 'Communist danger'."

Where the review in THE TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT said of the author that "he maintains an attitude of scientific impartiality and detachment, although he is occasionally betrayed into some - possibly pardonable - impatience with Lord Lytton. . ." and "If the author is not wholly uninfluenced, particularly in his comments upon past motives and actions, by the currents of political thinking which prevail in his country today, he has a high regard for the sanctity of facts. . ." these appear in Khalfin's version as: "The newspaper mentions as positive features 'the purely scientific, non-Party (nepartynny), detached' attitude of the author to the events being described, and also that in his research work Prof. Prasad was subject only to a small extent to the influence of 'the political opinions prevailing in his country at the present time'."

Khalfin sums up this review as follows: "Thus the author is praised for the weak points in his work and reproached for correct statements which were not, unfortunately, developed in the book. The objectivist and superficial study of such a critical question as British policy in the East is fully to the liking of THE TIMES. This organ of the reactionary circles of England, while doing its best to draw a parallel between 'yesterday' and 'today', attempts to whitewash British imperialist activity in the past by emphasizing that it was aimed solely at 'seeking security' under provocation from the 'menace to India from the north'."

In dealing with Mr. E.T. Stokes's review of Dr. Prasad's book in INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (No.1, January 1957, p.127) Khalfin manages again, more by selective quotation than by any distortion, to give the impression that the reviewer is more unconditional in his approval of the book than appears from his words. Most of this review is translated in separate extracts with comments linking them. Where this treatment is seen to best effect is perhaps in Khalfin's account of Mr. Stokes's concluding words. Thus Mr. Stokes: "It is a disappointing book. The great issues get obscured in a mass of detail, broad analysis is displaced by tedious abstracts of documents, and the style of the doctoral dissertation infects the composition. This is a pity because the theme, if properly handled, could have an important influence on Indian thinking." Khalfin sums this up as follows: "Stokes, however, is far from liking everything in B. Prasad's work. In particular he dislikes the superfluous detail and, above all, the way that 'broad analysis is displaced by tedious extracts from documents'. It is easy to understand the reviewer in this case: the 'tedious extracts from documents' provide a very good exposure of the true, predatory nature of British foreign policy in the East."

Khalfin concludes his survey with the following observations: "As we see, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS follows exactly the same line as THE TIMES, and here and there between the lines one and the same motif may be perceived: a desire that India should, 'at last', have done with a peace-loving policy, 'look to her security' and to that end join, say, SEATO. Thus history is in the closest way interwoven with politics."

Notes

The notes are the author's unless otherwise stated.

- (1) See B. Prasad, THE FOUNDATIONS OF INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY, Vol.I, 1860-82, Bombay - Calcutta - Madras, 1955, London, 1956; A.Ch. Kapur, "Disraeli's Forward Policy on the North-West of India, 1874-77", THE RESEARCH BULLETIN (ARTS) OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PANJAB, No.IV, History, Hoshiarpur, Panjab, 1951; M. Chaudhuri, "Power-Politics in Afghanistan, Past and Present", THE MODERN REVIEW, Calcutta, February, 1949, Vol. LXXXV, No.2, pp.137-40; K.M. Panikkar, "The Himalayas and Indian Defence", INDIAN QUARTERLY, New Delhi, April-June 1947, Vol.3, No.2, pp.127-35.
- (2) See N. Kasturi, HISTORY OF THE BRITISH OCCUPATION OF INDIA, Calcutta, s.a.; K.M. Panikkar, A SURVEY OF INDIAN HISTORY, 2nd Ed., Bombay - Calcutta, 1954; K.M. Panikkar, ASIA AND WESTERN DOMINANCE: A SURVEY OF THE VASCO DA GAMA EPOCH OF ASIAN HISTORY 1498-1945, London, 1953; N.K. Sinkha and A.Ch. Banerdzhi, ISTORIYA INDII, Moscow, Izdatel'stvo inostrannoy literatury, 1954; V. Kumar, ANGLO-AMERIKANSKIY ZAGOVOR PROTIV KASHMIRA, Moscow, Izdatel'stvo inostrannoy literatury, 1954.
- (3) Dzh.Neru. OTKRYTIYE INDII, Moscow, Izdatel'stvo inostrannoy literatury, 1955, p.306.
- (4) N. Kasturi, op.cit., pp.1-2.
- (5) See H. Rawlinson, ENGLAND AND RUSSIA IN THE EAST, London, 1875; G.N. Curzon, RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA IN 1889 AND THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN QUESTION, London - New York, 1889; G.N. Curzon, PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN QUESTION, Vols.I-II, London, 1892; P. Sykes, A HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN, Vols.I-II, London, 1940; B. Prasad, op.cit.
- (6) B. Prasad, op.cit., p.171.
- (7) K.M. Panikkar, A SURVEY OF INDIAN HISTORY, p.ix.
- (8) M.A. Terentyef, RUSSIA AND ENGLAND IN CENTRAL ASIA, 2 Vols., Calcutta, Foreign Department Press, 1876. This is a translation of the Russian original which was published in St.Petersburg in 1875. Terent'yev, in his introduction to this book, dated July 1875, refers to THE HISTORY OF RUSSIAN CONQUESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA, saying that it will shortly be ready for the press and that he has been engaged on it since 1870. (Translator's note.)
- (9) B. Prasad, op.cit., pp.52-64, 65-82, 41-51.

- (10) M. Chaudhuri, op.cit., pp.137-40; N.K. Sinkha and A.Ch. Banerdzhi, op.cit., p.381; V. Kumar, op.cit., pp.8, 25-29, 38, etc.
- (11) See K. Marks and F. Engels, SOCHINENIYA, Vol.XVI, Part II, p.34; I.P. Minayev, DNEVNIKI PUTESHESTVIY V INDIYU I BIRMU, 1880 and 1885-86, Moscow, Izdatel'stvo AN/SSSR, 1955; A.A. Benediktov, INDIYSKOYE KREST'YANSTVO V 70-KH GODAKH XIX VEKA (EKONOMICHESKOYE POLOZHENIYE I BOR'BA PROTIV FEODAL'NOGO I KOLONIAL'NOGO GNETA), Stalinabad, 1953.
- (12) B. Prasad, op.cit., p.106 (Dr. Prasad is quoting Viceroy to Secretary of State, Telegram, 30th May 1877, F.D.S.P., November 1877, No.106/27). F.D.S.P. is presumably the Foreign Department Secret Proceedings mentioned at the end of Dr. Prasad's bibliography - Translator.
- (13) The word here - analogichnyye - is a mistranslation of the English word "likely". (Translator's note.)
- (14) B. Prasad, op.cit., p.233.
- (15) K.M. Panikkar, ASIA AND WESTERN DOMINANCE, pp.158, 160.
- (16) Ibid., p.157. (Translator's note.)
- (17) Ye.V. Tarle, "Vtoraya mirovaya voyna v krivom zerkale", BOL'SHEVIK, 1949, No.21, p.60.
- (18) "India and her Neighbours." THE TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, 7th September 1956, p.520. Unsigned review.

A F G H A N I S T A N :

T H E P A S H T U N I S T A N P R O B L E M

The following is a slightly abridged translation of an article entitled "New Trends in the Development of Social Ideas in Afghanistan in Connection with the Pashtunistan Problem" by R.T. Akhramovich, which appeared in SOVETSKOYE VOSTOKOVEDENIYE, 1958, No.4. The author unmistakably supports the Afghan point of view in the matter of Pashtunistan as this is in line with Soviet policy.

A historical comment by Sir Olaf Caroe is appended.

. . .

I. The Nature of Afghan Nationalism - II. The Historical Development of Ideas on Pashtunistan - III. The Attitude towards the British - IV. National Rights in Islam - V. The Pashtunistan Problem in the Light of Current Developments.

I. The Nature of Afghan Nationalism

The article starts with a brief description of the progress of Afghan nationalism, after which it continues:

"The policy of the leading circles in the country on questions relating to national self-determination for the Afghans of Pakistan (the Pashtuns, or the so-called 'Pathans') is undoubtedly a manifestation of Afghan nationalism. The great attention which has been paid by these articles to the fate of the Pashtuns beyond their borders has in recent years established itself as a main factor in the foreign policy of Afghanistan and provides interesting material throwing light on the nature of Afghan nationalism. .

"The present survey is based on material published in the Afghan Press between 1953 and 1955. It was precisely in those years that the conflict between the course of foreign policy being followed by sovereign Afghanistan and that policy which the imperialist powers were pursuing in Asia came more clearly into the open."

The author claims that: "In their attempts to draw Afghanistan into the camp of the aggressors, imperialist circles tried to put pressure on her by turning to their account the Afghan-Pakistan quarrel over the Pashtunistan question. The problem of Pashtunistan has been one of the causes of Afghan-Pakistan discord ever since the state of Pakistan was set up in 1947. Defying

the attempts of Pakistan's ruling circles, who regard those regions with a population of five million Afghans (Pashtuns) at one time forcibly included in British India, as a part of Pakistan territory, Afghanistan has come forward in defence of the right of Afghans beyond her borders to national self-determination. At the same time a peaceful settlement of the problem is proposed by means of a universal referendum among the Pashtuns."

After explaining the moral justification claimed by Afghan leaders in defending Afghans abroad from the designs of imperialism, the author describes how the irridentist campaign intensified between 1953 and 1955. "In contrast to the diffuse arguments of the first post-war years, the pages of the Afghan press have now begun to resound with the themes of the national consolidation of the Afghan people and their common historical destiny. By proving that the aspirations towards liberty shown by the Pashtuns of Pakistan are part of a regular historical pattern and by submitting to criticism the 'foreign forces' who endeavour to suppress these aspirations, the Afghan press assigns to the national movement of the Pashtuns a definite place among the peoples of Indo-China, India, Indonesia, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, etc., who are asserting their right to independent development."

II. The Historical Development of Ideas on Pashtunistan

The author says that although "the concept of the common ethnic inheritance of the Pashtuns of Afghanistan and those of the north-western regions of what was British India. . . was turned to good account by the representatives of the Afghan feudal-monarchic state in their defence of Afghan independence against the encroachments of British colonizers. . . the modern approach to the question of the nationality of the Pashtuns beyond the borders differs from the approach which was adopted in the previous period". He explains that whereas Afghan nationalism was previously "dressed out in religious garb. . . emphasis is now being laid on the conditions affecting the origin and development of a people and on the importance of national self-determination as the most important factor of this development.

"Pashtunistan is the name of a land which has been in existence for centuries. The people who live there have all the elements and characteristics of nationhood. . . The name "Pashtunistan" apparently came into being at the time of the partition of India. In fact, however, it has a very ancient history stretching back over the years', wrote the great Afghan scholar and publicist Sadiqullah Rishtin. (ISLAH, 5. 2.53.) In this connection Rishtin's attempt to define the 'elements and characteristics of nationhood' and to give an original analysis of a nation's component parts is highly significant. Applied to the Afghans beyond the borders these 'elements', according to Rishtin, appear as follows: 'All the inhabitants of Pashtunistan are of the same stock, race and origin. . . they also have the same mother-country, and have lived from generation to generation on the same territory, side by side.'"

Map of the Peshawar Region, Northwest Frontier Province, India

Legend:

- · — · — Afghan frontier
- — — Frontier of the province
- - - - - Boundary between the Tribal Area and the Administered Districts
- - - - - Frontiers of the principalities of Dir and Swat
- - - - - Boundaries of areas inhabited by the different tribes in the Tribal Area
- District boundaries
- 1 Gadgus
- 2-9 Tribes akin to the Yusufzais

The article gives further quotations from Rishtin on the common language and customs of the Pashtuns and continues: "In proving and emphasizing the national separateness of the Pashtuns abroad, the Afghan press especially notes their ethnic independence in relation to the other peoples inhabiting Pakistan: 'The land of Pashtunistan stretches from the Khyber to Dera Ghazi Khan, from Gilgit and Chitral to the Arabian Sea. The inhabitants of this land are all Pashtuns and are utterly different in language, customs and culture from the inhabitants of Pakistan'." (ISLAH, 1.10.53.)

After giving a number of quotations from Afghan publications and pronouncements on the subject of the common kinship of all Pashtuns the author continues: "While the authors of a number of publications limit themselves to an examination of the close bonds of kinship between the 'peoples of Afghanistan and Pashtunistan' - two peoples, albeit fraternal ones - others go still further and raise the question of one united Afghan people on both sides of the border. In corroboration of this thesis the Afghan press often includes information on the settlement of Afghan tribes on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border. The territory of Pashtunistan, ISLAH (5. 6.55) points out, 'was torn from the people of Afghanistan and is the homeland of those Pashtun tribes which are to be found in Pashtunistan as well as in Afghanistan'. Mention is made in this connection of the following tribes, among others, 'which live partly on the territory of Afghanistan and partly in the regions of Pashtunistan': the Mohmands, Shinwaris, Wazirs, Kakars, Afridis, Chamkannis, Mangals, Shiranis, and Dauris.

"Among the phenomena which bear witness to the way in which Afghan national consciousness is being actively strengthened, are the decidedly interesting attempts by Afghan publicists to interpret such concepts as the people, the tribe, and the correlation between tribe and people. This is particularly important for the Afghan people, whose social life has preserved down to the present time considerable survivals of a communal-clan structure. Questions of adherence to a particular tribe and its sub-unit (khel) still play an appreciable part in the consciousness and way of life of a considerable number of Afghans. A representative attempt of this kind is the article of the great Afghan writer and publicist and president of the Afghan Academy, Gul Pacha Ulfat, entitled 'Pashtun is not the name of a tribe but of a people'. (ISLAH, 28.12.53.) Observing that a people differs from a tribe in that it is 'a collection of tribes, an association of tribes', Ulfat writes: 'Whoever identifies people and tribe will count the Pashtuns as a tribe.' Meanwhile 'Pashtuns must know that the concept of "Pashtun" is considerably wider than that of a tribe. This concept is not as small and insignificant as some believe who have given it extremely limited consideration.' Acknowledging the presence among the Afghans of stable groups of related tribes such as the Ghilzais and Durranis Ulfat puts them into categories 'broader than the tribe, but narrower than the people'. The author's conclusion reads as follows: 'The Pashtuns are those who are settled in two countries, in Afghanistan and Pashtunistan'.

"In the last few years the Afghan press has been calling for 'a strengthening of national feeling', this being, as the newspaper KABUL (No.376, 1955) points out, a people's 'source of greatness'."

III. The Attitude Towards the British

"A pronounced anti-imperialist trend appears in the treatment given by contemporary Afghan publicists to the question of the role played by the British colonial invaders in severing the Afghan people, now divided into two parts by the state boundary.

"The Afghans beyond the border, writes ISLAH (29. 4.53), 'were separated from us and from the dear land of our birth at the end of the nineteenth century by the artificial and ill-fated boundary called the Durand Line and by the use of oppression and force'."

A number of quotations on this subject follow and the author notes that "particular attention is given to the combined struggle of the Afghans living on both sides of the Durand Line against the British invaders and to the support which the Pathans gave to the cause of Afghan independence".

The article continues: "Afghan publicists have also mentioned the part played by the anti-British actions of the Afghans of north-west India in the all-India liberation movement. Observing that the Pashtuns took an active part 'in the struggle of the people of India against oppression' (ISLAH, 26.12.54), the newspaper ISLAH (2. 9.54) writes, 'Present-day Pakistan received her freedom and independence with the help of these Pashtun tribes'.

"Some authors dwell on the economic results of British colonial rule in the Pashtun regions. 'In the regions of Pashtunistan, when it was under British rule, no industrial progress took place', writes Sadiqullah Rishtin. 'Under the British', he continues, 'the territory of Pashtunistan was used only for building fortifications and quartering garrisons. . . . Because of that Pashtunistan is extremely backward economically and culturally.' (ISLAH, 31. 5.55.) It should at the same time be mentioned that Afghan writers still describe the economic consequences of British colonial rule in the Pashtun regions very seldom and too superficially. However, the mere appearance of even desultory remarks on the economic consequences of British colonialism in Pashtunistan is of interest. . . .

"At the same time the traditions of the anti-imperialist liberation struggle of the Afghans are being popularized, it being described as of vital importance to the whole Afghan people and as serving, now as in the past, the interests of both parts of that people. The need to protect and strengthen the Afghan national state is asserted and serves as a motto for this struggle."

(The remainder of the article is given in full.)

IV. National Rights in Islam

"Afghan publications clearly demonstrate that questions of religion now play a subordinate role in Afghan nationalism, whereas the assertion and defence of the rights of Afghans to independent existence and development occupy the main role. Articles appearing in recent years in Afghan periodicals in defence of the national rights of the Pathans have been remarkable for the unambiguous way in which they referred to attempts at limiting these rights under the pretext of the common religion of the population of Pakistan.

"'Every Muslim people has the right to maintain its national existence', writes ISLAH (23. 4.53). 'In this age of freedom people are not willing to be slaves and will guard and defend against the encroachments of others not only freedom of religious belief, but also their right to political independence and national freedom', explains KHIVAD (22. 9.54). Contemporary Afghan publicists vigorously protest against 'taking advantage of the pure name of Islam to encroach on the rights of other peoples'. (KHIVAD, 22. 9.54.) The Afghan Press is conducting a big campaign with the object of refuting the thesis of the primacy of religious 'unity' over national unity. Such attacks as these mark a definite stage in the development of Afghan nationalism.

"The Afghan press defends its point of view on questions of 'the unity of the peoples in the Muslim world'. Islam is the official religion in Afghanistan. In questions of internal policy the leading circles of the country are careful to preserve the positions held by the Muslim clergy who are able in many ways to influence the course of state affairs. In accordance with the constitution the higher clergy take part in enacting legislation and the legal system functions in conformity with the shariat regulations, and so on. Present-day Afghanistan emphasizes in international questions her devotion to the cause of 'Muslim brotherhood'. At the same time the theory of 'the unity of Muslim countries', as interpreted by the press of Afghanistan and applied to the Pashtun problem, means that such a unity ought not to hinder, but rather to assist the Muslim peoples in the attainment of their national rights. The newspaper ISLAH (17.2, 23. 4.53), for example, makes an appeal for co-operation and sympathy between Muslim peoples while at the same time protesting against the infringement of their national rights. The national principle behind such utterances as these, which echo the contemporary interests of the Afghan nation, is obvious.

"Contemporary Afghan publicists protest against the infringement of the national rights of the Pashtuns beyond the borders 'under the cloak of Islam', and even assert the right of peoples to an independent national development irrespective of a religion's being held in common with other peoples, but at the same time they turn to religion for a confirmation of their new attitudes which echo the interests of a nation in process of consolidation. The press devotes a large amount of space to material where the violation of the national rights of small peoples is described as 'apostacy from Islam'."

V. The Pashtunistan Problem in the Light of Current Developments

"The active part played by contemporary Afghan publicists in the ideological struggle for the national right of Afghans, carries with it the imperative need for these publicists to define where they stand in relation to international events. They analyse the historical conditions which affect underdeveloped countries and the factors influencing the development of these countries as independent nations. This is a highly progressive tendency which testifies to the radical development of social ideas in Afghanistan. It can be clearly traced in Afghan publications of recent years.

"Of great interest in giving an idea of the opinions of Afghan publicists is the article by Ghulam Sarvara Rahimi published in the semi-official organ KHIYAD in 1954 with the title 'The Freedom of Pushtunistan in the Light of the Natural Rights of Man'. (22, 24. 9.54.) The author describes, from an anti-imperialist standpoint, the relations of domination and subjection which exist between the colonial powers and the peoples enslaved by them. Rahimi sees the 'economic foundation of colonialism and exploitation' in the way 'the colonizing powers seek to keep their colonies as sources of raw materials and as markets for selling finished articles at inflated prices'. 'The chief evil in colonialism', the author points out, 'lies in the way the (oppressed - R.A.) country is economically enfeebled, resulting in the spread of poverty and destitution'. The author links the growth of the liberation movement in the East with the national interests of the peoples 'who have resolutely raised their national flags against colonialism and oppression'.

"The vast lands of Asia have been visited by hurricanes of tremendous force', writes ISLAH. 'And as a result of these storms Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and other great states have become free, and the cherished dreams of many peoples have come true.' (4.11.53.) 'The age in which we live is the age of liberation', announced KHIYAD (3. 9.54) in a leading article.

"The Afghan Press emphasizes the national character of the aspirations towards liberty shown by the Pashtuns beyond the borders while seeing their movement as part of a common liberation struggle by peoples against 'colonialism and oppression'. Afghan publications show an anti-imperialist trend when remarking on the link between the national movement of the Pashtuns and contemporary events in the East. 'All those countries', writes KHIYAD (22. 9.54), 'which up to the present time were under an alien yoke, are engaged in a struggle to throw it off. . . So also do the valiant Pashtuns resolutely struggle to attain their freedom'. A firm belief is expressed at the same time in the irresistible nature of the peoples' national liberation movement and the futility of all attempts to suppress it by means of force.

"ISLAH insists that the true way to bring about world-wide security lies in granting peoples their legitimate rights, and declares, 'As long as the rights of peoples are not granted. . . all attempts at establishing peace in

the world will be of no avail. As long as violence exists in the world. . . uneasiness will remain and universal security will be absent'. (16. 7.53.) This attitude is directly linked with the declaration about the need to settle the Pashtunistan problem in accordance with the national demands of the Pashtuns."

. . .

Historical Comment by Sir Olaf Caroe

Afghan irridentism in respect of the Afghan (or Pathan) territories in Pakistan is the theme of this article, which seeks to justify such a policy on historical grounds.

It is very normal and natural that the Afghan (Durrani) rulers of Afghanistan should aim at such an end, for the Afghan (or Pathan) population of Pakistan is in some ways even more Afghan than the Durrani, both ethnically and linguistically. But the historical basis assumed is over-simplified and full of gaps and errors.

At the outset, the variants Pakhtun, Pashtun and Pathan, all at various times used with the affix -stan, should be understood. Most, but not all, of the Afghans in Pakistan are Pakhtuns (the Khataks, Wazirs and Kakars are Pashtuns, however); most but not all of the Afghans in Afghanistan, including the Durrani, are Pashtuns. The difference in this context is one of dialect. For this reason Kabul apologists tend to speak of Pashtunistan, while Peshawar references are to Pakhtunistan. The word Pathan is only the Indian (Hindi and Panjabi) variant of Pukhtuna, the plural of Pakhtun. There is therefore no distinction between Pathan and Pakhtun/Pashtun.

In this article there are two sub-themes:

(a) A Pakhtunistan should be carved out of Pakistan. It is clear from the article that this state is not conceived as including any Pashtuns in Afghanistan, for it is to embrace "the Pashtuns beyond the border" and its limits are stated as "from the Khyber to Dera Ghazi, from Gilgit and Chitral to the Arabian Sea". It thus covers the old North-West Frontier Province in the tribal regions and Baluchistan, or in other words the trans-Indus portion of Pakistan up to the Durand Line.

Incidentally the southern portion of Baluchistan, south of Quetta, is inhabited by Brahui and Baluchi tribes, not Pathans at all. And neither Chitral nor Gilgit are Pathan in population. But all of these, except Gilgit, owed a loose allegiance to the Durrani Empire of Ahmad Shah (1747-73).

(b) When this Pakhtunistan is set up, it would, for reasons of ethnical, linguistic and other affinities naturally join Afghanistan. "Since there is no difference between us, there is no sense in our being disunited." The irridentism is thus proclaimed.

The argument is sustained by stating in effect that Pakistan has succeeded to an unjust inheritance in that all these Pakhtuns were wrenched away from Afghanistan by the British. This is a distortion of history.

In the first place Afghanistan as a state was created only in 1747 by Ahmad Shah, the Saddozai Durrani. Before that the territories of what are now Afghanistan and the Afghan portion of Pakistan were contended for between the rulers of Persia and the rulers of India. Roughly during the period 1525-1740, they were divided between the Safavis of Isfahan and the Mughals of Delhi. Herat and up to the Helmand was held by the Safavis, Peshawar and Kabul by the Mughals, and Kandahar mostly by the Safavis, though the Mughals had it for an aggregate of 50 years. The result of this was that the Western Afghan tribes, of which the Durrani (then called Abdalis) were and are the most important, developed as Persian feudatories with a Persian bias, while the Eastern Afghan tribes, of which the Yusufzais, Mohmands, Afridis and Wazirs are typical, developed with a Mughal bias. And since many of the Eastern Afghans live in secluded mountains, they were never subjected by an empire and retained much more purely their Pakhtu/Pashtu language and characteristics. The Durrani on the other hand, or at any rate their chiefs, became Persianized and lost their Pashtu. There was thus a deep historical cleavage which has been accentuated by later divisions.

Then came Ahmad Shah. Ahmad was a very great man and like other great forces was able to fuse together by his might and power elements which had hitherto been more notable for divergence than unity. He was the henchman of Nadir Shah, the Persian usurper who overturned the Safavis and invaded India, thereby bringing about the beginning of the Mughal downfall also.

As one price of Nadir's Indian campaign the Mughals had to surrender to him Kabul and all the Eastern Afghan country now included in Pakistan. When Nadir was murdered in 1747, Ahmad, the captain of his Afghan bodyguard, seized Nadir's treasure and with it set up an Afghan kingdom at Kandahar, and a year later secured the allegiance of the Eastern Afghans in and around Peshawar. They were led to join his banner by the success of his campaigns, in the course of which he annexed in rather nominal dependence not only all the Eastern Afghans but Lahore, Multan, Sind and Baluchistan. He also conquered the Khurasan province of Persia. The Pakhtunistan theme is in essence a kind of Messianic reversion to the glories of Ahmad's Durrani Empire. That this is its inspiration is shown by the fact that Baluchistan down to the sea, Chitral and Gilgit are claimed in it, though none of them hold Afghan populations. (Its propagandists might as justly claim Lahore, Sind and Multan; the last has al-

ways had a large Afghan population.)

Ahmad's Durrani Empire only outlasted his son Timur (1773-93). After Timur's death the Saddozai dynasty broke up in internecine struggles between his sons. This enabled the Sikhs under Ranjit Singh to wrench away the whole of the Afghan lands between the Indus and the foothills. (They never penetrated into the mountain regions, e.g. Swat, Tirah or Waziristan, but nor did Ahmad.) The article never even mentions the Sikhs, but it is they, and not the British, who took Peshawar, Hazara, Kohat and Bannu and the Derajat from Afghanistan. When in 1826 the Barakzai/Muhammadzai dynasty of Dost Muhammad Khan succeeded to power in Kabul, they were not able to recover Peshawar or the other regions mentioned from the Sikhs. The Sikhs won Peshawar in 1823.

After the two Sikh wars (1846 and 1848-9) the British, having defeated the Sikhs, took over the Sikh kingdom including the trans-Indus portions inhabited by Afghans. Both Sikhs and British were, probably unconsciously, building on historical foundations long laid; that is to say the Eastern Afghans had for centuries looked towards India, and so indeed had Kabul. It was only under Ahmad Shah that for a short time they looked towards a Persianized authority. In other words in the context of history the Muslim successor state of Pakistan would have as much cause for irridentist claims on Kabul as the successor of the Mughals as the Western and Persianized Afghans have for claims on what they call Pashtunistan.

There remains the tribal belt between the Pakistan Frontier Districts (Peshawar etc.) and the Durand Line. These tribes are still mainly interested in keeping their tribal autonomy and avoiding subjection to taxation and administration. Ahmad Shah raised levies from among them, but never taxed or administered them; the Sikhs left them alone; the British established a more or less loose political control over them, never introducing law, police or taxation. The Barakzai dynasties - there have been two since the Saddozais fell - never succeeded in subjecting or penetrating any of them either before or after the establishment of the Durand Line in 1893, although it is true that on many occasions the Afghan Ruler of Kabul was able to encourage them to act as "a prickly hedge" against the non-Muslim British Government, and frequently paid "an Afghan party" allowances, and raised levies. But, whatever the verdict on whether Amir Abdurrahman made the Durand Agreement freely or under duress - and his own published words in his Autobiography suggest the former - there is no doubt whatever that, from Mughal times to the present day, the economic ties of all these tribes, Yusufzais, Tarklanris, Mohmands, Afridis, Orakzais, Wazirs, Mahsuds, Sheranis, Kakars etc., are with the marts towards the Indus, and not with Kabul, Ghazni or Kandahar. In other words they naturally look east, not west.

The sum of the matter is that, while it is perfectly natural that patriotic Afghans should aim at uniting all people of Afghan stock and language in one state, this has only been done in history for a very short time under

Ahmad Shah and his immediate Saddozai successors. When Ahmad Shah's powerful cement was loosened, Eastern and Western Afghans reverted to century-old and traditional cleavages, the former drawn towards the authority holding sway in the Indus Valley. The part played by the Sikhs in all this was vital; and cannot be dismissed. Finally the Pakhtunistan theme entirely overlooks the century during which the Eastern Afghans were introduced to the standards of European thought and practice which are the heritage of the Indo-British synthesis. It is perhaps more likely that the inheritors of this synthesized way of life will draw Kabul into their orbit than that those who remember Sahibzada Abdulqayyum and Dr. Khan Sahib will gravitate towards Durrani feudalism.

A N A F G H A N M A G A Z I N E

The following is a translation of a review entitled "Notes on the magazine AFGHANISTAN in 1957" by Yu.V. Gankovskiy which appeared in SOVETSKOYE VOSTOKOVEDENIYE, 1958, No.4.

. . .

Evidence of the successful growth of Afghan historical scholarship is provided not only by Afghan historians' recently published monographic treatises of Afghan historians, but by these historians' articles in various periodicals and principally in the magazine AFGHANISTAN, the organ of the Afghan "Historical Society". A list confined to the main articles published in AFGHANISTAN in 1957 gives an idea of Afghan scholars' wide range of scholarly interests which covers not only the remote historical past of their country but contemporary events as well.

The first number contains the continuation of Muhammad Ali's work "Aryana", the sections included here (Nos.XI to XIV) dealing with the history of Afghanistan from the third century B.C. to the seventh century A.D. The same number has a brief essay on the development of the fine arts in Afghanistan from the Graeco-Bactrian epoch to the end of the fifteenth century. This essay is from the pen of the well-known historian Ahmad Ali Kohzad, the director of the "Historical Society" and the Kabul Museum.

Ahmad Ali Kohzad is the author of an extremely interesting work on the recent history of Afghanistan published in Nos.2, 3 and 4 of the magazine. A.A. Kohzad tells of the prolonged internecine struggle which broke out in Afghanistan between the successors of Ahmad Shah Durrani. As a result of this struggle the vast empire established by that outstanding Afghan general and political leader disintegrated. A.A. Kohzad's account is illustrated with a number of official documents preserved in the Kabul Museum. He gives, for example a translation of three letters from Muhammad Azim Khan to Aminullah Khan Logari (who became famous at the time of the struggle for Afghanistan's independence 1838-42). In these letters, written in Zu 'l-Qa'dah and Zu 'l-Hijjah 1233 A.H., Muhammad Azim Khan invites Aminullah Khan and his clan to ally themselves to the Barakzais in order to take vengeance on Shah Mahmud Durrani for the murder of the celebrated Fath Khan Barakzai. A.A. Kohzad writes about the rise of Dost Muhammad, bringing to his narration a translation of the full text of the treaty signed on the 10th Rabi' ath-Thani 1242 A.H. between the sons of Painda Khan Barakzai who divided Afghanistan between themselves into independent principalities. The detailed account in No.3 of the uprisings of the viceregents of Kashmir against the power of the

Afghan shahs is very interesting, as in the report of the events connected with the siege of Ghazni by the army of British colonizers at the time of the First Anglo-Afghan War (No.4). Dealing with the same period as this section of A.A. Kohzad's work is the essay on the modern and recent history of Afghanistan by Muhammad Ali, published in No.1. This is an account of events from the end of the First Anglo-Afghan War to the present day.

Apart from papers on purely historical subjects AFGHANISTAN printed in 1957 several articles on ethnography, linguistics and archaeology which included articles by Ahmad Ali Kohzad on the Ghaznavid bronzes (No.2), by Muhammad Nabi Kohzad on the Parachi language (No.2) and by Ahmad Ali Mutamedî on the Afghan popular game of buzkash (No.2). Ahmad Ali Mutamedî is also the author of some notes on the nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes of present-day Afghanistan (No.1), and on the mythology of the Kafirs-Siyah-Push which he collected in the summer of 1953 in the course of a journey through Nuristan (Nos.3 and 4). Muhammad Ali has an article on some customs of the Afghan people, on hospitality, for example, and on their wedding rites and ceremonies (No.3).

The magazine AFGHANISTAN also comments on contemporary events and its pages carry material on the ever-growing friendship and ties between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist camp.

N E W S D I A R Y

AFGHANISTAN, INDIA, PAKISTAN, SINKIANG

The following diary includes items from newspapers and periodicals received during the period April - June 1959 inclusive. In view of the variety of sources from which the information has been collected, contradictions may occur; no responsibility can be taken for the accuracy of the information given but the source is given for each item. Items dealing with Persia are being unavoidably held over till the next issue.

A list of abbreviations used will be found at the beginning of the REVIEW.

. . .

AFGHANISTAN

- April 27th. Protocols on the turnover of merchandize in 1959 and on prices were signed in Moscow after having been initialled in Kabul. The former envisages an increase in trade between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, while the goods involved remain those traditionally associated with Soviet-Afghan trade.
P. 24, 28.4.59, 6.5.59; KP., KT., SK. 25.4.59;
BR., KP., PV. 29.4.59
- M a y 7th. The Afghan Minister of Trade left Moscow for Afghanistan and the Afghan Government delegation left for Leningrad.
P. 8.5.59; KP. 9.5.59; FET. June 1959
- 14th. A photographic exhibition called "The Life of Soviet People" closed after a highly successful week in Kabul with the showing of a film which drew "uninterrupted applause". PV. 16.5.59
- 16th. A contract has been signed in Kabul between the Ministry of Public Works and TEKHNOEKSPORT for the reconstruction of Kabul's airport. BR., PV. 19.5.59
- 22nd. The Prime Minister of Afghanistan, Muhammad Daud Khan, left Moscow after a four-day visit. P. 19-24.5.59
(Also covered by KZ. and Central Asian newspapers.)

28th. An economic and technical cooperation agreement was signed yesterday under the terms of which the Soviet Union will help in the construction of a motor road from Kushka to Kandahar via Herat. Work will begin this year. It is also proposed to build an airfield in the west of Afghanistan.

T. 29.5.59; P., KZ. 30.5.59;
BR., KP., SK. 31.5.59; PV. 27.6.59

Recent development at the river port of Termez in Uzbekistan has made it an important Afghan-Russian trade junction. FET. June 1959

To meet the shortage of food grains in Afghanistan the Soviet Union has promised 40,000 tons of wheat. FET. June 1959

Built with the help of Czech experts, a cement plant went into operation at Jebel-i-Siraj on the 5th May. FET. June 1959

A Soviet anti-locust team has been working in Afghanistan in co-operation with Afghan specialists. P. 20.5.59

June An Afghan parliamentary delegation is to visit the USSR on a Soviet invitation at a date to be announced later. P., PV. 4. 6.59

An oil-pumping station has been installed at the Afghan port of Kizil-kala by workers from the Chardzhou ship repair yard. (See also CAR, Vol.VII, No.1, p.100.) TI. 5. 6.59

INDIA

March 7th. A trade agreement for 1959 was signed in New Delhi between India and Czechoslovakia. Details are given of the commodities involved. FET. May 1959

April 5th. The All-India Conference of Solidarity of the Countries of Asia and Africa ended its work, in which a Soviet delegation had participated. A telegram from Mr. Khrushchev was read at the final session. P. 3,7.4.59; BR. 7. 4.59

5th. Mr. Nehru said that he had declined an invitation from Mr. Khrushchev to visit Russia. T. 6. 4.59

21st. Mr. I.A. Benediktov, deputy chairman of the Soviet planning commission, was named as the new Russian Ambassador in Delhi to succeed Mr. P.K. Ponomarenko. T. 22. 4.59

23rd. Sahib Singh Sokkhey, an "eminent Indian public figure", arrived in Moscow to sit on the International Lenin Prize Committee "for the strengthening of peace between the nations". P. 24.4.59

25th. An exhibition of works by the Photographic Society of Allahabad opened in Moscow. P. 24.4.59

The Azerbaydzhan machine industry recently received from India an order for the delivery in the second and third quarters of 1959 of a large quantity of oil equipment, underground machinery and apparatus. BR. 8. 4.59

A statue of Sarasvati, Indian goddess of wisdom and learning, carved by a Kirgiz has been exhibited at a Kirgiz show in Moscow. SU. 1959, No.110

M a y

6th. A contract was signed in Delhi under which the Soviet Union will assist India in building a 250,000 kilowatt thermal power station at Neiveli (Madras). BR., KP., KT., PV., SK. 9. 5.59
BR., KP. 26.6.59

6th. An Indian Government trade delegation left for Moscow on a five-week tour of East European countries to explore possibilities of expanding exports. T. 7. 5.59

15th. Yuvaraj Karan Singh, head of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, left Moscow at the end of his visit to the Soviet Union with his wife, the Yuvaranee. Since their arrival on the 23rd April they have been to Leningrad, Sochi, Tbilisi, Tashkent, Samarkand, and Stalinabad. P. 1,4,15.5.59 (Also covered by KT. and PV.)

21st. Mr. P.Ya. Antropov, the Russian Minister for Geological Survey and Mineral Resources, accompanied by a Russian geological expert, left Delhi where he has been since the 12th May at the invitation of the Indian Government. He visited Cambay, Baroda, Hoshiarpur and Dehra Dun. Increased Soviet help to the public sector of India's oil industry is expected to result from this visit. P. 13.5.59; KP. 14,23.5.59; T. 22.5.59

29th. A Soviet-Indian agreement was signed in Moscow under which the Soviet Union will assist India in the construction of pharmaceutical and medical equipment and plants. (See also CAR, Vol.VII, No.1, p.104.) NEW TIMES, No.23, 1959

29th. An Indian economic mission, headed by Sardar Swaran Singh Minister for Steel, Mines and Fuel. left the Soviet Union where it has been since the 14th May for talks and visits to various Soviet

industrial enterprises. P. 31.5.59; FET. June 1959. (Also covered in Central Asian Press.)

An Indian educationalists' delegation visited Tashkent from 14th-18th May before going on to Moscow. SK. 16.5.59; PV. 19.5.59

Indian schoolchildren have been visiting a Tashkent school where Hindi is being taught. (See also CAR, Vol.VI, No.1, p.118.) PV. 19.5.59

Mr. Mukhitdinov has presented the Rabindranath Tagore Museum at Shantineketan, West Bengal, with volumes containing Tagore's works in various languages of the Soviet Union. P. 21.5.59; KT., PV. 22.5.59

Professor Prasanta Chandra Mahalanobis, director and organizer of the Indian Statistical Institute in Delhi, arrived in the Soviet Union on 23rd April and has been received by Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Kosygin. (See also CAR, Vol.VI, No.4, p.473.) P. 24.4., 8, 24.5.59
(Also covered in Central Asian Press.)

An Indian industrial mission left Delhi for Moscow to discuss possibilities of Russian economic aid to India during a third five-year plan. T. 22.5.59

Banarasi Das Chaturvedi and Tkakazhi (sic) Shivashankara Pillai from India delivered speeches at the third USSR writers' congress. LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 24.5.59; 2. 6.59

Czechoslovak airlines are to open a route to India. FET. June 1959

The Western Shipping Corporation is expected this year to be operating on the India-Poland route, it was announced in the Lok-Sabha. FET. June 1959

Mr. W. Trampeczynski, Minister for Foreign Trade of the Polish People's Republic, who is touring India, has indicated that a new Polish-Indian trade agreement to follow the current agreement (see CAR, Vol.VI, No.1, p.91 and No.3, p.360) is likely to be spread over a longer period and cover a wider range of items. Details given. FET. June 1959

June 16th. A branch of the Society for Soviet-Indian cultural links has been set up in Azerbaydzhan. BR. 18.6.59

A play by the Indian author Pragdzhi Dossa (sic) entitled ISPORCHENNY REBENOK (The Spoilt Child) is to be acted on the Tashkent stage in the autumn. It will be the first work of an Indian writer dealing with Indian present-day life to appear on the Soviet stage. PV. 30.6.59

A gift of Azerbaydzhani books has been sent from the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaydzhan SSR to the Vice-President of India, Dr. Radhakrishnan. BR. 21.6.59

Elmira Ragimova, a singer from Baku, has just completed a year's study at the University of Fine Arts in India. She was invited to India by Dr. Radhakrishnan, who heard her sing during his visit to the Soviet Union and was much impressed. SU. 1959, No.112

Sholokhov's novel AND QUIET FLOWS THE DON has been published in India in a Bengali translation. LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 18.6.59

PAKISTAN

June 12th. The new Pakistani Ambassador in Moscow, Aga Hilali, presented his letters of credence at the Kremlin. P. 13.6.59


SINKIANG

May 8th. A delegation of sportsmen and women from Kirgizia arrived in Sinkiang for a ten-day visit. SK. 19.6.59

Reports reaching Sikkim stated that Russian troops entered Tibet through Sinkiang. DAILY TELEGRAPH, 21.5.59

June An experimental sheep-farm on the Kunges steppe has, with Soviet aid, made great progress during the twenty years of its existence and has plans worked out up to 1962. DRUZHBA, No.23, 1959

THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
OF
KAZAKHSTAN, KIRGIZIA, TADZHIKISTAN,
UZBEKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN AND AZERBAIDZHAN



- Borders of the U.S.S.R.
- Limits of Union Republics.
- Capitals of Union Republics.
- Railways.
- Canals.
- Canals under construction or projected.
- Sands.
- Main arterial road with pass.

Also published by Central Asian Research Centre

THE TURKIC LANGUAGES OF CENTRAL ASIA: Problems of Planned Culture Contact. A translation of an article entitled "The Turkic Peoples of the USSR: the Development of their Languages and Writing" by Professor N.A. Baskakov, with comments by Dr. Stefan Wurm. 52pp. large post quarto. Price: Six Shillings. (Out of print)

TURKIC PEOPLES OF THE USSR: Their historical background, their languages and the development of Soviet linguistic policy, by Dr. Stefan Wurm. 51 pp. large post quarto. Price: Ten Shillings.

SOME FEATURES OF THE MORPHOLOGY OF THE OIROT (GORNO-ALTAI) LANGUAGE by C.G. Simpson, Reader in Turkish at the University of Durham. 68 pp. large post quarto. Price: Seven Shillings and Sixpence.

A concise description of the main features of the noun, pronoun, postposition and verb of the Oirot language spoken in the Gorno-Altai Autonomous Oblast of the USSR.

ISLAM AND RUSSIA: A detailed analysis of "An Outline of the History of Islamic Studies in the USSR" by N.A. Smirnov (Moscow 1954), with an introduction by Ann K.S. Lambton, Professor of Persian in the University of London. 87 pp. large post quarto. Price: Twelve Shillings and Sixpence.

N.A. Smirnov's book is the most important work on Islamic Studies published in the USSR and is of particular significance at the present time. It is divided into two approximately equal parts dealing with Islamic Studies in Russia before and after the Revolution. The present analysis is reproduced from CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW and is accompanied by a long introduction dealing with the history of Russian relations with Islam. The Bibliography consists of a list of all the works on Islamic and cognate subjects mentioned in the text.

THE TURKISH LANGUAGE OF SOVIET AZERBAIJAN by C.G. Simpson, Reader in Turkish at the University of Durham. 120 pp. large post quarto. Price: Twenty Shillings.

A summary of the grammar of the current literary language of Soviet Azerbaijan together with passages of contemporary literature and extracts from the press.

RUSSIAN WORKS ON AFGHANISTAN. 12 pp. large post quarto. Price: Five Shillings.

A bibliography compiled for the most part from bibliographies and references found in Russian publications in the course of the Centre's study on Afghanistan (CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, Vol. IV, No. 2). It does not claim to be exhaustive, but is believed to be the only one of its kind in existence. Although seldom referred to in Western literature, the amount of Russian writing on Afghanistan is considerable, particularly in relation to Afghan affairs during the past thirty-five years.


RECENT SOVIET SOURCE MATERIAL ON SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA AND THE BORDERLANDS: Issued as a biannual supplement to CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW. Approx. 40 pp. large post quarto. Price: Five Shillings.

This bibliography is limited to certain specific periodicals, about 50 in number, and to new books. Highly technical source material is not included.

In preparation

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE TURKMEN LANGUAGE by G.K. Dulling.

Turkmen, while related to modern Turkish and Azeri in the south-western group of Turkic languages, differs from them in several important points of phonetics, morphology and syntax. This book describes these differences and also contains some notes on the unwritten Turkmen dialects spoken outside the Soviet Republic of Turkmenistan in Persia and Afghanistan.



The above map shows the area covered by CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW in relation to the rest of the USSR. The total extent of the area is about $1\frac{1}{2}$ million square miles. According to the latest available figures the total population is 24,300,000 of whom about 16 millions are estimated to be indigenous.

The total area of Soviet Asia (i.e. the Urals Region, Transcaucasia, Eastern and Western Siberia, Soviet Far East, Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan) is approximately 7 million square miles and the population about 64 million of whom 23 million are estimated to be indigenous. Thus, while the six Muslim Republics together occupy only one fifth of the total area of this region, their indigenous population amounts to two thirds the total indigenous population.